50. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)1
[Omitted here is discussion not related to START.]
We had an important NSC meeting today2 to determine the instructions to the delegation returning to the START negotiations. The crucial issue was whether or not to collapse the two phases of the negotiations into a single phase. This has to do with the question of cruise missiles and throw-weight, the two principal topics in the second stage. Secretary Shultz argued forcibly that it would be a mistake to collapse the two phases, because we did not want at this time to give away anything on cruise missiles, whereas if we pushed on throw-weight, as DOD, which is proposing the collapsing of the stages, wishes, we would inevitably find ourselves negotiating away something on cruise missiles. The cruise missile discussion had largely to do with SLCMs, since almost everybody agrees that some negotiations about ALCMs can be undertaken without foreclosing conventional options for the future, [Page 174] which is the principal reason why one would be reluctant to enter into these discussions now anyway.
On the whole, I found the discussion not very well conducted. It kept slipping off the track, particularly as Cap Weinberger argued what I considered quite unreasonable lines of analysis (even though his conclusion was not so controversial). In short, I found his approach totally illogical, although I do not find it illogical to want to collapse the two stages. Essentially what he was saying was that we could get the Soviets to negotiate on throw-weight without them getting us to negotiate at all on cruise missiles. I think this is totally unrealistic and makes one wonder whether the true purpose of the DOD proposal is not simply to make negotiations, or at least any agreement, impossible.3
[Omitted here is discussion not related to START.]
- Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982—Sept. 1983. Secret. Dictated on January 25.↩
- See Document 49.↩
- On January 31, Dam dictated a personal note that read in part: “My arms control discussion group met this morning at 10 a.m. We discussed the concept of negotiability in arms control agreements. Richard Perle is of the view that the State Department is too prone to table solid, justifiable proposals in arms control negotiation on the grounds that they are unnegotiable. His view is that posture is neither necessary nor desirable. First, it is not desirable, because it does not give any room for settlement of the negotiation by proposing something that could be bargained away. In any event, the issue comes up in connection with verification because of the fear that anything that is proposed on verification that is not achieved will be difficult to justify in the Congress at the time of ratification. But Perle argues that in connection with SALT and the problems that created the greatest difficulty on Capitol Hill—the Backfire and heavy missiles—the negotiators did not even raise the issues with the Russians, and their failure to do so did not protect the SALT agreement. We also began a discussion, to be carried on next time, of the issues in connection with onsite inspection.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982—Sept. 1983.)↩