236. Telegram From the Embassy in Moscow to the Department of State1

00592. Subject: Soviet NST policy, the last year of the Reagan administration and the Washington summit.

1. Secret—Entire text.

Summary

2. With the INF Treaty to be signed at next week’s summit, the focus of Soviet arms control policy is now on START and the ABM Treaty. Despite the fact that President Reagan has only a year left in [Page 1015] office, the Soviets seem willing, and have incentives, to work to conclude further agreements with the current administration.

3. The Soviets recognize, however, that time is short. In order to have a START accord ready for the 1988 Moscow summit, they probably believe that the Washington meeting must produce agreed instructions to the NST negotiators regarding the basic structure of a treaty (or two treaties). In fact, the success or failure of the Washington meeting in this regard will determine the thrust of the Soviet NST approach for the next year, i.e. whether they work actively for agreement or adopt a more passive stance, waiting for the next administration.

4. We believe Gorbachev in Washington will be ready to accept something approaching our START sublimits structure, solving the main question and moving the focus to other issues—mobile ICBMs, Backfire, SLCM and verification—on which the Soviets also will press to make progress next week. He is likely to maintain some linkage between START reductions and the ABM Treaty. While the Soviets are less obsessed with and unnerved by SDI than in the past, they have made much of it politically. We doubt Gorbachev can back totally off, though he may settle for a “solution” which is largely cosmetic.

End summary

5. This message provides Embassy thoughts on how the Soviets will pursue NST arms control in 1988 and how they will approach this subject at the Washington summit.

Soviet incentives to deal

6. The Reagan administration has slightly over a year remaining in office. While Moscow may hope that a “softer” administration will succeed it, the Soviets regularly state they are ready to work with this administration. The INF treaty—in which the Soviets have essentially accepted the original U.S. proposal—is one proof. We think Gorbachev personally continues to have incentives to achieve further arms control accords with this administration:

—First, Gorbachev’s interest in striking arms control deals with the U.S. is driven by two longer term desires: to show his countrymen he is a leader of international stature working to reduce the outside threat, and to pursue perestroyka with a minimal number of foreign distractions.

—Second, arms control “successes” over the short term can strengthen Gorbachev’s immediate domestic position. A successful and productive Moscow summit would give him a solid boost going into next June’s extraordinary Party conference.

7. There are other reasons that argue in Moscow for moving now as opposed to waiting for the next administration:

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—The Soviets probably believe President Reagan is in a stronger position than any likely successor (at least at the start of the new president’s term) to press for Senate ratification of an agreement.

—Given the “hard-line” image of the President, his conclusion of major arms control deals with the USSR can be seen as “blessing” the process and making it easier for subsequent administrations to do so.

—The Soviets probably expect that one off shoot of a series of major U.S.-Soviet arms control deals could be a relaxation of U.S. and Western concerns about the Soviet threat (perhaps with less public/legislative support for increased defense spending and greater access to Western technology), a desirable off shoot from the Soviet standpoint.

The potential costs of waiting

8. While some of these benefits could be realized as a result of arms control agreements with the next administration, the Soviets surely appreciate the potential costs of waiting. Although Yel’stin’s fall shows that Gorbachev is ready to make tactical retreats when necessary, he still strikes us as an impatient man. He wants to get on with his programs and some of the pluses of further accords (i.e. a personal boost for next June’s conference) would be irretrievably lost if the Soviets were to wait for President Reagan’s successor.

9. Moreover, the Soviets probably understand that the “waiting period” would be considerably more than a year. A new administration would need time to learn the ropes, reinvent some wheels, and build a relationship with the Senate to ensure ratification of any agreement it might conclude. Delay thus does not mean one year, but likely much more.

Time is growing short

10. The Soviets recognize that the time remaining for dealing with the current administration is growing short. And they understand that the farther we move into 1988, the more the American political process will become absorbed with the election campaign and the less time there would be for Senate ratification (indeed, some of our Soviet interlocutors are pessimistic that a START treaty submitted even in late spring would have time to be ratified, and expect that a subsequent administration would not accept the accord as is, but try to “improve” it).

11. The Soviets also understand that coming to agreement on the details of an accord, even if the main provisions are settled, can be a complex and time-consuming process. This has certainly been the case with INF (though the Soviets appear to believe that much of the INF experience, for example the verification regime, can be applied to START, and thus make that negotiation somewhat simpler).

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12. The Soviets believe that, if they are to be in a position to sign further accords at the Moscow summit, they must reach agreement with us on the basic outlines of those accords in Washington. This is the objective (whether expressed as key provisions or instructions to delegations) that they have publicly set for Washington. Delegations in Geneva could then focus on secondary issues and verification when they resume in January, most likely with periodic help from ministers, as has been the INF case the last three months.

