The vehicle for arms control discussion is a compartmented paper (GRIP
40) (Tab D)3 based on Paul
Nitze’s version of a summit joint statement. At present, it includes the
following changes in existing U.S. positions
favored by State:
Most of of these will be controversial; some more so than others. The
paper has some agreed points as well, including the outline of a
verification approach for START. In
addition to the substantive issues, we believe you need to discuss the
tactics of how the statement would [Page 1023] be tabled. This is not on the agenda, but is
essential and we have alerted agencies to be prepared for it.
We believe the agency positions are reflected in the paper. We suspect
Secretary Shultz will assume this has all been decided. We understand
Secretary Carlucci may
introduce the idea of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty through 1994 and non-deployment through 1996.
The DCI may raise the issue of European
concerns with a START treaty.
We are aware of no plans by any agency to raise any other arms control
issues. If such issues are raised, we recommend discouraging discussion
during the meeting; we need to focus on the questions directly related
to START and Defense and Space.
Fritz Ermarth, Steve Steiner, Don Mahley and Bill Heiser concur (all on
previous drafts).
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the National Security
Council6
GENERAL POWELL’S TALKING
POINTS
I. INTRODUCTION
—We are here for a final review of some aspects of our arms
reductions positions before the summit.
—Mr. President, would you care to make any initial remarks before we
begin?
[President makes opening remarks.]
[Page 1024]
—Thank you sir. We have a compartmented paper you’ve all been
provided to help structure the discussion. Lets first turn to START.
II. DISCUSSION OF
ALTERNATIVE START POSITIONS
—I want to walk through the approach as I understand it. First we all
need to be clear that this is intended as a package. I know it’s
important to the JCS and others to
view it that way; some moves are only acceptable in the context of
things like counting rules.
NOTE: THIS POINT IS IMPORTANT TO THE CHIEFS.
—What we’ve done is set forth a paper that describes how we want the joint statement at the end of the
summit to come out. Near the end of the meeting we’ll talk about how
we get there.
—We have general agreement on several points. We all agree to begin
with a chapeau that makes it clear the Joint Draft Treaty Text is
agreed by both sides. In the chapeau we also would nail down:
—1600 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (Bombers, ICBMs and SLBMs);
—6000 total “warheads”
—1540 warheads on Soviet heavy ICBMs (a 50% cut from current levels); and
—A 50% cut in total Soviet ballistic missile
throwweight
—Then we’d have sections on:
—4800 ballistic missile sublimit and 3300 sublimit on ICBMs
NOTE: ADELMAN SAID ON THE RECORD YESTERDAY THAT 3300 WASN’T
ESSENTIAL. SHOULD STAY IN NONETHELESS.
—ALCM counting rules
(attribute 6 ALCMs to each
ALCM-carrying heavy
bomber)
—Ballistic missile warhead counting rules for existing
missiles
—A verification package.
NOTE: PACKAGE INCLUDES:
1. Data exchange
2. Baseline inspections
3. On-site observance of elimination
4. Continuous monitoring of portals of productions facilities
5. Short-notice inspections of declared facilities
6. Short-notice inspections of suspect sites
7. No concealment or interference with NTM
8. Cooperative measures
to enhance NTM
—None of this is inconsistent with our past position, although we had
not previously agreed on ALCM
counting rules or decided on numbers of Soviet RVs we could accept.
[Page 1025]
—Since there is general agreement on this part, I’d like to move on
to the issues where we don’t have consensus unless someone
objects.
—The first such area is mobile ICBMs. We’ve discussed this before. As I understand it,
there are three views:
—Decide that we should alter our position and accept mobile
ICBMs in a future treaty.
State advocates agreeing to accept mobiles if effective
verification is possible.
—OSD and Ed Rowny would not move
in this area.
—ACDA would accept only
road-mobile, single RV
ICBMs.
—George [Shultz] why should the President change now? Why not
wait?
—Verification is key here. Judge [Webster] what are the CIA’s views?
—Ken [Adelman] why do
you think we should only allow road-mobile.
—How do the JCS feel about Ken’s
idea?
NOTE: JCS/OSD PROBABLY PLAN TO ABANDON MIDGETMAN WHICH IS ONLY
MOBILE ICBM KEN’S PROPOSAL
ALLOWS.
—Does OSD still want to hang tough
on mobiles? Does anyone?
NOTE: ROWNY WILL WANT TO HANG TOUGH.
