Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

2. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 21, 1981

SUBJECT

• Preliminary Conversations on Arms Control

PARTICIPANTS

• For the US:

  • Eugene V. Rostow, ACDA
  • Amb. E. Rowny, ACDA
  • James P. Timbie, ACDA
  • Alan Holmes, State (EUR)

• For the USSR:

  • Alexander A. Bessmertnykh

The meeting had been arranged at the request of Mr. Rostow.

Mr. Rostow said it was the hope of the USG that this conversation would be the first of a series of informal exchanges with the Soviet Union on a number of problems the USG regards as fundamental to the possibility of success in arms control negotiations, including START and TNF as well as others such as BW and CW. We do not expect these talks necessarily to result in agreements at this stage, but rather we hope for frank and searching discussions which could affect the atmosphere and the outcome of the negotiations ahead of us. USG believes there is a need for the two governments to exchange views on a number of difficult and troublesome issues—through diplomatic conversation or perhaps at small meetings of experts, if the Soviet Government thinks well of the idea, in Washington or in Moscow.

USG believes the issue of verification would be a good place to start such discussions. Verification of arms control agreements is one of the most important aspects of arms control; verification will be much more difficult than in the past. It is essential that both sides have confidence in their ability to verify arms control agreements. One of the problems which SALT II faced in the Senate was a lack of confidence in verification. There were verification problems associated with the new types provision, with the MIRV limits, with the denial of telemetry, as well as with the broader problem of manufacture. For the Soviet Government, it is not difficult to know what USG is doing or to verify compliance. We have Aviation Week, and what is not published in Aviation Week is printed in the Washington Post. The Soviet situation is altogether different. There is a long Soviet tradition of secrecy, and there is also a pattern of concealment. It is much more difficult for USG to verify Soviet compliance, and more broadly to assess Soviet plans and programs. NTM are remarkable devices and impressive in many ways, but we are reaching the limits of what they can do in view of the increasing complexity of nuclear weapons systems, their scale and variety. In future agreements the two governments must go beyond NTM and use cooperative measures to make verification possible. We have made a list of cooperative measures which have been used and proposed in the past. It is a long list, longer than we expected, and we are learning all we can from past experience.

In the TNF and START negotiations, the two governments will have to agree on treaty provisions which are relevant to the conditions they face today—not those of the past—rules which limit the destructive power of nuclear weapons equally, equitably, and in the interest of stability, an interest which both governments share. What is the best way to compare the destructive power of nuclear weapons? How can each side verify these attributes of the other’s systems? These are the problems to be solved in the negotiations. Rostow suggested that the problems will prove to be insoluble unless both governments undertake to solve them together. He commented that he had been struck by a recent article in the Soviet press by a Mr. Krasikov. (Rostow handed over the attached excerpt.)² This is exactly the problem USG has in mind.

There is also the issue of data. The days when the US provided all the data are over. USG was encouraged by Soviet willingness to provide some data in SALT and in MBFR, but that is only a beginning. Much more is needed, as the Rome communiqué of NAC pointed out.³

There are other subjects which it would be useful to discuss: for example, means to improve prevention of accidental war and our respective views of what arms control is supposed to accomplish. Many of our differences arise from differences in doctrine and intention, and perhaps from misunderstandings about what the other side wants. Doctrine might well be a fruitful subject to examine. The SCC has been a useful forum for discussions between the US and the Soviet Union but that forum is limited. The last session was a disappointment for USG. The issues raised by the American side were not resolved. They must be resolved at the next session. The issues that Matlock raised in Moscow⁴ must also be resolved.

The two governments have no choice but to talk to each other. The development of nuclear weapons and other aspects of Soviet policy have produced a situation of instability which compels Soviet-American cooperation. There are marriages of love and there are marriages of convenience. The relation between our two countries is such as to require something like a marriage of necessity. The alternatives are much worse.

Bessmertnykh said he was sure his government would welcome Rostow’s proposal. He wanted to clarify whether our interest in first raising questions about verification and data applies to all the negotiations or only to SALT and TNF. Did we believe it was advisable to discuss verification generally, or specifically with regard to SALT? Bessmertnykh thought well of the word START Rostow had suggested as a substitute for SALT.

Rostow said that verification was fundamental to all arms control efforts. Its application, of course, would be different in the different areas. If we could reach an understanding on the critical idea that there must be more cooperation, that verification would no longer be a cat-and-mouse game, this would apply to all the negotiations. Then we could go on to agree how it would be most useful to proceed,—diplomatic discussions like this, meetings of experts, perhaps no follow-up at all except in the several negotiations themselves.

Bessmertnykh said that if the general idea of verification were decoupled from the talks themselves, this might get us up too high, or we might find ourselves in the forest. The verification issues are intimately connected with specific areas. The procedures in each area are different; the solutions in each area are different.

Rostow agreed.

Bessmertnykh welcomed the idea of the necessity of cooperation. Recognition of the importance of cooperation is a first step. Perhaps this is a good start. He accepts the notion that we have a marriage of necessity, a phrase to which he returned several times. On data, he understood the importance of data and thought that we had come to a certain level on this subject. He thought the key point was not who provides the data but the attitude toward the data. For example, in Vienna the Soviets had provided data but the West had not accepted it. In SALT it was different, and the SALT experience was not a bad way to go.