13. A failure to produce any major progress on START and the ABM Treaty next week could lead the Soviets to conclude there was not enough time to come to agreement with the current administration. In this case, they might adopt a passive approach at the negotiating table, save “concessions” for the next administration, and play harder at the propaganda game while waiting for 1989.

START

14. With the INF Treaty to be signed next week, the Soviets have publicly placed the spotlight on START. (They previously also regarded START as the more crucial question, calling an INF agreement important above and beyond its own terms, i.e. as a prelude to an accord on strategic offensive arms cuts—the “root” problem.) The Soviets continue to note the need to maintain the ABM Treaty, but generally as a condition for a START accord. They do not usually give it equal attention or treatment.

15. We believe the Soviets are serious about reaching agreement on a fifty-percent START reduction (it is doubtful they would have invested so much public capital in the proposal if it was bluff). Gorbachev will be prepared to deal, and Akhromeyev’s presence on the Soviet delegation suggests they will be ready to try to work seriously on details next week.

More moves on sublimits?

16. At the first Washington, the Moscow and the Geneva ministerials, the Soviet START position evolved and acquired elements moving it toward our own in terms of sublimits structure. Gorbachev will likely have more ideas, perhaps including a combination of a sublimit on total ballistic missile warheads and a sublimit on ICBM warheads with some freedom to mix, that will bring the Soviet position even closer to our own structure.

17. We note that institute arms control experts have long suggested the Soviet position on sublimits could evolve toward our own. MFA Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate and USA desk officers have suggested to us in the last month that there is flexibility in the Soviet position on sublimits. And, in his NBC interview, Gorbachev [Page 1018] stated: “we shall be talking about the strategic offensive arms, about levels and sublevels. And here we have some steps that we could take to meet the American position halfway. Some of these steps we’ve already taken.” The implication is that some steps have not yet been taken. The summit is the logical place to do so.

18. The Soviets understand our position on sublimits. Although they complain about the impact such limits would have in forcing them to restructure their strategic forces, their complaints are less than they make them out to be. They are altering the structure of their strategic forces in any event. This is driven by concerns about the existing and potential threats posed to Soviet fixed land-based ICBMs by MX and the Trident D-5. They are already moving toward a force more reliant on SLBMs, bombers/ALCMs and mobile ICBMs. We believe this will make it easier for them to accept something akin to our own sublimits structure. I would predict that they will accept a limit lower than 5100 for ballistic missile warheads, and will probably accept our proposed 4800 if the other elements of the package are satisfactory to them.

Other START questions important

19. As the Soviets have done in Geneva, Gorbachev will undoubtedly reiterate their concerns over our positions on banning mobile ICBMs, including Backfire in the 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicle limit, and developing some limits on sea-launched cruise missiles. He will likely seek to trade further Soviet moves on sublimits not only to try to bring us to agreement on the ABM Treaty, but also for movement on these START questions.

20. We expect the Soviets will press hard to reach agreement on these secondary START issues as well as the sublimits structure. They may believe resolution of these questions in Washington is also essential to provide a chance to finish a START accord in the first half of 1988. The INF experience is instructive. Four months were necessary to close the deal after Gorbachev’s July 22 acceptance of Double Global Zero. If no progress is registered on these secondary issues in Washington, the Soviets may conclude there is not enough time to work out details, verification provisions and precise treaty text for the Moscow summit.

SDI—The concern appears to have lessened

21. As we have followed it in Moscow, the Soviet concern about SDI has decreased notably over the last two years. In contrast to the shrill outcries against the program after its inception, the Soviets now appear more relaxed about it. We believe there are several reasons for the Soviets becoming less obsessed with and unnerved by SDI:

—Congress has limited funding for the program to levels below those requested by the administration;

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—The administration has agreed for the foreseeable future to maintain the program within the restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty; and

—The Soviets appear to have concluded that there are significant technical complexities facing SDI and are less worried about the possibility of a quick breakthrough that would drastically, and with little warning, upset the strategic balance. Leading scientists, such as Space Research Institute Chief Sagdeyev, seem to have accepted (though they may not admit it publicly) the Sakharov view that the Soviets have nothing to fear from SDI since any system which might be deployed before the end of the century would be easily countered.

22. We have the impression here that the Soviets are downplaying the SDI issue. Indeed, their public short-hand formulation since the September ministerial has generally called for a fifty-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms “in conditions of strict observance of the ABM Treaty for an agreed period of time,” without detailed elaboration or specific attack on SDI.

23. The Soviets have publicly made a concerted effort to avoid SDI per se, and make their arguments in terms of preserving the ABM Treaty. Most recently Gorbachev denied that the Soviets were after SDI in his NBC interview. This may be nothing more than a change in words. Moscow knows full well that their proposals for preserving the ABM Treaty would entail restrictions on SDI. But the change in emphasis may also signal (1) acceptance that there will be a vigorous SDI program, and (2) a public approach more conducive to permitting a face-saving solution for both sides on the ABM Treaty issue.

