Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

49. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, January 25, 1983, 11 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Preparations for Round III of START

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Vice President
• Admiral Daniel J. Murphy

• State

  • Sec George P. Shultz
  • Dep Sec Kenneth Dam
  • Adm Jonathan Howe

• OSD

  • Sec Caspar W. Weinberger
  • Dep Sec Paul Thayer
  • Dr. Fred C. Ikle
  • Mr. Richard Perle

• OMB

  • Mr. Joseph Wright

• CIA

  • Mr. William J. Casey
  • Mr. Douglas George

• USUN

  • Amb Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

• ACDA

  • Dr. James George
  • General Edward Rowny

• JCS

  • Gen John W. Vessey, Jr.
  • Lt Gen Paul F. Gorman

• WHITE HOUSE

  • Mr. Edwin Meese III
  • Judge William P. Clark
  • Mr. Robert C. McFarlane

• NSC

  • Gen Richard T. Boverie
  • Col Robert Linhard
  • Mr. Sven Kraemer
  • Col Michael O. Wheeler

Minutes

JUDGE CLARK

Mr. President the next round of START will begin on February 2nd. We have a number of issues to be decided, however, most are driven by an essential decision to table a basic elements paper. (Judge Clark then used the Talking Points at Tab A² provided by NSC staff to introduce the meeting. After the introduction, Judge Clark left and transferred the chair for the meeting to Robert McFarlane and Richard Boverie.

GENERAL BOVERIE

(Used Talking Points provided to frame the issue of phasing. See Tab B.)³

SECRETARY OF STATE

I was not Secretary of State when the idea of two phases of negotiations was developed. However, I have studied the idea and it seems to be a reasonable way to proceed. Nothing has happened in negotiations to alter the basic U.S. decision. I support the desire to draw out the Soviets by talking a bit about all the elements of the U.S. approach as proposed by Amb Rowny. However, if the only way to do this is to collapse the phases, I feel that we should not do this. I think that we should be able to approach this issue as suggested by Option 2⁴ and to table the Basic Elements paper without necessarily changing the U.S. position on phases.

MR. McFARLANE

Mr. President, the logic of the current U.S. position is to focus on the most destabilizing systems, ballistic missiles and especially ICBMs. We consciously decided to defer negotiation of both slow flying systems and throw-weight until a later phase. The Soviets now feel that they may have found a weakness in the U.S. position by criticizing us on the grounds that it is not comprehensive. Therefore, the intent in tabling a Basic Elements paper is to show that all things are on the table and will be discussed ultimately, and thus undercut Soviet criticism of the U.S. position.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The only way to achieve the basic U.S. goal in these negotiations is to get a direct handle on the throw-weight. Today the Soviets have [amount not declassified] metric tons of throw-weight as compared to [amount not declassified] metric tons for the U.S. The two phases of negotiations should be collapsed. Unless this is done, a direct limit on throw-weight will never be negotiated and we will certainly never get the Soviets to talk seriously about the reductions to below the existing U.S. levels of throw-weight. Some argue that if we place direct throw-weight limits on the table, they will not be negotiated seriously by the Soviets in any case. This is basically the same position taken by those who refused the zero position in INF. They were wrong, and the Soviets are negotiating the zero position with us today. Our negotiators themselves feel that we should get rid of the artificial distinction between the phases, and I agree with them. Failing to request direct limits on throw-weight, ignores the best way to get to parity.

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

I have concern that in collapsing the phases we would be expected to be able to fill in all the blanks in the U.S. position, and some of those blanks are simply unknown at this time. SLCMs are especially a problem. The JCS do not want to lay out a Basic Elements paper with blanks in all the numerical limits. They are not sure that its in the U.S. interest to let the Soviets fill in the blanks. They are prepared to defer to the negotiators on how to tactically use blanks, but they are reluctant to start down the road until we internally have filled in all the blanks.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

We should be in a position soon to fill in all the blanks. What we are talking about now, however, is whether to table a basic framework. We will certainly need the JCS views on what the specific numerical limits should be, and this of course should be driven by the targets we need to hit. Some items we need not immediately raise. The Soviets have not yet asked us about SLCMs. We need only be able to talk about SLCMs in general terms at this time.

