—Would tabling such a Basic Elements paper change the US “phased”
approach to negotiations?
—What should be the US position on key remaining elements of the US
position (i.e., limits on bombers and cruise missiles and direct limits
on throw-weight)? (The paper at Tab A addresses these questions.)
—What latitude should be provided in the Instructions to the Delegation
(Provided at Tab C)3 on using the
Basic Elements paper? (S)
The most fundamental issue involves making absolutely clear what impact
tabling the Basic Elements paper is intended to have on the current
“phased” approach to negotiations.
—One agency (State) feels that by tabling such a paper we would simply
“show a little ankle” on the phase II issues of cruise missiles and
direct throw-weight limits. State would not authorize the delegation to
begin negotiating these phase II items until completing phase I. This
[Page 152]
would keep the existing US
position and maintain our emphasis on working the most destabilizing
elements (ballistic missiles) first.
Tab A
Paper Prepared by the Strategic Arms Reduction
Talks Interagency Group5
SUMMARY OF MAJOR ISSUES FOR THIRD
ROUND OF START
This paper summarizes key points regarding issues for the next round
of START negotiations. Where
options refer to limitations under consideration, the proposed
alternatives should be considered as internal guidance and not
necessarily as recommendations for proposals to be tabled in the
third round. For the implementation of these options, this paper
should be considered in the context of the draft Basic Elements
paper and third-round instructions.
I. Phasing
All agencies agree that, as recommended by the US START delegation, we should move
away from our current approach of negotiating Phase I issues before
Phase II issues and that we should be willing to discuss all issues
comprehensively, but only on the condition that the Soviets are
willing to be equally comprehensive by addressing seriously all of
what are now described as Phase II issues (e.g., direct limits on
throw-weight) and not merely the issues of greatest interest to the
Soviets (e.g, cruise missile limits).
There is disagreement over whether the US should propose to implement
START reductions in two
discrete phases, or whether there should be a single phase of
reductions. Whether to retain our ultimate goal of equal levels of
throw-weight at below the current US level is not at issue.
Option 1: Single Framework for Discussion of All
Issues
We should give up the notion of phases, whether in the sense of
negotiations or reductions, and prepare a comprehensive, integral
position for the third round. This option could be implemented by
tabling a Basic Elements document. Such a procedure would have a
number of advantages.
First and foremost, it maximizes the leverage which we possess by
virtue of the Soviets’ interest in limiting cruise missiles. If we
were to propose constraints for cruise missiles, even without
indicating any
[Page 154]
numbers,
without linking them directly to our second phase goals, we must
expect the Soviets to “pocket” our willingness to discuss cruise
missiles and to import the proposed constraints into the first
phase. Indeed, it would hardly be credible to maintain that the US
be allowed to build now a cruise missile force that would exceed the
ceiling we would be willing to accept eight or ten years hence. The
Soviets would attempt to move our proposed cruise missile
constraints into the first phase, thus depriving us of the necessary
leverage for achieving our second phase goals. Were this to happen,
we would duplicate the mistake we made in allowing the ABM restraints of SALT I to take precedence over the
restraints on strategic offensive arms, a procedure which virtually
guaranteed that we would not achieve the goal of limiting the Soviet
strategic offensive build-up to non-threatening levels.
By proposing a single set of restraints, we would obviate the need to
address the question of whether we can, consistent with military
requirements, propose ballistic missile and ballistic missile
warhead limits below the 850 and 5000 level. The possibility of
proposing further reductions in these categories now appears remote.
In any case, it would hardly seem a realistic use of our time and
energy to concern ourselves with the preparation of such a
proposal.
This procedure also serves our political interests in that it permits
us to come forward with a new position that is conducive to progress
in the negotiations while retaining maximum negotiating leverage. It
rebuts Soviet criticism of the US proposal as a non-comprehensive,
non-serious proposal, which concentrates on US concerns while
relegating Soviet concerns to a meaningless second phase. By
explicitly addressing ballistic missile throw-weight, an area of
Soviet advantage, we help explain the priority the US has placed on
ballistic missiles in general, and on heavy ICBMs in particular. Otherwise,
concentration on such demands as preferential constraints on heavy
ballistic missiles risk appearing as an arbitrary attack on the way
in which the Soviets have happened to structure their forces. The
required Soviet reduction in throw-weight (65%) is comparable to the
reductions the Soviets would have to make in ICBM warheads (58%), ballistic
missiles (64%) and heavy ICBMs
(65%), under our current Phase I proposal.
