Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

260. National Security Decision Directive 295¹

Washington, January 14, 1988

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NINTH NST NEGOTIATING ROUND (C)

The attached instructions provide guidance for the ninth round of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST), which begins on January 14, 1988, in Geneva. They include the agreements reached during my December 1987 meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Washington. (S)

Ronald Reagan

Attachment

Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva²

Washington, undated

Subject: (S) Overall instructions for Round IX of the US/Soviet Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST). Ref: State 134761.³

1. (S) Entire text.

2. The following is overall guidance for the US NST Delegation for Round IX, which begins on January 14, 1988. Guidance from previous rounds remains in effect except as modified below. Specific guidance for the START and Defense and Space Negotiating Groups is provided by SEPTEL.

3. Principal objectives for Round IX include:

—To build on the progress achieved during the December 7–10, 1987 summit by concluding by the earliest possible date:

A START Treaty, which implements US principles for effectively verifiable and stabilizing 50 percent reductions and limitations of strategic offensive arms:

A Defense and Space Treaty—with the same legal status as the START Treaty—consistent with US negotiating principles and agreements reached at the summit.

—To continue to counter Soviet efforts to hold START negotiations hostage to progress in Defense and Space, noting that agreement to equitably reduce and limit strategic offensive arms in a verifiable manner would benefit both sides.

—To continue to resist Soviet attempts to produce a key provisions or framework agreement for either START or DST.

4. In elaborating on US proposals and concluding treaty texts, the delegation should ensure that provisions for effective verification of the obligations assumed are agreed concurrently with other treaty provisions.

5. The delegation should continue to emphasize the need for compliance with existing arms control agreements, noting that Soviet non-compliance with existing agreements is an obstacle to achieving arms reductions.

6. If the Soviets raise non-NST issues, the delegation should respond that the issues should be addressed in the FORA designated to discuss them. In the event that the Soviets raise the issue of the ABM Treaty review, the delegation should respond that the US position has not changed. The delegation should repeat that the review may commence anytime before October 1988 and that a date will be established through diplomatic channels.

Attachment

Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva⁴

Washington, undated

Subject: START: Instructions for Round IX

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Previous START guidance remains in effect except as modified below. The overall objectives of the U.S. START Negotiating Group remains unchanged: to achieve a START Treaty providing for deep, stabilizing, equitable reductions and effective verification measures. The current U.S. position builds on the U.S. positions tabled after the Reykjavik summit and in the May 1987 U.S. Draft START Treaty.

3. The U.S. language in the November 23, 1987, version of the JDT is accepted and supercedes the U.S. Draft Treaty tabled on May 8, 1987, as the authoritative U.S. position. Negotiating Group should table changes to JDT contained in SEPTEL at earliest appropriate time. In Round IX, subject to the instructions included below, the U.S. START Negotiating Group should incorporate in the JDT the START elements of the December 10, 1987, joint statement issued at the Washington summit (text in para 5). The Group should make clear that the U.S. is ready to accelerate the resolution of JDT issues on that basis, toward a completed START Treaty package at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature during the next summit meeting in the first half of 1988. While Washington hopes such a package might be ready in time for signature during the next summit meeting in the first half of 1988, the U.S. will not negotiate against an arbitrary deadline.

4. In addition to the START elements of the Washington summit joint statement, the Negotiating Group should draw on the following instructions. The Group should, as appropriate, incorporate these instructions into the JDT.

SUBLIMITS

—The U.S. continues to believe that a sublimit on ICBM warheads of preferably 3000, but certainly not more than 3300, should be included to ensure strategic stability.

—Further, the U.S. accepts the Soviet proposal for a sublimit of 1540 warheads on 154 deployed heavy ballistic missiles; the U.S. is willing therefore to drop its proposed sublimit of 1650. The delegation may delay informing the Soviets of U.S. willingness to drop the 1650 sublimit until tactically appropriate.

Mobile ICBMs

—The U.S. continues to propose that mobile ICBMs be banned. The U.S. continues to have very significant concerns regarding verification of mobile ICBMs and their effect on strategic stability. Since the USSR apparently believes that numerical limits on mobile ICBMs can be verified, the Soviet side should table their inspection protocol containing the specific provisions of the mobile ICBM verification regime it envisages. (FYI. If the Soviet side agrees to the U.S. approach on START counting rules and sublimits as provided in NSDD 290,⁵ and given acceptable progress toward the U.S. position in the Defense and Space area, and if agreement is reached on an inspection protocol incorporating provisions for effective verification of numerical limits on mobile ICBMs, Washington would consider permitting a limited number of warheads and missiles within the 1600 delivery vehicle/6000 warhead central limits. End FYI.)

