Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

258. Memorandum From Linton Brooks and William Tobey of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, January 8, 1988

SUBJECT

• Instructions for Upcoming NST Round

Bob Linhard is on travel but is aware of this action.

The next round in the Nuclear and Space talks (NST) begins on January 14. Attached (Tab II)² are interagency developed draft START, Defense and Space, and overall instructions. Both START and Defense and Space instructions have brackets.

Normal practice is to submit NST instructions to the President for his approval, documenting that approval in an NSDD. We believe that the issues raised are not deserving of the President’s time; they are either (a) minor issues of nuance or (b) issues where it is only necessary to reaffirm existing U.S. policy. Thus, we propose that you resolve the issues and forward a clean copy of the instructions to the President for approval as attachments to the NSDD. We have included in your cover memorandum a summary of the action taken so that the President is aware that some of these issues are contentious.

Our recommended action on each issue follows. We have annotated Tab II to indicate our recommendations.

START Issue 1—Sublimits. On the familiar issue of sublimits of 3300 ICBM warheads and 1650 ICBM warheads on heavy/highly MIRVd ICBMs, OSD , JCS , the START Negotiator, and Ambassador Rowny would retain both sublimits. All but OSD see these as bargaining chips to be given up eventually; OSD continues to believe that the 1650 sublimit (which would constrain the ten RV SS–X–24) is important. State and ACDA would drop the 1650 sublimit now in the interest of moving negotiations forward. They would retain the 3300 sublimit with the intent of swapping it for Soviet sublimits of ALCMs and SLBMs (the Soviets will certainly accept such a swap; thus the de facto State/ACDA position is to drop both sublimits).

NSC staff sees no advantage in giving up the 3300 ICBM sublimit. It is of modest value, may actually be negotiable, and, at a minimum, could serve as a useful bargaining chip to be given up during one of the ministrial meetings. In contrast, the 1650 sublimit has de facto been replaced by the summit agreement of a 1540 sublimit on heavy ICBMs. We recommend authorizing the delegation to acknowledge that fact, but leaving when to do so to the tactical discretion of the negotiator.³

START Issue 2—Mobile ICBMs . All agencies agree that we should discuss mobile ICBM verification with the Soviets, seeking Soviet ideas. OSD and Ambassador Rowny would stop there, deferring any decision to allow mobile ICBMs until progress has been made in other areas. Other agencies would tell the Soviets that, if verification procedures can be improved, we would “consider permitting” ( JCS and the START Negotiator), “permit” (State) or “permit road mobile only” ( ACDA ). These positions, and the accompanying rationale, are familiar and are unchanged since the last NSPG (or indeed in the last year).

NSC staff recommends the OSD position; not informing the Soviets for now that we will permit mobile ICBMs. We believe this is consistent with NSDD–290⁴ and the President’s guidance during the summit, which made acceptance of mobile ICBMs contingent on progress in other areas.⁵

START Issue 3—Throwweight. OSD and ACDA would insert a sentence directing the delegation to make it clear that we expect the 50 percent throwweight constraint to be a genuine constraint recorded in the treaty, with throwweight measured in accordance with a throwweight protocol. These agencies fear the Soviets will misinterpret the summit Joint Statement as a softening of our position. Other agencies, especially State, oppose the suggested insertion as unnecessary. As you recall, in the past State has favored a side agreement with only a limited definition of throwweight.

NSC staff recommends accepting the ACDA/OSD insertion. A constraint on throwweight has been a consistent goal of this Administration; we do not yet know that the Soviets will reject including it in a treaty. Pressing them may be useful. More importantly, a decision to exclude this sentence could be misperceived as a softening of our position in an eagerness to gain treaty agreement.⁶

START Issue 4—ALCM Range Definition. All agencies accept ACDA propose using the INF definition of cruise missile range for START. Under this definition range is “the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion.” ACDA opposed this definition in START and continues to oppose it, on the grounds that “standard design mode” is not an agreed term and that we can only be certain of capturing ALCMs if they have been flight tested to greater than 1500 km range. Such flight testing is, however, not essential for ALCM deployment. ACDA thus favors placeholder language while we try to develop a better definition.

NSC staff recommends accepting the INF definition. Whatever the merits of the as-yet-to-be-developed ACDA alternative, it is simply too hard to have different definitions, especially when we already face an uphill fight on negotiating an ALCM range cutoff.⁷

START Issue 5—RV Counting Rules. OSD (supported by ACDA ) would impose a new condition on RV counting rules. Presently our approach to RV counting rules allows the sides to agree on a number of warheads to be attributed to a given missile. OSD and ACDA would limit this number to no less than two-thirds of the maximum number of RVs a missile is capable of carrying. This proposed constraint, which results from concern with our agreement to accept four RVs on the SS–N–23, would have no effect on U.S. systems. The OSD/ACDA intent is to minimize the breakout potential by placing some bound on the ability of a side to understate its capability. The practical effect would be to preclude deployment of the SS–N–23 with the smaller of its two designed RVs. All other agencies oppose the OSD addition.