On SALT II, Bessmertnykh noted that the USG is not satisfied with certain parts of SALT II; and USSR is not satisfied with other parts. Each side must try to imagine what the other side is trying to do. Rostow had mentioned certain weak points in verification. The Soviet Union on the other hand believes it gave USG gifts on verification. For example, D and P. The USSR accepted that all the missiles in that category are MIRVed, even though everybody knew only a small number of them actually are. On the question of distinguishing Minuteman II from Minuteman III, a comparable issue arose, and this too was resolved in the US favor. For the USSR, this was a gesture, and if we had a Senate we would have had great difficulty explaining to that Senate what we had done.

Rostow said he understood the concept of compromise and that the Soviet view was a natural one in view of the past. On the data question in Vienna that you referred to, he thinks this is a good example of the problems we face. When he talks to people he explains that all the data has until recently been provided by the US side, and people can’t believe it. They tell me they would never buy a house that way, or a car. Time is the only possible cure for these suspicions based on past experience, time and a better experience with genuine cooperation.

Bessmertnykh pointed out that the first question Moscow will ask is what is the SALT situation. To say that there is no SALT II is impossible. What is the status of the SALT II Treaty? It is in the Senate, it is signed, but you have no position.

Rostow replied that we are working hard, night and day, to reach a fully considered position. You may be sure it will be a constructive position, and it will embody some of the work done in the negotiations for SALT II. We will have ideas of our own, both on TNF and on SALT. They will be positive and they will build upon the experience of the past.

Bessmertnykh said that the USSR is prepared to continue the SALT process. The work of all those years, of General Rowny and others, should be preserved. Rostow said that was our view too, although we shall propose certain changes.

Rostow referred again to the Krasikov article, saying that as we move toward more modern measures for counting the destructive power of weapons, verification becomes more difficult. This is a problem we will have to face up to.

Bessmertnykh said his side pays more attention to the general strategic situation and thought discussions about strategic doctrine might be useful. He noted Rostow’s reference in his confirmation hearings to ambiguity and approved Rostow’s comment that some ambiguity was inevitable, but that we should try to minimize it. Rostow should know that the Soviets don’t like ambiguity either. He noted the example of circumvention which turned out to be too ambiguous, and had turned out badly for them. He said an agreement with an advantage to one side was impossible.

Rostow said he welcomed Bessmertnykh’s view of the importance of strategic doctrine, of discussing what each side wants. He agreed that these questions were fundamental and should be examined carefully.

Bessmertnykh asked whether the informal talks Rostow was proposing were preconditions for the negotiations themselves, and a pretext for delaying the negotiations. Rostow said he was glad Bessmertnykh had brought that point up. The President has made no preconditions for the TNF or START negotiations. Secretary Haig has pointed out that certain linkage was a fact. Rostow recalled that he was in the government during the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. He remembered the effect that had had on the prospects for negotiations at that time.

Bessmertnykh said he accepted linkage in this sense.

Rostow said that the conversations started today are not preconditions for TNF or START; and they are not intended to delay the start of the negotiations. On the contrary, they are intended to prepare the way for those negotiations. That is why Rostow had noted earlier that these talks need not necessarily result in agreements or understandings at this stage. We have no impulse to delay, but we must be well prepared.

Bessmertnykh said these discussions could go on in parallel with the negotiations. We could discuss doctrine. People could come together, diplomatic people, military people. We believed that we had reached a certain level of trust and confidence in each other by handling the most sensitive elements together. If the new Administration believes a certain amount of trust and confidence is possible, then progress is possible. If there is no trust and confidence, the situation is hopeless. We welcomed the new Administration, and thought having new people was a good idea. They bring with them fresh thoughts.

Rostow mentioned that he had read about personal attacks on him in the Soviet press. Bessmertnykh said he followed the American press more than the Soviet press, but he thought Rostow had been spared, and that he should not take it personally if he was caught up in this exchange of salvos. Rowny was also sometimes mentioned in the press. We are professionals and this sort of thing should not cloud our relations.

Rostow handed over a copy of the attached talking points,⁵ as well as a brief account for the press of the fact, but not the content, of these discussions.⁶

Bessmertnykh said he approved the announcement, Bessmertnykh also took a copy of the Krasikov excerpt, saying that Krasikov had been expounding the American view.

Bessmertnykh said he would report the conversation to Moscow and would be in touch with Rostow when he receives instructions.⁷

Attachments:

Krasikov Article

Talking Points

Draft Press Release

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P810120–2056. Secret.
2. Attached but not printed is an English translation of an August 16 TASS article by Anatoliy Krasikov titled “War or Peace,” in which an unknown hand bracketed the phrase “one should realize that as new types and modifications of weapons are coming into being it is becoming increasingly difficult to find a common denominator for defining the equilibrium of forces, and to verify arms limitation.”
3. For the text of the final communiqué of the May 4–5 ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council, see telegram 10771 from Rome, May 5 (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D812011–0307)
4. For Matlock’s July 23 tour d’horizon with Korniyenko, see Foreign Relations, 1981–1988 vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Document 76.
5. Attached but not printed are Rostow’s undated talking points on verification.
6. Attached but not printed is an undated statement: “The Director of ACDA, Dr. Eugene Rostow, met this afternoon with Mr. Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Charge of the Embassy of the USSR in Washington, on arms control issues. This was the first meeting of the Director with a Soviet representative and it is anticipated that further exchanges will take place concerning arms control problems.”
7. The Department transmitted the memorandum of conversation in telegram 229568 to Moscow and NATO, August 27, copying for information London, Paris, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, Geneva, and MBFR Vienna. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810403–0659)