THE PRESIDENT

Do the Soviets exceed us in the number of SLBMs?

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Yes they do, but we have more SLBM warheads then they do. Also the Soviets have more SLCMs deployed today than we do.

AMB ROWNY

All the members of the U.S. Delegation agree on the need to capture the high ground in the negotiations by tabling a Basic Elements paper. We can table this paper with blanks rather than specific numerical limits. All agencies generally felt this was a good idea. The idea of collapsing the phases is a step further than simply tabling a Basic Elements paper. Deciding on whether or not to collapse the phases is a more difficult problem but to do so may help me now in negotiations. You can always instruct me not to give anything away, and I certainly don’t intend to anyway. I lean towards the idea of collapsing the phases, but whether you do this or not I really want to table a Basic Elements paper.

In tabling such a paper, a direct limit on throw-weight would be included, but the number can be left blank. We would make it clear that we would not agree on cruise missile limits unless we also agreed on direct throw-weight limits. The idea of collapsing the phases as a necessary part of tabling a Basic Elements agreement was not part of my original idea. However, it expanded my horizons and is attractive to me now, and we will eventually have to table everything at some point.

SECRETARY OF STATE

If you start negotiating Phase II issues you certainly do collapse the phases. The basic idea we have with respect to the Basic Elements paper was to talk about but not negotiate Phase II items. We want to maintain our concentration on Phase I.

The Soviets will likely come back to us on the issue of cruise missile limits. Cruise missiles are our strong suit. We should not deal on this issue unless we absolutely have to. The implications that cruise missiles have for improving our convential war-fighting capability are just too great. We are way out in front in this area. I would resist strongly to moving Phase II items into Phase I.

If we got the Phase I limits we have proposed, we would make a drastic reduction in throw-weight. As a technical matter I have to ask if throw-weight really is that important. I recognize that it is an important measure, but with improvements in accuracy and other items, it isn’t the only important measure.

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

If you put Phase II items on the table at this time and negotiate on them, you should recognize that you are putting on the table the toughest items to verify.

THE PRESIDENT

I need this oral session to understand the material that I have read. Is the obstacle that we face here that we need to have a treaty on all items before we can have a treaty on any items? Can’t we say that we will accept a treaty on Phase I items only if there is a commitment to negotiate seriously Phase II items?

AMB ROWNY

That is one of the concerns of the Soviets on our phased approach. The Soviets claim that the U.S. just wants them to cut down in areas where the Soviets have strength. They are in effect telling us that they will not agree to talk in these terms until the U.S. is prepared to talk to them about cruise missiles.

SECRETARY OF STATE

If, however, the Soviets accepted our Phase I approach would it not be in our interest to agree to them and pocket them immediately? Is is possible that the Soviets fear U.S. technology and that if we go to our Phase I limits leaving cruise missile technology unconstrained we will be superior to the Soviets?

AMB ROWNY

The Soviets fear that we won’t really cut anything in Phase II.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

If in fact we get to limits on SLCMs, the Soviets will not be able to accept the verification measures we will require. If we ignore direct limits on throw-weight until the end (Phase II) it will be hard to get it back into a treaty at that point. We need to introduce direct limits on throw-weight from the very beginning in any discussions about a treaty. If we do not, we risk getting agreement without equal ceilings on throw-weight. I agree that we should table a Basic Elements paper, but with collapsed phases. The issue of multiple agreements or order of agreements are matters for later discussion.

THE PRESIDENT

You mention SLCMs, don’t we also have SLBMs?

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

All our SLBMs are already covered in negotiations.

THE PRESIDENT

Couldn’t we negotiate a limit on total throw-weight agreement for both sides and then have that limit divided up between SLBMs and SLCMs?

(NOTE: The intent of the President’s question apparently was to ask whether we could not have an aggregate ceiling which includes ballistic missile throw-weight and cruise missile throw-weight/payload. Further, his intent apparently was to ask whether we could have a total limit in which we consider ballistic missile throw-weight (an area of Soviet advantage) and bomber and cruise missile payload/throw-weight (an area of U.S. advantage). If this is a correct interpretation of the President’s question, it was never directly understood or answered.)

