238. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) to President Reagan1
In preparation for your meetings next week with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, to review US START and Defense and Space positions and identify what, if any, moves we might make in an attempt to reach agreement by next summer.
Your meeting next week with General Secretary Gorbachev will deal with all four aspects of the U.S.—Soviet relationship: human rights, regional issues and bilateral issues as well as arms control. The principal focus of this NSPG, however, is arms control since there are no policy decisions required in other areas. This NSPG will be your final opportunity to personally review issues with your senior advisors.
The most important arms reductions issues facing us are whether (and if so how) to modify our START and Defense and Space position in order to move closer to an acceptable START Treaty. I propose the NSPG focus on this issue. In preparation for the meeting the Arms Control Support Group has prepared a compartmented paper attached as Tab D. This paper is structured around a draft summit joint statement as a vehicle for considering possible specific moves. The paper has been distributed to your senior advisors and I intend to use it as the focus of discussion.
In general, I expect at least some individuals to argue for the following changes in existing U.S. positions:
—Dropping the 1650 ICBM sublimit.
—Establishing a counting rule of 6 air-launched cruise missiles per bomber.
—Accepting a SALT II approach on the BACKFIRE bomber by excluding Backfire from START in return for Soviet commitments not to increase numbers or provide for in-flight refueling. (This would not be part of our going in position but would be available as a response should the Soviets seem serious).
—Allowing heavy ICBM modernization.[Page 1029]
—Allowing mobile ICBMs, subject to an agreed limit and agreed verification.
—Extending the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty through 1996.
—Accepting reversion to the ABM Treaty rather than freedom to deploy after the non-withdrawal period.
—Agreeing to negotiate on what is permitted and what is prohibited under the ABM Treaty.
—Accepting a construction moratorium rather than dismantlement of Krasnoyarsk.
Many of these will be controversial; some more so than others. In addition to the substantive issues, we will have a brief discussion on tactics.
Participants at Tab B.2
IV. PRESS PLAN
White House photographer only.
V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
The agenda is at Tab A.3 I will open by asking for your comments; suggested talking points are at Tab C. We will then spend 25 minutes reviewing START options, followed by a similar period on Defense and Space. We will conclude with a brief discussion of Krasnoyarsk (time permitting) and summit tactics. No decisions are required at the meeting; decisions will be needed over the weekend.[Page 1030]
- Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 171. Secret. Copied to Bush and Senator Baker. Prepared by Brooks and Tobey. A stamped notation indicates Reagan saw the memorandum.↩
- Attached but not printed is the participants list.↩
- Attached but not printed is the agenda.↩
- Secret; Noforn; Grip.↩
- [1 paragraph (13 lines) not declassified]↩
- See footnote 6.↩
- “The DCI’s Representative notes that in many cases, the Intelligence Community would not want to step back from the provisions listed below. Our monitoring confidence for many of the START-related tasks would be higher given a more comprehensive set of verification measures. As an example, such a set could include a more restrictive deployment mode for mobile missiles. The DCI’s Representative also notes we have not examined the risks associated with various verification provisions and our monitoring uncertainties. The policy agencies need to address the risks associated with cheating which may result from such provisions.” [Footnote is in the original.]↩
- “The DCI’s Representative notes that under a START agreement which only limits mobile missiles, many of our monitoring confidences will be reduced over those under a ban. [6 lines not declassified]. Confidence Building Measures can increase our confidence about the size of deployed forces and the number produced at declared facilities but will not eliminate the potential for the Soviets to store previously produced equipment or to covertly produce equipment and missiles at other facilities. ACDA notes there are significant verification differences between road- and rail-mobile ICBMs [less than 1 line not declassified]” [Footnote is in the original.]↩