—The next area is allowing heavy missile modernization. As I
understand it only State advocates this. George, why is this
important?
—Are others opposed to doing this at all, or just opposed to doing it
now?
NOTE: MOST WILL ACCEPT; ISSUE IS TIMING.
—We can be sure the Soviets will raise SLCMs and Backfire. As I understand it we all agree
that we could respond to Soviet concerns by offering an exchange of
unilateral declarations of nuclear SLCM forces. Does anyone disagree?
NOTE: THIS IS THE BEST WE CAN DO, BUT WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT SATISFY THE SOVIETS.
—With respect to Backfire, if the Soviets accept our position, State
would exclude Backfire from the treaty if there was no increase in
numbers, it could not be refueled, and was not equipped to carry
ALCMs.
—OSD, ACDA and Ed Rowny oppose this. Why?
CALL ON EACH IN TURN
—What do the JCS think?
III. DISCUSSION OF
ALTERNATIVE DEFENSE AND SPACE POSITIONS
—Lets move to Defense and Space. Here we have agreement on a chapeau
paragraph that is consistent with our current position.
[Page 1026]
—Our Defense and Space Negotiator, Hank Cooper, and Ed Rowny would
make no move beyond that paragraph lengthening the non-withdrawal
period, unless the Soviets concede to us a clear right to deploy
after the period.
—Other agencies believe that we need to make some concessions. These
are spelled out in the first two options.
—The first option would extend the non-withdrawal period through
1996, return us to the ABM Treaty
after the period, and commit us to negotiate on the distinction
between permitted testing and prohibited deployment.
—The second option would entail a non-deployment commitment through 1996, with a right to deploy
thereafter, and an agreed understanding of what constitutes
prohibited deployment, coupled with clear acknowledgement of our
right to test under the broad interpretation.
—Finally, a third option weaves together elements of the first two. I
think it would be best if we work from Option 3, as it captures the
basic points at issue:
—Whether we commit not to withdraw from
the ABM Treaty, or simply not
to deploy defenses not permitted by the
Treaty.
—Whether we have a clear right to deploy after the period, or
whether we would have to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.
—And, whether we should negotiate what constitutes prohibited
testing versus permitted deployment.
—Option 3 also contains points of agreement among those who favor
changing our position—that we should lengthen the period to 1996 and
that we should undertake measures to improve predictability.
—As we we think about these options, some of which involve major
concessions to the Soviets, we need to think about the tactics
involved.
—George [Shultz] why do we need to move on SDI now, and are there any requirements that the
Soviets would have to meet before we table the option favored by
State?
[AFTER DISCUSSION]
—Frank [Carlucci]
does Defense want to see anything from the Soviets before we would
move in Defense & Space?
NOTE: CARLUCCI MAY
SUPPORT NON-WITHDRAWAL THROUGH 1994 AND NON-DEPLOYMENT THROUGH 1996
AS A COMPROMISE
[AFTER DISCUSSION]
—Other opinions?
[AFTER DISCUSSION]
—As we are about to go toe to toe with the Soviets, I think we must
be absolutely clear about where we stand. Mr. President, your [Page 1027] key advisors differ over
lengthening the non-withdrawal period (absent key Soviet concessions
in Defense and Space), what should happen during the period, and
perhaps most importantly what happens to the ABM Treaty after the period.
—We will be preparing papers for your decisions on these issues.
IV. SUMMARY
—We have two more areas to cover.
NOTE: IF TIME SHORT, SKIP KRASNOYARSK AND GO TO TACTICS WHICH IS MORE
IMPORTANT.
—Agencies differ on what to do about Krasnoyarsk.
—Two formulations have been suggested:
—Halt construction and agree that the radar will be dismantled
in a verifiable manner. This is the choice of OSD, Ed Rowny and Ambassador
Cooper.
—Agree that construction will not be resumed, that the
transmitter power supply will be removed and that we’ll have a
right to periodic on-site inspection. State and ACDA favor this.
—We’re running short of time; are there any essential points on this
to make to the President?
[AFTER BRIEF DISCUSSION]
—I’d like to talk about tactics for a moment. I see three basic
possibilities for introducing this material:
—Provide it as a paper to Soviet Marshal Ahkromeyev on Monday
December 7.
—Have the President introduce it in his initial meeting and
explain it in detail.
—Have the President introduce it and suggest that it be discussed
by experts.
—What are your thoughts?
[DISCUSSION]
—This has been useful. Thank you for coming.