NSC staff recommends rejecting the OSD proposal. It requires additional technical analysis to determine how it would be verified and the impact of such verification on future U.S. systems. Since OSD claims it is not intended to walk back the SS–N–23 decision, its primary effect would be on future systems. It thus can be reconsidered when we draft the so-called “default rules” for attributing warheads to future systems. We have included a statement to this effect in the cover memorandum promulgating the NST instructions.⁸

START Issue 6—Verification Language. There is disagreement on the wording of an instruction to incorporate the verification language from the summit statement into the Joint Draft Text. OSD and JCS would do so “as appropriate;” State and ACDA would use the phrase “in an appropriate manner.” This is a silly issue; while there are some nuances, the practical result of either phrase will be the same.

Per our discussion, NSC staff recommends dropping both phrases.⁹

START Issue 7—Inspection Quotas. State and ACDA would aggregate the inspection quotas for various types of inspections, including suspect site inspections, to more closely parallel the INF agreement. All other agencies oppose this as premature. NSC staff agrees and recommends the provision be deleted for now.¹⁰

START Issue 8—Transit Notification. Our current draft treaty requires an after the fact notification of the movement of ballistic missiles between sites. All agencies except JCS favor adding a requirement to provide the route and the location at two-day intervals. Such a requirement (but with four-day intervals) is in the INF Treaty. The intent is to enhance our ability to use NTM to verify declared movements. JCS objections are based on the administrative burden of such reporting.

NSC staff recommend overriding the JCS (the Joint Staff expects this and won’t yell) and including the requirement, recognizing that we will probably have to accept four-day intervals in START as we did in INF at some point during the negotiating process (which will reduce the “administrative burden”).¹¹

Additional agency arguments on all START issues are at Tab III.

Defense and Space Issue 1—Status of the ABM Treaty. OSD would delete the paragraph at the bottom of p. 4 and the top of p. 5 of the D&S Instructions. OSD believes the paragraph is inconsistent with U.S. policy because it implies that we would revert to the ABM Treaty after the non-withdrawal period. All other agencies would include the paragraph as a necessary clarification of our policy.

NSC Staff recommend retaining the paragraph but modifying “After the specified period . . .” to read “Through the specified period. . . .” This would maintain our current position, giving us a right to deploy after the non-withdrawal period, while avoiding the implication that the end of the non-withdrawal period would also end the ABM Treaty.¹²

Defense and Space Issue 2—Characterizing Our Commitment to Deploy. This issue, at the top of p. 5, concerns the strength of our commitment to deploy if we prove that defenses can meet our criteria. State would say we “may” deploy, believing this to be consistent with our policy that no deployment decisions have been made. OSD would say we “intend” to deploy, believing this to be consistent with our policy that once our criteria are met we will proceed to deployment.

NSC Staff recommend accepting the OSD formulation. The President has repeatedly said that when we are ready (and our criteria are met) we intend to deploy defenses. We have also told this to the Soviets in Geneva.¹³

Recommendation

That you accept our suggested resolution of the issues above, and sign the memorandum at Tab I ¹⁴ forwarding the NSDD to the President to document his approval of the instructions.¹⁵

Fritz Ermarth, Don Mahley, Steve Steiner, Bill Heiser, Judyt Mandel, Nicholas Rostow (who has coordinated the NSDD with A.B. Culvahouse), and Brenda Regon concur.

Attachment

Memorandum From the Chief of the Arms Control Intelligence Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency (Castillo) to Linton Brooks of the National Security Council Staff¹⁶

Washington, January 6, 1988

SUBJECT

• START Instructions: Round IX [portion marking not declassified]

1. The latest draft of the subject instructions has been reviewed by the Intelligence Community. A number of Intelligence Community positions need to be stated to accurately reflect the views of the OCI’s Representative. [portion marking not declassified]

2. The following specific views are noted:

—Mobile ICBMs: [less than 2 lines not declassified] that mobile missiles are extremely difficult to monitor, and, if they are not banned outright, any acceptable verification regime would require severe restrictions on basing and activities as well as require very substantial OSI.

—Throw-weight: [less than 1 line not declassified] any throw-weight option selected will provide treaty accountable throw-weight. This may or may not be the same as the missiles maximum TW potential. The Intelligence Community will continue to monitor throw-weight [1 line not declassified] and report these results through normal channels.

—ALCMs: [4 lines not declassified] Furthermore, no verification regime can effectively monitor whether a particular weapon has a nuclear or non-nuclear warhead. Moreover, in a breakout scenario, an ALCM non-nuclear warhead could easily be replaced with a nuclear warhead in a very short period of time. [3 lines not declassified]

—RV Counting: [less than 1 line not declassified] any warhead counting rules are for the purpose of treaty accountability, and may not be related to the actual number of reentry vehicles carried on deployed missiles and may not be equal to their maximum carrying capability. [3 lines not declassified]

Joseph B. Castillo, Jr.

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 096, NSDD 295. Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads “Signed.” Attached but not printed is a January 14 memorandum for Powell to Bush, Shultz, Carlucci, Herrington, Webster, Crowe, and Burns forwarding NSDD–295 (see Document 260.).
2. Attached but not printed.
3. Powell initialed his approval.
4. See Document 244.
5. Powell initialed his approval.
6. Powell initialed his approval, and wrote: “But we won’t belabor all Winter + Spring.”
7. Powell initialed his approval.
8. Powell initialed his approval.
9. Powell initialed his approval.
10. Powell initialed his approval.
11. Powell initialed his approval.
12. Powell initialed his approval.
13. Powell indicated his approval.
14. Printed as Document 260.
15. Powell indicated his approval.
16. Secret; Noforn.