In the context of a single proposal, we should table both our
proposed framework for constraints on ALCMs and our second phase goal of a direct
throw-weight limit of approximately 1.8 million kg in order to make
explicit our right to a ballistic missile force equal to that of the
Soviet Union in destructive capacity. Our emphasis on throw-weight
at this point will facilitate the negotiation of an agreement which
accommodates our requirements in the bomber/cruise missile area. The
importance of throw-weight as a measure of the destructive
[Page 155]
capability of a ballistic
missile has been emphasized by the recent debate concerning the
survivability of CSB. The sole unit of account which captures the
ability of the Soviets to adapt their ballistic missile force to the
task of threatening CSB is throw-weight. A direct limit on
throw-weight would considerably simplify our current approach by
allowing us the option of eliminating current indirect constraints
on throw-weight (i.e., 210 heavy and medium ICBMs, with a sub-limit of 110 medium
ICBMs).
While we would propose a unified set of constraints on strategic
forces, we could, of course, take into account the practical
problems of effecuating large reductions in forces by providing for
gradual reductions in all units of account, in accordance with a
schedule of agreed, equal intermediate ceilings.
Option 2: Separate Phases
Combining Phases I and II would establish a direct limitation on
throw-weight (specifically the 1.8 million kg ceiling) as a US
objective with the same weight and visibility as our other goals of
equal ceilings on deployed ballistic missiles and warheads. To
propose that the Soviets reduce their current throw-weight level by
65%, while the US reduces little or not at all, would be construed
by the Administration’s critics, both here and in Europe, as a new
and non-negotiable demand. These critics would invoke the
throw-weight limit as evidence of a lack of seriousness and
responsibility in the President’s arms control policies. Thus,
collapsing the phases would undermine US credibility at the very
moment when our objective should be to sustain the support of the US
public and our Allies. Any decrease in political support for the
Administration’s arms control policies would undercut our position
and leverage at the START
negotiations.
The first phase of the US START
proposal focuses on destabilizing systems by seeking equal ceilings
in the most easily understood indicators of strategic power:
ballistic missiles (particularly ICBMs) and their warheads. Through specific limitations
on heavy and medium ICBMs, the
Phase I proposal is intended to reduce Soviet throw-weight to no
more than 2.5 million kg (one-half the current Soviet level).
Therefore, the ceilings in Phase I would provide a dramatic
reduction in Soviet throw-weight as well as missiles and warheads.
Moreover, because we are seeking in Phase I direct limits on the
most destabilizing systems themselves, this approach is easier to
explain and defend than direct limits on throw-weight, which is not
a clearly understood concept outside the strategic community.
Furthermore, it is questionable whether direct throw-weight limits
deserve the same prominence in our START proposal as the other limitations which we seek.
Because of improvements in accuracy and
[Page 156]
yield-to-weight ratios, throw-weight is a
factor of declining importance as a measure of strategic power.
Despite their 250% advantage in throw-weight, no one claims that the
Soviets are two-and-a-half times stronger than the US. In addition,
throw-weight is more difficult to verify than limits on deployed
missiles and warheads and is even difficult to define and to
count.
As a Phase II objective, an equal throw-weight ceiling of 1.8 million
kg is easier to understand and to defend. Achieving our Phase I
objectives would result in a major reduction in Soviet throw-weight
and would make such a ceiling a more realistic goal for future
reductions. Seeking a direct throw-weight limit at the same time as
our other Phase I objectives, however, would make it more difficult
to achieve our more immediate and important goals of limitations on
deployed missiles and warheads.
For these reasons, the President decided last year against including
a direct throw-weight limit in the first phase of START. The result was a START proposal which, because of its
fairness, ambitious objectives, clarity and coherence, has won the
support of Allied governments and most of the US public. The phased
framework of our proposal was an important element in gaining that
support. Moreover, phasing is a source of negotiating leverage which
we hope to utilize—through the Basic Elements approach—to draw the
Soviets out on such as ballistic missile warhead limits. Combining
the phases would be a major departure from our present framework
which is not warranted by any developments in the negotiations; it
should not be undertaken without careful consideration of our
overall position in the START
talks.
|
IG
Participants |
| Options |
ACDA |
JCS |
OSD |
State |
Amb Rowny |
| 1. Combine the phases |
X |
|
X |
|
X |
| 2. Separate phases |
X |
|
|
X |
|
II. Limits on Heavy
Bombers and Air-Launched Cruise Missiles
A. Bomber Limits
Current guidance sets a goal of a ceiling of
250 heavy bombers in Phase II. This ceiling, however, would limit US
flexibility in responding to unconstrained Soviet air defenses,
possible modifications in US ballistic missile programs and the
outcome of negotiations on ballistic missile limits. All agencies,
therefore, agree that we cannot now propose a heavy bomber limit
below 350, either under a single-phase approach or in the second
phase of the alternative approach.