Throwweight

—The Negotiating Group should seek early Soviet agreement in the JDT to reduce its aggregate ballistic missile throwweight to a level 50 percent below the existing level and for each side not to increase its aggregate throwweight above that level;

The Negotiating Group should make clear that throwweight for both existing and future systems must be calculated in a manner that accurately reflects each missile’s potential destructive capability, and that whatever method or methods are used, the resultant throwweight will represent treaty accountable.

Negotiating Group may inform the Soviet side that the U.S. will be providing language that accomplishes these objectives.

SLCMS

—In any discussion of the sides’ commitments on SLCMs contained in the Washington summit joint statement, the Negotiating Group should stress the continuing and very basic U.S. concerns about the verifiability of SLCM limits. The Group should indicate that, on the basis of information received so far, the U.S. remains highly dubious that the verification methods discussed during the Washington summit could provide an effective means to verify limits on deployed long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs. The U.S. will continue to examine these verification measures and respond at a future date. Pending resolution of verification issues and further guidance, the Negotiating Group should neither table or accept language on SLCMs in the JDT nor discuss specific SLCM limitations except to reiterate that the limits proposed by the Soviet side in the November 23 JDT are unacceptable.

ALCMS

—The U.S. believes that long-range ALCMs, for the purposes of a START Treaty, should be defined as ALCMs capable of a range in excess of 1500 kilometers and that only nuclear-armed, long-range ALCMs will be limited by a START Treaty. With respect to those current and future types of heavy bombers declared to be ALCM heavy bombers, the U.S. believes the number to be attributed to them should be six per bomber. Negotiating Group should state that while six would be the number of ALCMs attributed to ALCM heavy bombers for the purposes of counting against the 6000 warhead limit, each side would be free to actually deploy ALCMs up to the bomber’s maximum capability. Other types of heavy bombers which are not equipped for such cruise missiles, including Backfire, shall be counted in accordance with the bomber counting rule agreed at Reykjavik.

—The U.S. believes that the method for determining the range capability of an air-launched cruise missile shall be considered to be the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earth’s sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact. (FYI. This definition would capture any and all ranges demonstrated in flight testing. End FYI.)

RV Counting

—The group should make clear that U.S. acceptance of Soviet warhead numbers on existing ballistic missiles, as contained in the Washington summit joint statement, is contingent on mutual agreement on procedures, which must at a minimum include on-site inspection to ensure that a side has not deployed more warheads on the deployed ballistic missile being inspected than the side declared in the MOU, and that the joint statement recognizes that there will be an agreement on rules for counting warhead numbers on future types of ballistic missiles. Furthermore, a side may claim a reduced number of RVs for an existing type of ballistic missile only as provided under agreed provisions or limitations. In addition, in discussing this issue, negotiating group should recall that the SS–18 follow-on now being tested would be prohibited by the treaty.

Forum

—The Group should table the following new language for Article XII of the JDT:

“To promote the objectives of the treaty and compliance with its provisions, the parties hereby establish the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The parties agree that, if either party so requests, they shall meet using the joint compliance and inspection commission to:

(A) Resolve concerns relating to compliance with the obligations assumed and

(B) Agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this treaty.

The parties also agree that they shall use the nuclear risk reduction centers, which provide for continuous communication between the parties, to:

(A) Exchange data and provide notifications as required by paragraphs (blank) of Article VIII and Paragraphs (blank) of Article X of this treaty;

(B) Exchange schedules for conversion, dismantlement or destruction as required by Paragraph (blank) of Article VIII of this treaty; and

(C) Provide and receive notifications as required by the Protocol on Inspections.”

—In addition, the Group should make the appropriate tracking fixes to Articles VIII and X of the JDT.

—The Group should confirm to the Soviet side that it is the U.S. intent to establish separate commissions for INF and for START, as is clear from the proposed START forum name that is different from the INF forum name.

Verification

—The Group must stress the importance of Agreement to Effective Verification Measures. U.S. agreement to a START Treaty will not be possible without such measures. The Group should continue to stress that the sides must begin to agree now on verification provisions in parallel with agreement on substantive limitations in the JDT, as noted in the joint statement. The group should work to incorporate into the JDT the verification concepts from the joint statement.

Negotiating Group should make it clear to the Soviets that the Treaty cannot be signed until all verification measures are agreed and finalized.

