Office of the Historian

4. Memorandum From Sven Kraemer and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)1

Washington, February 19, 1982

SUBJECT

  • START Preparations

This memo is in response to your questions concerning the status and schedule of USG preparations for the initiation of START negotiations. Interagency preparations have bogged down within the last month and are confused by a number of inadequately coordinated efforts as follows:

1. The START IG, co-chaired by State’s PM (Burt) and OSD (Perle), but dominated by State, spent last year in preparatory activities focused on: (a) comprehensive, if not totally honest, review of SALT compliance and verification issues; (b) overall guidance for US-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) meetings; (c) outline of basic considerations for initial policy framework; and (d) approval in October of a detailed work program, to include a matrix of eight diverse force structures on the basis of which to calculate and recommend major reduction proposals consistent with US national security requirements, equity, and verifiability, and to be ready for NSC review in April 1982.

Although substantial interagency agreement had been reached on these efforts in the Working Group by late December, the IG’s PM chairman at that time rejected most of the previous work, substantially slowed the Work Program, and, in spite of protests from the other agencies, essentially opposed convening of IGs required to resolve remaining issues and to get on with the job (see Tab IA).2 The IG was last convened on January 12.

2. The START IG’s Working Group, and a Technical Subgroup chaired by OSD, have further refined the IG-approved matrix to focus initially on three of the force packages and on cuts of 30%. However, there is no agreement yet on many critical assumptions and evaluation criteria, and assured DOD/JCS computer support is lacking. The Work Program [Page 12] is currently scheduled to be completed for NSC review by May, but it is behind schedule and requires substantial revamping.

3. The SCC Backstopping Committee, chaired by ACDA, has assessed, with occasional overall guidance from the START IG, specific SALT compliance issues in preparation for the SCC meetings of March and October 1981 and March 1982. Such issues have included Soviet radars, ABM missiles, encryption, etc. The Backstopping Committee, which is also working on ABM Treaty review issues, has been weak in terms of forcing compliance issues with the Soviets and in terms of articulating lessons learned from the SALT I and II experience. Meanwhile, the US delegation to the SCC still lacks a chairman.

4. Independent efforts are being undertaken in addition to, and somewhat in opposition to, the formal START IG/Working Group/Technical Subgroup analytical efforts. These independent efforts include competitive and extremely close-hold proposals being fostered separately by State’s PM (Burt to Haig) and by ACDA (Timbie to Rostow). These efforts have deliberately leapfrogged the interagency process and have been designed to capture and lock cabinet-level principals into simple outcomes—e.g., 7,000 warhead limit (PM) and 50% cut (ACDA)—that essentially ignore the formal interagency analytical program. The PM and ACDA proposals are known to NSC staff only through bootleg copies and have not yet been brought into the interagency process.

A semi-independent review effort by Chief START negotiator, Ambassador Ed Rowny, has been circulated by him to Rostow, OSD, and NSC staff as an aid to the formal analytical process.

In the face of this mix of proliferating and uncoordinating efforts, with START IGs not regularly convened and with Working Group and Technical Group stalled, NSC-level action is required to overcome delay, confusion, and wasted efforts. It is necessary to assure systematic and timely preparations and to lay on the table and analyze current independent proposals.

We believe that the best way of meeting this objective is by formalizing the Work Program3 via a National Security Study Directive. Attached at Tab I, as prepared by Bob Linhard, are outlines of the basic elements, including schedule and substantive issues, which need to be addressed in an NSSD. With informal consultation in the next day or two with other agencies, we will submit for your consideration a draft NSSD based upon the elements outlined at Tab I. Executing this NSSD with discipline should assure NSC review by mid-May.

[Page 13]

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve preparation of a draft NSSD based upon the elements outlined at Tab I.4

  1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR078, NSDD 33 [START Negotiations]. Secret. Sent for action. Sent through Reed. Attached but not printed are two February 19 papers, “Handling the Core Issues: Units of Limitation” and “General Outline of the Proposed Approach.”↩
  2. Attached but not printed is a February 19 chart listing the status of the work for the START Interagency Group and START Interagency Group’s Working Group.↩
  3. Attached but not printed is a February 16 paper, “Proposed Approach—Terms of Reference for Focusing/Completing Ongoing START Preparations.”↩
  4. Reed indicated his approval.↩