Option 1: Limit of 350 Bombers
This limit would provide the US and the USSR additional flexibility to meet bomber
requirements. It would preclude any proposal to reduce
[Page 157]
below 350 heavy bombers in
Phase II at this time. Because of the relationship between heavy
bomber requirements and the permitted level of ballistic missile
systems, this limit may be reassessed on the basis of the ballistic
missile warhead ceiling. The bomber limit, however, would still be
affected by the need to take into account unconstrained Soviet air
defenses and the proposed limitations on ALCMs.
Option 2: Missile/Bomber Aggregate
This would set a combined limit on the heavy bombers and deployed
missiles (1200) and a sub-limit on deployed missiles (850). Both
sides would be allowed to trade ballistic missiles for bombers, but
not vice versa. This approach could be adopted for either a
single-phase approach or for both phases of a two-phase approach. It
could also accomodate a higher Phase II bomber ceiling as in Option
1.
Option 2 would provide additional flexibility to expand the US bomber
force in response to future challenges (at the expense of ballistic
missiles), without necessarily increasing the proposed bomber
ceiling. However, the adoption of a combined bomber/missile
aggregate would involve a significant change in the framework of our
position and would be viewed by some as movement toward the Soviet
proposal and SALT II. The Soviets
may use this step to support their proposals for total freedom to
mix (i.e., to trade bombers for missiles as well) and a single
warhead aggregate (including bomber weapons).
Option 3: Phase II Goal of Further Reductions
Conditional upon the decision regarding phasing, the US would, under
this approach, abandon the internal objective of 250 heavy bombers
but would not set an alternative level. As indicated under Option 1,
our Phase II bomber requirements would depend upon several factors
which cannot be predicted at this time, such as the permitted level
of ballistic missile systems and improvements in Soviet air
defenses. Rather than specify a Phase II limit of 350 bombers at
this time (which would preclude Phase II reductions), Option 3 would
treat heavy bombers (internally and with the Soviets) in the same
way as Phase II limits on ballistic missiles and warheads, i.e., we
would be willing to discuss further limits and reductions in Phase
II if national security requirements permit.
B. Limit on ALCM
Loadings
Current guidance is that the US should not seek special limits on
ALCMs themselves, that ALCM carriers should not be subject
to limits beyond those applicable to other heavy bombers, and that
we should not propose limits on the maxi-bombers, and that we should
not propose limits on the maximum number of ALCMs which could be carried
[Page 158]
on a heavy bomber. In the
START negotiations, the
USSR has pressed for limits on
cruise missiles. Moreover, the Soviets and our other critics have
charged that, without limits on cruise missiles, the US START proposal is not
“comprehensive.” The issue, therefore, is whether to maintain
current guidance or to set a limit on ALCM loadings. These limits would apply in the second
phase of a two-phase agreement, if we should adopt the approach
involving two phases of reductions.
Option 1: No Specific Limits at
This Time
This option would limit ALCMs in
the same way that we propose to limit other bomber weapons, i.e., by
limiting the number of heavy bombers. This would provide more
flexibility to adjust ALCM
deployments to respond to improvements in unconstrained Soviet air
defenses and reinforce our negotiating emphasis on more
destabilizing ballistic missiles. Proposing an ALCM limit at this time could move
the US closer to including bomber weapons in an overall nuclear
weapon ceiling. In addition, the Soviets would probably attempt to
bargain downwards any US-proposed limit on ALCMs.
This option would not, however, provide additional US leverage in the
negotiations and would make achievement of a START agreement much more difficult.
It would also leave our proposal open to criticism for a lack of
“comprehensiveness.” In addition, Soviet ALCM deployments would be similarly unconstrained.