AMB ROWNY

Yes, Mr. President we could, but this would get us directly into a negotiation over throw-weight. To get the Soviets to talk about direct limits on throw-weight, I need to offer some limits on something that bothers them. That something is limits on ALCMs. And I need to offer limits on cruise missiles to cut the threat to MX that the large amount of Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight provides.

SECRETARY OF STATE

I disagree. I am not sure a full scale discussion of cruise missiles would be in our interest. We need to nurse along the current U.S. cruise missile programs. The phased approach that is in our current position makes good sense today. It would effect throw-weight (although indirectly).

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The fact that cruise missiles could be discussed does not mean that we should agree to immediate limits on cruise missiles. All things are on the table, and the fact that cruise missiles are on the table is not a serious problem.

ROBERT McFARLANE

Mr. President, when we began these negotiations the Soviets were at [amount not declassified] MKG of throw-weight while we were and are at [amount not declassified] MKG. To ask the Soviets to go to an equal ceiling at or below our current level ([amount not declassified] MKG) would be a real problem. Your original decision which was reflected in our phased approach, was to get to this low equal ceiling indirectly at first. Our Phase I goals would move the Soviets from about 1400 ballistic missiles to 850 ballistic missiles. This would cut their overall ballistic missile throw-weight significantly. The idea of tabling the Basic Elements paper was to undercut Soviets criticism that our position is not comprehensive.

Ed Rowny wants to put all items on the table. What should Ed say with respect to cruise missiles and throw-weight?

SECRETARY OF STATE

I think he should say vague things and keep all numerical limits blank.

AMB ROWNY

That was my original idea.

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

We must remember that SLCMs are different from ALCMs. ALCMs are clearly strategic. While they could be launched from a number of different type of aircraft, we are planning to deploy them as strategic systems. The Soviets will be able to recognize them as such. SLCMs are a different problem. They are not obviously strategic weapons. Verification will be a really big problem with respect to SLCMs.

[1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

The U.S. SLCM is not a strategic weapon; it really is an INF weapon. I don’t propose putting SLCM in the INF negotiations, but it is important to see the difference between SLCM and ALCM. We certainly don’t want U.S. SLCM lumped into agreement packages, especially in overall weapons or throw-weight agreements.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

We do not suggest putting SLCM in the negotiations at all at this time. But like throw-weight, we can’t keep it off the table.

I don’t believe we will get to meaningful limits on throw-weight in an indirect way.

THE PRESIDENT

Is it correct that the Soviets have not brought up SLCM?

AMB ROWNY

They have only addressed ALCM, not SLCM. However, they know we plan to buy 4,000 ALCMs. [3 lines not declassified]

THE PRESIDENT

(If this is true) would they not want to focus on (total numbers of) bombers?

AMB ROWNY

Yes. And that is why I think we should be prepared to negotiate to 350 total bombers plus some loading limits on the ALCMs on the bombers.

ROBERT McFARLANE

If I may summarize, it appears that all agree that we should table a Basic Elements paper as suggested with all elements included (cruise missiles and throw-weight). We disagree on whether to collapse the phases of our current position and negotiate on all issues at this time.

Could we now turn to a discussion of the specific limits involved (on slow flying systems and throw-weight) if you were to decide to negotiate.

GENERAL BOVERIE

(Used Talking Points provided to frame the issue of bomber and ALCM loading limits. See Tab B.)⁵

Are there any agencies who wish to change or elaborate on their positions on these issues as listed in the paper?

If there are none, can we move to a discussion of the issue of SLCM? (Used Talking points provided to frame the SLCM issue. See Tab B.)⁶

SECRETARY OF STATE

I, of course, must defer to the Joint Chiefs for guidance in this area. The cruise missile area is one in which we have a lot going for us. I feel it is a little premature to include this in any final position. I think we should stay very vague on SLCM.

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

It is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs that we should go into negotiations with no limits on SLCMs at this time. In other words we support Option 5.⁷ But to admit that sooner or later we may wish to negotiate some limits soon is okay.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

We feel we shouldn’t limit ourselves. Now is not the time to put numbers in on this issue. This question takes me back to the issue of throw-weight. If we propose SLCM limits, the Soviets will seize the high-ground by noting the potential high cruise missile numbers that we will need to counter the Soviet advantage in throw-weight.

AMB ROWNY

I am loath to enter discussion on this area without knowing where U.S. interests lie. I agree that we should remain very vague on this point.

