3. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union1
304512. Subject: Soviet reply to Rostow/Bessmertnykh conversation of August 21.2 Ref: State 229568.3
1. Secret–entire text.
2. In the course of a luncheon a deux at the Soviet Embassy at Dobrynin’s invitation on 11 November, the Soviet ambassador gave ACDA director Rostow a quote official unquote answer on instructions to the questions Rostow put to Bessmertnykh on August 21 (see Reftel).
3. Dobrynin made it clear that the reply was a response to a comment Rostow had made in New York to the effect—that the US was still waiting for a reply to the questions he had asked Bessmertnykh in August.
4. The Soviet Union agreed that problems of quote control unquote, compliance, and verification were important and should be considered not in isolation but in the context of each negotiation, where the issues would be more tangible Dobrynin added that it might be useful to supplement such discussions with conversations between them in Washington. The use of such channels had proved helpful in the past, when negotiations had reached an impasse.
5. The Soviet Union continued to regard national technical means as the primary method of verification.
6. Rostow replied that the Soviet response was welcome and was within the framework of the issue as he had put it in August. We could accept the procedure the Soviet side proposed. USG had also noted Brezhnev’s comments on verification in his recent interview in Der Spiegel.4 In connection with the Soviet thesis that each verification problem was different, Rostow stressed the extreme importance in our minds of the issues that had arisen in connection with chemical and biological weapons, where national technical means were far less adequate than was the case with nuclear weapons. We were concerned that the Soviet Union was refusing even scrutiny by experts in these [Page 9] situations. Dobrynin replied by quoting an alleged remark by Richard Burt to the effect that the USG was convinced the Soviet Union was using bacteriological weapons in Afghanistan although quote we had no evidence unquote. He repeated this several times with relish and denied that the Soviet Union would use or had used chemical or biological weapons.5 Rostow said he had not seen any report of Burt’s comment, but it was hardly an answer to Rostow’s point or to the American demarches on the subject.
7. Dobrynin hoped that in our comments to the press USG would respect the privacy of diplomatic conversations. He said that Bessmertnykh had been somewhat concerned by stories in the press about the August 21 conversation. Rostow replied that it was our earnest policy to stay well behind the line between the permissible and the impermissible in this regard. In the New York episodes to which Dobrynin referred, we were responding to the steady drumbeat of Soviet propaganda accusing us of avoiding or delaying nuclear arms control talks. Moreover, it was Rostow’s plan to keep both our own public and the Soviet Union fully informed on the broad lines of our thinking and would continue to do so. Rostow believed the chances for success in the talks would be improved if the Soviet government understood what was in our minds. Dobrynin said here and at several other points that we should ignore Soviet propaganda. Rostow replied it was a little difficult to follow that advice.
8. As Rostow left, Dobrynin gave him the following talking points. (You will note that Dobrynin did not repeat not touch the more tendentious items in the talking points and that those items contain a number of manifest inaccuracies, several of which were dealt with in the original conversation.) Begin text.
A. “It has been noticed in Moscow that your recent statements in New York referring to your conversation with the Minister-Counselor of the USSR Embassy in Washington gave a distorted picture of whose fault it is that the Soviet-American negotiations on various questions of arms limitation are being delayed. To try to create an impression as if the whole trouble was in the Soviet side not responding to certain considerations you set forth on the questions of arms limitations verification is, at the very least, not serious, let alone the fact that it’s actually inaccurate.
B. “In response to the thoughts that you expressed at that time in a generalized manner, concerning the desirability of having a prelimi [Page 10] nary exchange of views on ways and methods of verification of the compliance with possible future agreements prior to the resumption of negotiations on specific questions of arms limitation, the Soviet side called attention to the fact that this was an irrelevant—and unpromising proposition.
C. “Our position of principle remains unchanged, verification can be discussed only sumultaneously and in close connection with the consideration of the substance of any specific aspects of arms limitation, and they cannot be divorced from the concrete arms limitation measures.
D. “The desire to turn the verification question into an isolated problem and to make its resolution—in fact a condition for the solution of issues of arms limitation including strategic arms limitation, can be regarded in no other way than as yet another manifestation of the U.S. side’s general policy, whereby instead of seeking to solidify the existing agreements in the arms-limitation area and to try to conclude new agreements in this respect, attempts are being made to block negotiations and to undermine whatever positive that was achieved earlier. Such an attitude, naturally, can find no support on our side.
E. “Adequate verification of the compliance with the obligations under arms limitation constitutes an inseparable and important part of the appropriate agreements. The Soviet Union is, no less than the U.S., interested in finding effective solutions on verification matters in the process of achieving specific agreements on arms limitation measures.
F. “Of fundamental importance, from the standpoint of the functioning of the verification system regarding the compliance of the sides with their obligations in the area of arms limitation and disarmament, is the verification through national technical means. And this should be the case for the future too, when time comes for the conclusion of new agreements in this regard. Specific details of the verification question, as well as the practical application of that principle will, of course, be subject of a special consideration during subsequent negotiations. It is to be repeated, however, that the resolution of such questions is only possible when they are considered in close connection with the other elements of the negotiated agreements.” End text.
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810541–1005. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Bonn, Brussels, Geneva, The Hague, London, Paris, Rome, the Mission to NATO, and MBFR Vienna. Drafted by Rostow; cleared in S/S; approved by Rostow.↩
- See Document 2.↩
- See footnote 7, Document 2.↩
- Reference is to Brezhnev’s interview in Der Spiegel, November 2, 1981, on the occasion of his visit to Bonn.↩
- Burt’s November 10 statement on the “Use of Chemical Weapons in Asia” before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations, and Environment of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, January 1982, pp. 52–54.↩