Option 2: Average Loading of 28 ALCMs per Heavy Bomber, Maximum of 20
ALCMs on Existing Bomber
Types
This option is consistent with currently planned US ALCM deployments. The Soviets have
already accepted this loading limit once on ALCM-carrying heavy bombers (in
SALT II), so this option would
be less likely to be the subject of serious public criticism than
some alternative options. It would, however, draw the US into
negotiations on one type of bomber weapon, which the Soviets would
seek to expand to limit all bomber weapons.
|
IG
Participants |
| Options |
ACDA |
JCS |
OSD |
State |
Amb Rowny |
| Phase II Bomber Ceiling |
|
|
|
|
|
| 1. 350 Bombers |
X |
X |
|
|
X |
| 2. Missile/Bomber Aggregate |
X |
|
|
|
|
| 3. Goal of Phase II Reductions |
X |
|
|
X |
|
| ALCM
Loadings |
|
|
|
|
|
| 1. No Limits |
|
|
X |
|
|
[Page 159]
| 2. Avg. Loading of 28, Max of 20 on Existing Types |
X |
X |
|
X |
X |
III. Limits on
Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs)
[Less than 3 lines not declassified] The
USSR has deployed more than
1300 SLCMs, most of which are
under 600 km range and can carry either nuclear or conventional
payloads. In addition, the Soviets are developing a long-range
SLCM (with a range above 2500
km) for land attack.
Current US guidance is to defer discussion of constraints on
“slow-flying systems” other than heavy bombers (i.e., possibly
including SLCMs) until Phase II.
In the START negotiations, the
USSR has proposed a ban on the
deployment of cruise missiles (including SLCMs) over 600 km range, which all agencies agree is
unacceptable to the US. The issue, therefore, is whether to propose
a Phase II limit on SLCMs which is
more acceptable to the US.
Option 1: No Limits
This approach would permit the US unlimited flexibility to deploy
SLCMs. The primarily tactical
roles of US SLCM platforms would
prevent our nuclear SLCMs from
being committed to the SIOP
(although they could perform a strategic reserve role), so it may
not be appropriate to limit them in START. Moreover, this approach recognizes the
significant monitoring and verification problems associated with the
other options. The alternative approaches, therefore, could have the
effect of constraining the US while the USSR may be able to evade the limitation.
On the other hand, a refusal to discuss SLCM limits would give the Soviets a propaganda
opportunity to attack the US position for leaving a “loophole” which
would allow a major increase in strategic capability. Also, the
Soviets could exploit the lack of SLCM limits to deploy a large number of long-range
nuclear SLCMs for land attack. If
the US were to argue that SLCMs
should not be limited because of their tactical (as opposed to
strategic) role, this would undermine our position that weapons
should be subject to limitation on the basis of their capabilities,
and not their missions.
Option 2: Ban All Nuclear SLCMs
This option would exempt from limitation the large majority of US
SLCMs (which will not be
nuclear-armed) and would ban the Soviet nuclear SLCM threat to the US and to surface
ships. This option would require the Soviets to dismantle some
portion of their SLCM force. (We
do not know how many Soviet SLCMs
are nuclear-armed.) This option
[Page 160]
is the most consistent with our INF position and would be the most
politically appealing to domestic and international critics of US
arms control policy.
However, our ability to distinguish between nuclear and conventional
SLCMs with NTM alone is poor.
Even with intrusive verification measures, the US could abandon its
nuclear SLCM program with little
assurance that the Soviets would comply with the ban or that we
could detect Soviet cheating.
Option 3: Numerical Limit on All SLCM Platforms
This option would establish a relatively verifiable indirect
limitation on SLCM deployments by
setting a ceiling on SLCM
platforms. Presuming that all submarines would have to be counted as
SLCM platforms (for
verification reasons), this option would also indirectly constrain
the Soviet submarine fleet. Those surface ships with a SLCM capability (as determined by
NTM) would also be counted. As the Soviets would have a greater
number of SLCM platforms than the
US, this option would allow the US considerable flexibility to
expand deployments of nuclear and conventional SLCMs.
However, as a simple platform limit would contain no limit on SLCMs themselves, this approach would
appear to be a purely cosmetic limitation. Moreover, a permissive
limit (e.g., 300 or more vessels) would lead critics of US arms
control policy to add the high number of permitted SLCM platforms to our proposed
ceilings on bombers and deployed missiles in order to undercut our
public focus on significant reductions. Also, because of the
asymmetry in platform numbers, a platform limit would be difficult
to negotiate.