I am concerned, however, and wish to alert you to the fact that the Soviets may try to put SLCM in the INF negotiations. This would certainly hurt us in our dealings with the European allies. If we give certain allies the option of putting missiles at sea rather than on shore it would be very attractive to them. I also don’t want to sabotage Nitze by putting this problem into his INF negotiations.

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Verification of SLCMs will, of course, be very difficult.

THE PRESIDENT

What is the state of the art in Soviet defenses against cruise missiles? Are they capable of defending against them?

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

They are developing defenses.

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The Soviets are spending a lot in this area. It is an easier problem than defending against ballistic missiles.

THE PRESIDENT

What happens if we find out later that it’s not in our interest to be as dependent upon cruise missiles as we may be?

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

They will certainly show up on Soviet radars.

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

But the answer to your concern, we think, is stealth technology. Stealth is the counter.

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

We estimate the Soviets will not have a capability until into the 1990s.

ROBERT MCFARLANE

I think that issue is illuminated. Couldn’t we go on to the remaining issues in this paper.⁸

GENERAL BOVERIE

(Used Talking Points to frame the remaining issues noting that the IG had provided concensus recommendations on each of these. He recommended that the IG concensus recommendations be accepted. See Tab B.)⁹

(General Boverie then turned to the Basic Elements paper¹⁰ and used the Talking Points provided to frame a short review of that paper. See Tab C.)¹¹

Ambassador Rowny would you care to describe how specifically you would see using the Basic Elements paper.

AMB ROWNY

I would use it to show that we are in earnest in negotiating all aspects of this problem. In no case would I fill in the blanks with our bottom line position before getting approval. In any case I would initially table higher numbers before tabling our bottom line. In summary I would use the paper with all blanks or with a few key blanks.

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Am I correct in assuming that we need more work on the bracketed language?

ROBERT MCFARLANE

Yes, the language will have to be reconciled with our decisions.

GENERAL BOVERIE

(Used Talking Points to frame a discussion of the draft delegation instructions. See Tab D.)¹²

AMB ROWNY

I really need the guidance provided in paragraph 6 of the instructions concerning CBMs. I specifically need to be authorized to table a CBM providing for the notification of major military exercises. We still have problems concerning the criteria to use within the CBM. We need resolution of these technical problems as early as possible.

VICE PRESIDENT

Do the CBM proposals you are discussing or negotiating relate to the proposals made by Senators Jackson and Nunn?

AMB ROWNY

We are not discussing the proposed crisis center. The crisis center idea is being studied in the Pentagon.

VICE PRESIDENT

To me it seems like a good step forward. Where does it stand?

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

We see some promise in the CBMs area. We are studying the Senators’ ideas along with other items which we have proposed, for example, improvements in the hotline. We need to move out ahead on such measures.

VICE PRESIDENT

The more we can do in this area the better.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

We will be sending over papers on this subject soon. We have no problem with some of the new twists introduced by Senator Jackson, and we are considering some alternatives.

ROBERT MCFARLANE

The Department of Defense has tackled the problem well.

Mr. President we will give you time to reflect on these issues and provide you a decision document soon. I guess all that is left is to wish Ed Rowny well in his negotiations.

THE PRESIDENT

I guess that’s all we have done today, because I don’t think that up to this point we have helped you much.

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

I will solve the exercise problem for you this afternoon.

NOTE: The meeting ended at 1230. No specific decisions were reached during the meeting.

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR–103, NSC 00072. Top Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Linhard and Kraemer. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Council Room.
2. Attached but not printed.
3. Attached but not printed.
4. Option 2 involved keeping separate phases. See Tab A, Document 48.
5. Attached but not printed.
6. Attached but not printed.
7. Option 5 involved a JCS-led “study of the military and verification problems associated with SLCM limits, with a view to proposing more meaningful and effective SLCM limits to the NSC by the middle of the third round.” See Tab A, Document 48.
8. The remaining issues, on which the START IG had come to a consensus, were limits on mobile ICBMs, Phase II throw-weight ceilings, and throw-weight counting rules. See Tab A, Document 48.
9. Attached but not printed.
10. Attached but not printed.
11. See Tab A, Document 48.
12. Attached but not printed.