—The Group should stress that, while INF verification concepts can in many cases be applied to START and make important contributions there, START verification problems are much more complicated and difficult than those addressed in the INF Treaty, and that START verification measures will thus have to be much more comprehensive than those for INF.

—The Group should make clear that OSI will be applied to both the reduction and post-reduction phases.

—The Group should emphasize that the U.S. continues to believe that it is necessary to establish a requirement in a START Treaty to ban encryption of telemetry, to make on-board engineering measurements during the flight of every ballistic missile subject to the treaty and to broadcast all such measurements during flight.

—The Group should incorporate the following changes into the JDT:

—Amend Article IX to permit OSI at ballistic missile test ranges;

—Add to Article XI a specific provision for “close-out inspection” of mobile ICBM facilities and facilities (excepting silos) for other ballistic missiles when all such missiles are permanently removed from those facilities and those facilities cease all activities;

—Add to the transit notification in Article X a requirement to provide a description of the entire transit route, including the location and time at that location at least once every two days during the period of transit.

MOU

—The Group will make clear that signature of the MOU does not imply certification by one side of data tabled by the other side. The U.S. believes that the MOU must make explicit that each side attests to the timeliness and accuracy of the data which it tables. The Negotiating Group should make it clear to the Soviets that a treaty cannot be signed until all the MOU data has been provided.

5. There follows the text of the START-related portions of the Washington summit joint statement of December 10, 1987. The Group should, as appropriate, incorporate these positions into the JDT.

Begin text:

“The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on reductions in strategic offensive arms. They noted the considerable progress which has been made toward conclusion of a treaty implementing the principle of 50-percent reductions. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to work toward the completion of the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of the treaty during the next meeting of leaders of state in the first half of 1988. Recognizing that areas of agreement and disagreement are recorded in detail in the joint draft treaty text, they agreed to instruct their negotiators to accelerate resolution of issues within the joint draft treaty text including early agreement on provisions for effective verification.

In so doing, the negotiators should build upon the agreements on 50-percent reductions achieved at Reykjavik as subsequently developed and now reflected in the agreed portions of the joint draft START treaty text being developed in Geneva, including agreement on ceilings of no more than 1600 strategic offensive delivery systems, 6000 warheads, 1540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles; the agreed rule of account for heavy bombers and their nuclear armament; and an agreement that as a result of the reductions the aggregate throwweight of the Soviet Union’s ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to a level approximately 50-percent below the existing level, and this level will not be exceeded by either side. Such an agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner.

As priority tasks, they should focus on the following issues:

(A) The additional steps necessary to ensure that the reductions enhance strategic stability. This will include a ceiling of 4900 on the aggregate number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads within the 6000 total.

(B) The counting rules governing the number of long-range, nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to be attributed to each type of heavy bomber. The delegations shall define concrete rules in this area.

(C) The counting rules with respect to existing ballistic missiles. The sides proceed from the assumption that existing types of ballistic missiles are deployed with the following numbers of warheads. In the United States: Peacekeeper (MX): 10, Minuteman III: 3, Minuteman II: 1, Trident I: 8, Trident II: 8, Poseidon: 10. In the Soviet Union: SS–17: 4, SS–19: 6, SS–18: 10, SS–24: 10, SS–25: 1, SS–11: 1, SS–13: 1, SS–N–6: 1, SS–N–8: 1, SS–N–17: 1, SS–N–18: 7, SS–N–20: 10 and SS–N–23: 4. Procedures will be developed that enable verification of the number of warheads on deployed ballistic missiles of each specific type. In the event either side changes the number of warheads declared for a type of deployed ballistic missile, the sides shall notify each other in advance. There shall also be agreement on how to account for warheads on future types of ballistic missiles covered by the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.

(D) The sides will find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs. Such limitations will not involve counting long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs within the 6000 warhead and 1600 strategic offensive delivery systems limits. The sides committed themselves to establish ceilings on such missiles, and to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of such limitations, which could include the employment of national technical means, cooperative measures and on-site inspection.

(E) Building upon the provisions of the treaty on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, the measures by which the provisions of the treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms can be verified will, at a minimum, include:

1. Data exchanges, to include declarations by each side of the number and location of weapon systems limited by the treaty and of facilities at which such systems are located and appropriate notifications. These facilities will include locations and facilities for production and final assembly, storage, testing, and deployment of systems covered by this treaty. Such declarations will be exchanged between the sides before the treaty is signed and updated periodically after entry into force.