Option 4: Limit Nuclear-Armed SLCMs to Equal Levels on the Basis of Average Loading
per Platform
The number of platforms and the average loading limit could be set to
accommodate planned US SLCM
deployments. There are major uncertainties in our estimates of the
number of Soviet nuclear SLCMs.
However, to the extent that the Soviets comply with such a limit,
this option would capture a large number of existing Soviet SLCMs and would presumably constrain
the future Soviet threat to the US.
This option would be the most difficult to verify, as it would
combine requirements to monitor SLCM payload (nuclear/conventional) and average loading
per platform. Moreover, because maximum potential SLCM loadings would be significantly
greater than the average loading limit, the Soviets would have a
large breakout potential. (However, if the agreed loading limit is
consistent with US deployment plans, the net national security
impact would probably not be less favorable to the US than the
absence of SLCM limits.)
[Page 161]
Option 5: Seek More Meaningful and Effective Limit
As indicated above, there are significant military, political and
verification problems with the various SLCM limitations under consideration. On the other
hand, a refusal to limit SLCMs
would undercut the seriousness of the US START proposal and would leave the Soviets with a major
capability to circumvent an agreement.
Under this approach, the JCS would
take the lead on a study of the military and verification problems
associated with SLCM limits, with
a view to proposing more meaningful and effective SLCM limits to the NSC by the middle of the third round.
If this option is approved, we would need to decide how to treat the
issue of SLCM limits until the
NSC decides on an approach.
There are two major alternatives:
a) The US would express (publicly and to the Soviets) a willingness
to accept SLCM limits but would
defer a specific proposal.
b) The US would not express a willingness to accept SLCM limits until the difficult
problems associated with this issue are resolved. If the Soviets
raise the SLCM issue in the third
round, the US delegation would confine its discussion to
verification issues, without committing the US to limit SLCMs in START.
|
IG
Participants |
| Options |
ACDA |
JCS |
OSD |
State |
Amb Rowny |
| 1. No limits |
|
|
|
|
|
| 2. Ban all nuclear SLCMs |
|
|
|
|
|
| 3. Limit all SLCM
platforms |
|
|
|
|
|
| 4. Limit nuclear SLCMs
on basis of avg. loading per platform |
|
|
|
|
|
| 5. Seek different approach |
|
|
|
|
|
IV. Limits on Mobile
ICBMs
The Soviets have implied in the negotiations that they intend to
deploy mobile ICBMs. At least one
of their ICBMs in development
would be suitable for mobile deployment. Soviet development of
mobiles could have a positive impact on crisis stability (by
reducing Soviet ICBM
vulnerability) and could reduce the Soviet throw-weight potential.
Counting Soviet mobile ICBM
launchers, however, is much more difficult than for fixed launchers,
and Soviet deployment of mobiles would greatly complicate US
targeting requirements.
[Page 162]
The IG recommends that we neither
propose to ban nor to permit mobile ICBMs at this time but continue our current position
that mobile ICBMs, if allowed in
START, must be accompanied by
measures to ensure effective verification. We are developing a
comprehensive verification package to enhance our ability to monitor
Soviet mobile deployments, and this verification package should be
an intrinsic part of our position. Furthermore, the US delegation
would use Soviet interest in mobiles as leverage to achieve our
other negotiating objectives.
V. Phase II
Throw-Weight Ceiling
The US proposal for Phase II limits includes direct limits and
reductions to equal levels of ballistic missile throw-weight below
current US levels. The current US throw-weight level is
approximately 1.9 million kg.
The IG recommends that we adopt a
Phase II objective of an equal throw-weight ceiling on deployed
ballistic missiles of just below 1.9 million kg, consistent with the
throw-weight definition and counting rule described below. This
level is consistent with projected US force structures under START.
VI. Throw-Weight
Counting Rule
The IG recommends that, for existing
types of ballistic missiles, throw-weight should be determined on
the basis of the maximum throw-weight demonstrated in any flight
test. There is concern, however, that in the future the Soviets may
attempt to circumvent direct limits on throw-weight by testing their
missiles with less throw-weight than they are capable of
carrying.
The IG therefore recommends that, for
new types of ballistic missiles, the maximum demonstrated
throw-weight should be compared to potential throw-weight for a
reference range, and that the larger of the two values should be
assigned to the particular missile. This approach would be
accompanied by collateral constraints which would result in less
than 10% uncertainty in monitoring Soviet ballistic missile
throw-weight.