24. Some Soviet officials seem to be downplaying the nature of the U.S.-Soviet disagreement over the ABM Treaty question as well. MFA Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate Chief Karpov, appearing at a November 26 press conference, appeared to suggest the main remaining question on the ABM Treaty was the length of the period of non-withdrawal, an issue he called open for discussion. (However, on December 1, one of his staff told Emboff Karpov had not meant to focus on the time issue to the exclusion of all others.)

25. While the Soviets are focusing less public attention on SDI and the ABM Treaty issue, the question is what will be their bottom line in terms of what they demand in the ABM Treaty area. Over the last six months, there have been some suggestions that the Soviets might be willing to drop the linkage and implement START cuts independently. Various Soviet Institute Arms Control experts (including Sagdeyev) and, on one occasion in June, MFA Deputy Minister Bessmertnykh have expressed interest in an idea originally attributed to Andrey Sakharov, i.e. that the sides would agree to and implement fifty-percent START cuts with the proviso that either could withdraw from those cuts if it felt the other had violated the ABM Treaty, but without further definition of what limits the ABM Treaty entailed.

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But the linkage remains

26. We do not wholly exclude the “Sakharov” notion (primarily because Sagdeyev has an interesting track record; though supposedly not a participant in the formal arms control process, he foreshadowed the Soviet NST position on a list and setting parameters that would determine whether devices were allowed or prohibited from space). But delinkage in this manner seems unlikely. The Soviets have made such an issue over SDI and preserving the ABM Treaty that it would be nearly impossible for them to drop any formal connection between the two. While we suspect Soviet concern about SDI has lessened over the last few years, we would be very surprised if the military—suspicious as it is of the possibilities of American high tech—did not insist on some measures to provide predictability in the offense-defense relationship.

27. We would also point out that, while the general Soviet line has been to downplay SDI, the Politburo notes of November 12 made clear in an authoritative manner that the linkage remains. In fact, those notes cited the ABM Treaty’s importance for maintaining strategic stability and as a basis for positive progressive movement in the U.S.-Soviet relationship in general.

28. A variant would be to maintain the linkage, reaffirm the ABM Treaty, but leave open the question of its interpretation. We have occasionally tried to sound out some of our Soviet interlocutors about their reaction to such an approach. The reaction is generally one of no interest.

The September variants

29. We thus come back to the two variants that Shevardnadze offered in September: agreement on a list approach setting parameters for determining devices permitted and prohibited from space or to abide by the ABM Treaty as originally signed and ratified for an agreed period of time. We believe these will be the basis of Gorbachev’s ABM Treaty approach in Washington.

30. While the Soviets appeared to be pressing the list notion over the summer, we have the impression that they are now giving more attention to the latter variant, offering the list as a fall back should there be a need to set specific parameters. There appears to be some sense to this. Our Soviet interlocutors understand that the second variant is simpler; working out a list of devices and parameters would be technically complex and time-consuming (time again being an important factor).

31. But it is also possible that Gorbachev may go back to pursue the list approach in his discussions with the President. First, the Soviets have undoubtedly taken note of press reports regarding interest in [Page 1021] various Washington quarters in exploring the idea. And second, if Gorbachev wants to show some flexibility on the ABM Treaty issue, it may be possible by adjusting the levels for parameters on the list. Reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty as agreed in 1972 likely translates, in Soviet eyes, to reaffirmation of the “narrow” interpretation, a reversal the Soviets may calculate the present administration cannot make, while they themselves cannot accept the “broad” interpretation. They could see the list proposal (admittedly a more complex approach) as a means to blur the “narrow” vs. “broad” interpretation question, and come up with a pragmatic solution presenting a compromise that avoided the impression that either side had given up its principled position.

32. On other ABM Treaty issues, we suspect Gorbachev may show some flexibility on the length of the non-withdrawal period (this was the implication at Karpov’s recent press conference). We believe Gorbachev will be more rigid in refusing to commit now to a new regime after expiration of that period, insisting on reversion to the ABM Treaty’s six month withdrawal clause.

In sum

33. The Soviets likely see the Washington summit as key to how the NST talks will play out during 1988. The meeting’s success or failure will have a major impact on the Soviet approach next year, and could determine such a basic question as whether the Soviets adopt an active and business-like attitude or instead play a waiting game for the next administration.

34. We see significant reasons why Gorbachev would want to make the Washington meeting a success, reasons that relate not least of all to his own domestic position. To this end, he may travel to the U.S. next week prepared to take serious steps to find compromises on START and the ABM Treaty that will move the NST negotiations toward further accords in the first half of 1988.

35. Leningrad minimize considered.

Matlock
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870988-0097. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.