2. Baseline inspection to verify the accuracy of these declarations promptly after entry into force of the treaty.

3. On-site observation of the elimination of strategic systems necessary to achieve the agreed limits.

4. Continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production and support facilities to confirm the output of these facilities.

5. Short-notice on-site inspection of:

(I) Declared locations during the process of reducing to agreed limits;

(II) Locations where systems covered by this treaty remain after achieving the agreed limits; and

(III) Locations where such systems have been located (formerly declared facilities).

6. The right to implement, in accordance with agreed-upon procedures, short-notice inspections at locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring.

7. Provisions prohibiting the use of concealment or other activities which impede verification by national technical means. Such provisions would include a ban on telemetry encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric information broadcast during missile flight.

8. Measures designed to enhance observation of activities related to reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms by national technical means. These would include open displays of treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting party.”

Attachment

Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva⁶

Washington, undated

Ref: A. Draft D&S Treaty,⁷ B. SCC Instructions,⁸ C. Cd Instructions⁹

1. Secret–entire text.

2. The following is guidance for the U.S. Defense and Space Negotiating Group to the negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms for Round IX, beginning on January 14, 1988. Except as modified below, guidance for the Defense and Space Negotiating Group for previous rounds remains in effect.

Principal Objectives

3. The principal U.S. objectives in the Defense and Space area remain the preservation of the option to deploy and to facilitate deployment of advanced strategic defenses which meet our criteria in a safe and stabilizing manner as soon as possible—if we choose to do so—preferably in a cooperative transition to greater reliance on defenses. In this connection, we wish to maintain all rights to conduct research, development and testing—including testing in space—as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, in order to determine the feasibility of such defenses. The Negotiating Group should continue to emphasize the U.S. objectives and oppose conflicting soviet objectives.

Objectives for Round IX:

4. The overall U.S. objective for Round IX is:

—To implement the instructions issued jointly by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in their joint U.S.-Soviet summit statement of December 10, 1987, which stated:

“Taking into account the preparation of the treaty on strategic offensive arms, the leaders of the two countries also instructed their delegations in Geneva to work out an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time. Intensive discussions of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the specified period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its course of action. Such an agreement must have the same legal status as the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, the ABM Treaty, and other similar, legally binding agreements. This agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner. Therefore, they direct their delegations to address these issues on a priority basis.

“The sides shall discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of stategic stability, to reduce the risk of nuclear war.”

—(FYI to Negotiating Group: the joint U.S.-Soviet summit statement does not constitute a complete statement of the positions held by the two sides on these issues. In order to record areas of agreement at the summit, neither side insisted on the inclusion of explicit language setting forth certain aspects of its position which the other side could not accept. Both sides did this while retaining the right to maintain their positions on issues of principle. End FYI.)

5. Specific U.S. objectives for Round IX include:

—To reach agreement on a separate, new Defense and Space Treaty consistent with the December 10, 1987, joint U.S.-Soviet summit statement. Such a treaty could enter into force at the same time as a treaty on strategic offensive arms. The Negotiating Group should emphasize that the U.S. approach to such a treaty responds to Soviet concerns regarding predictability in the development of the U.S-Soviet strategic relationship to reduce the risk of war, and ensure strategic stability over the long term.

—To table a U.S. D&S Treaty and to develop a joint draft D&S text, while opposing any Soviet attempts to produce a key provision or framework agreement on START and DST issues.

—While maintaining the principal focus of the negotiations on the U.S. proposal and agenda, to respond to Soviet Defense and Space proposals by continuing to question, criticize and probe them as part of the development of a joint text, pointing out the ways in which the U.S. proposals respond to Soviet concerns and showing how the U.S. proposals lead to increased stability and security for both parties.

General Approach

6. The Negotiating Group should emphasize that the U.S.-proposed treaty text (REF A) reflects the agreement between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev embodied in their December 10 joint summit statement, building upon the following central provisions:

—Agreement that the sides would observe the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time. This would be reflected in a general commitment by the sides that, during the specified period, neither side would exercise its rights under the new treaty or Article XV of the ABM treaty on the grounds that the ABM Treaty’s restrictions on the deployment of systems for strategic defense or on acquiring or improving certain capabilities for strategic defense are, in and of themselves, extraordinary events jeopardizing its supreme interests.

