Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

257. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 4, 1988, noon

PARTICIPANTS

• Col. Robert Linhard, NSC
• Amb. Paul H. Nitze

Linhard began by stressing the importance of thinking through a time-phased strategy for the continuing NST negotiations, so that we control the agenda and what issues remain for the final summit session.

I said I thought we had so many issues to resolve that we must begin with all of them concurrently; we could later decide those on which we wished to place greatest pressure at that particular time. Our first task was to plot our tactics for the late February ministerial in Moscow.

Linhard said he viewed the task of our Geneva negotiators as setting up and clarifying issues for each subsequent ministerial meeting.

We then discussed the various START issues. I said most of them involved verification; this was obviously true of land-mobile ICBMs and of SLCMs; but there were also issues connected with the verification of the other START systems. Linhard said the Verification Working Group was busy drafting a Verification Protocol for tabling at an early session; but there were serious problems with their work. Someone would have to work with the U.S. contractors to take account of their concerns.

I said it was important for us to have a clear idea of what systems we would actually wish to deploy and have the resources and Congressional backing to support. We would need to compare the strategic stability of realistically foreseeable deployments under the assumption that a START agreement along the lines we seek is achieved; it could then be compared with what we could anticipate in the event of no agreement. It was important to know whether a multiplicity of silos per missile would be adequate or whether we need a Midgetman type of mobile system.

Linhard said Carlucci was determined to kill the Midgetman; would the Garrison Rail Mobile be adequate? I said I thought not; it would be an invitation to a surprise attack and could convert the improbability of such an attack into a probability.

I said it was important that the State Department be exposed to, and understand, Pentagon thinking on these issues. He said the Air Force and the Navy views were irreconcilably opposed. I asked whether it was not OSD’s task to resolve such service conflicts. He said it was. He said he would see whether some of us at State could be briefed on the latest drafts of this year’s JCS Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) and on the comparable strategic forces paper.

Linhard said there were additional START points on which work needed to be done; (a) the ALCM counting rule, (b) the ballistic missile counting rules (conservatives were already questioning the Soviet declaration of four RVs for the SSN X23), (c) a throw-weight protocol (I said we might not be able to get more than a short unilateral declaration out of the Soviets), and (d) a resolution of the Backfire issue. Linhard urged us to work out the assignment of specific organizations and personnel to work each of these issues.

This got us into a discussion of the work to be done in Geneva and that to be done in Washington. Linhard noted that most of the substantive movement had come at levels higher than the Geneva negotiators, although some had been initiated by Gen. Chervov’s exploratory discussions with Mike.² I suggested we might have a problem now that Obukhov had replaced Vorontsov. I asked Linhard what he would think about a proposal that Mike stay on in Geneva and relieve Max as head of the Geneva delegation; he was senior to both Hank Cooper and Read Hanmer and I doubted whether Max would wish to deal with Obukhov. He noted that we were counting on Mike to support INF ratification. I suggested that John Woodworth might be able to carry much of the load.

We then turned to Defense and Space. We quickly agreed on the main outstanding issues of the Defense/Space Treaty text to be submitted; he said he bracketed language would be sent to the President for resolution.

I said I would like to visit some of the laboratories and contractors to gain some first-hand knowledge as to where the SDI program now stood. He said he would like to join me in doing so. We will coordinate on a possible time schedule.³

1. Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, All of Jan–Feb. 19, 1988. Secret. The meeting took place at the Metropolitan Club.
2. Reference is to Maynard “Mike” Glitman.
3. No record of a joint visit was found.