—However, in exercising its national sovereignty, each side would maintain the right to withdraw from this treaty and the ABM Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of either treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Each side shall also have the right to suspend or terminate, in whole or in part, the new treaty and the ABM Treaty in the event the other side commits a material breach of either treaty. In addition, each side would have the right to suspend or terminate, in whole or in part, the new treaty and the ABM Treaty if the other side fails to reduce its strategic offensive arms in accordance with the START Treaty.

—Intensive discussions of strategic stability would begin not later than three years before the end of the specified period.

—Through the specified period and until either side chooses a different course of action, the sides would continue to observe the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972, while conducting research, development and testing, as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.

—At the end of the specified period, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side would be free to decide its course of action. The Negotiating Group should clarify that the U.S. side would have the right to deploy strategic defenses and intends to exercise its freedom to choose to deploy advanced strategic defense if the U.S. research, development and testing program proves that such defenses meet our criteria. In so doing, the U.S. side seeks a cooperative transition, the planning for which could begin now.

—If, after the specified period, either side exercises its right to deploy strategic ballistic missile defenses that are prohibited by the ABM Treaty, then that side would be required to give six months’ written notice to the other side of its intention to deploy. In that event, the notice requirement provided in this Article of the defense and space agreement would supersede the notice provision of Article XV of the ABM Treaty. Following the six month notification period, all remaining ABM Treaty restrictions would be terminated unless the sides agreed otherwise.

7. In elaborating further on the U.S. position with regard to provisions of the U.S. draft treaty, the Negotiating Group should be guided by the Joint Summit Statement.

—The Negotiating Group should advocate the U.S.-proposed predictability package as a means to enhance predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability to reduce the risk of war. The Negotiating Group should indicate, however, U.S. disappointment that to date the Soviet side has shown no interest in these proposals, which would provide predictability for each side regarding the course of the strategic ballistic missile defense programs of the other side. Previous proposals for the predictability package, i.e. exchange of programmatic data, open laboratories initiative, and observation of strategic defense tests, remain on the table.

9. The Negotiating Group should continue to emphasize, as the U.S. side has done since the beginning of these negotiations in March 1985, the need for compliance with existing arms control agreements, noting that violations undermine the arms control process and make achievement of new agreements very difficult. No violations of a treaty can be considered to be a minor matter, nor can there be confidence in agreements if a country can pick and choose which provisions of an agreement it will comply with. Correcting their violations will be a true test of Soviet willingness to enter a more constructive relationship and broaden the basis for cooperation between our two countries on security matters. This becomes particularly important in the context of a commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, in light of Soviet noncompliance with that treaty. U.S. policy remains that Soviet non-compliance with existing treaties must be corrected, and in particular that the method of correcting the violation caused by the Krasnoyarsk radar is the dismantlement of this illegal radar. In the context of the negotiations, the U.S. side should make this policy clear to its Soviet counterparts, and note that in order to support efforts to negotiate new agreements, construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, which has been halted by the Soviet side, should not be resumed and that the radar should be dismantled in a verifiable manner.

Coordination with Other Negotiations

10. The NST and Defense and Space Negotiating Group relations with the SCC and CD are defined in references B and C.

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR 096, NSDD 295. Powell distributed the decision directive to Bush, Shultz, Carlucci, Herrington, Webster, Crowe, and Burns under cover of a January 14 memorandum, in which he noted: “Consideration of the proposal to modify RV counting rules to limit the number of declared warheads on a ballistic missile to no less than two-thirds of the maximum number of reentry vehicles the missile is capable of carrying is deferred. The proposal will be reconsidered once procedures have been developed for on-site inspection to verify the number of ballistic missile warheads to be attributed to a given system.” (Ibid.)
2. Secret. The Department transmitted these instructions in telegram 8948 to NST Geneva, January 13. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880597-0273)
3. In telegram 134761 to NST Geneva, May 5, 1987, the Department transmitted overall instructions for Round IX. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870618-0406)
4. Secret. The Department transmitted these instructions in telegram 8947 to NST Geneva, January 13. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File D880597-0272)
5. See Document 260.
6. Secret. The Department transmitted these instructions in telegram 8939 to NST Geneva, January 13. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880602-0060)
7. In telegram 18670 to NST Geneva, January 22, the Department transmitted the text of a draft Defense and Space Treaty. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File,
8. In telegram 105910 to Geneva, April 9, 1985, the Department transmitted instructions for the Standing Consultative Commission. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D850218-0117)
9. In telegram 96088 to Geneva, March 29, 1985, the Department transmitted instructions for coordination between delegations to the Conference on Disarmament and Defense and Space Talks. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880614-0373)