Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

20. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, May 21, 1982

SUBJECT

• NSC Meeting on START—May 21, 1982

Issue: What should be the U.S. position on additional issues related to our START position?

Facts: The purpose of the May 21 NSC meeting is to address issues not covered in the units of account decisions contained in NSDD-33.²

Discussion:

NSDD-33 directed the Interdepartmental Group (IG) to provide its recommendations on interim restraints and other elements of the U.S. START approach for NSC review by May 18.

The IG has now provided papers on: (1) interim restraints; (2) the treatment of mobile ICBMs; and (3) a collection of related topics upon which we have interdepartmental consensus. In addition, there is some confusion about the relationship of the phases of our approach to each other. This topic, for which there is no IG paper, needs immediate discussion. Additional work on certain other critical issues is not complete and must be clearly tasked for early IG completion.

We recommend the agenda below for the NSC meeting. For each item on the agenda, we have provided for your review both my intended talking points and the material generated by the IG to address the subject. We have not suggested any specific talking points for your use at this NSC meeting.

Proposed Agenda:

—Interim Restraints (Tab A)

—Issues Upon Which Interdepartmental Consensus Exists (Tab B)

—Treatment of Mobile ICBMs (Tab C)

—Necessary Additional Work (Tab D)

—Relationship of the “Phases” of Negotiation to Each Other (Tab E)

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council ³

Washington, undated

Background/Talking Points—INTERIM RESTRAINTS

Issue: What should be the US position with respect to “interim restraints” proposed while negotiations begin?

Facts:—US policy has been that while the US review of arms control policy continued, the US would take no action to undercut existing agreements as long as the Soviet Union exercised similar restraint.

—The ambiguity of this policy as to what constitutes undercutting existing agreements was intentional.

Discussion: There are three options offered in the attached paper:

1. Continue the policy of not “undercutting existing agreements.”

2. Add to the “no undercut” policy a “cap” on the number of ballistic missile warheads at the total number currently deployed by either side.

3. Change policy to one of respecting those provisions of existing agreements that do not adversely affect the President’s program of strategic force modernization.

—The attached Interdepartmental Group-developed paper adequately frames the issue.

Suggested Talking Points

—Unquestionably we need to have a position on interim restraints included in our START proposal, and we need to identify that position as quickly as possible.

—Without it we remain vulnerable to criticism from those who advocate a nuclear freeze and to those supporting ratification of SALT II.

—Three alternatives have been suggested.

—Some, notably State, advocate that we continue the policy of not undercutting existing agreements as long as the Soviets show similar restraint.

—The main arguments against this are that some feel that such a policy does not sufficiently distance us from SALT and makes it difficult to support not ratifying SALT II.

—In addition, some argue that the ambiguity of this policy with respect to what is meant by the phrase “not undercut” will lead many to interpret it as complying with agreements and will cause us difficulty when we move to deploy MX.

Option 2

—The JCS have suggested that there may be military merit in proposing that we “cap” the number of ballistic missile warheads at the total number currently deployed by either side.

—The main arguments against this are that it would appear to be a freeze, which we reject, that it could lead to an unacceptable Soviet counter-proposal (i.e., including bomber weapons) and to an ensuing distracting negotiation on what should be capped; it would be difficult to verify, and it would be inconsistent with our approach in INF (i.e., sounds too much like the Soviet moratorium proposal).

—These arguments have been compelling enough to move the JCS to support Option 1. No agency supports Option 2.

Option 3

—Others, notably Defense, suggest that we distance ourselves from SALT II by arguing that it conflicts with the President’s modernization program, a program necessary to achieve the US goal of enhanced strategic stability. They advocate a policy that the US will continue to respect those provisions of existing agreements that do not adversely affect the President’s modernization program which is essential to protecting the US deterrent and achieving stability and strategic arms reductions.

—The main argument against this is that while it does explicitly permit the US to proceed with planned modernizations, it opens the door to the Soviets to do likewise—and therefore it may make us vulnerable to the criticism of having no real policy for interim restraint.

—The various positions and arguments are provided in much more detail in the paper submitted by the Interdepartmental Group.

—Given our full agenda for today, perhaps we could simply hear briefly any additional views or arguments not captured in that paper at this time.

—Al Haig, would you like to begin?

Contingency Point If No Consensus Develops (as is likely)

—The main objections that remain for continuing the policy of not undercutting existing agreements remain that (1) it doesn’t sufficiently explain why we simply don’t ratify SALT II, and (2) that it may cause us problems when we take action to deploy MX.

—Would an alternative formulation of the no-undercut policy along these lines help us overcome these difficulties?

[Pass out copies of the attached formulation prepared by NSC staff.]

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the START IG ⁴

Washington, undated

BACKGROUND

It has been U.S. policy during the Reagan Administration to take no action that would undercut existing SALT agreements pending the completion of our START policy review provided the Soviets exercise similar restraint. With our policy review nearly completed, we must now decide what kind of interim restraints would best serve our interests after START negotiations begin. There will be substantial interest in some form of interim restraint from the Congress, our Allies, and the public as we proceed with START negotiations. A decision on interim restraints must be consistent with our position on units of account and therefore has been delayed until now.

IMPACT OF CURRENT POLICY

Under SALT I Interim Agreement (IA) restraints, both sides would be required to dismantle submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers; the U.S. would dismantle retired Polaris launchers while the Soviets would dismantle deployed submarine launchers.

To comply with SALT II provisions, the Soviets are observing its limit of 820 multiple warhead (MIRVed) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and the 30 per year production restriction on the Backfire bomber. Without this restraint, the Soviets could deploy over 160 additional MIRVed ICBMs by 1985.

SALT II limitations affect U.S. programs in the following ways:

—the planned U.S. MIRVed missile deployments would put the U.S. over the combined MIRV limits of 1200 and 1320 before the end of 1985;

—those MX basing mode alternatives that would build new fixed launchers would violate the SALT II (and IA) ban on such construction. We have made no basing decisions, however, and any impact would be several years away.

INTERIM RESTRAINT OPTIONS

There is general agreement that this Administration should adopt some form of interim restraint. This is especially important if we are to avoid new pressures for ratifying SALT II, which would surely cause a contentious and ultimately harmful debate. There are two broad approaches available:

1) Continuation of our current policy (“Not undercut existing agreements”): This would continue the current restraints on Soviet and U.S. forces if the Soviets continue to adhere to the same constraints. For two to three years there would be only modest impact on U.S. strategic plans. The impact on Soviet strategic forces, as indicated above, would be more significant: the Intelligence Community believes they would deploy MIRVed ICBMs well beyond the constraints of SALT II. The limitations of the SALT II Protocol would have applied only through the end of 1981 and thus would not be a part of this policy. The SALT I IA restraints would require both sides to continue dismantling old missile firing submarines as new ones were deployed; a SALT II restraint alone would not. Continuing our present policy would, however, permit substantial warhead growth on both sides.

It is the view of the agencies that support Option 1 that it represents the most effective means of avoiding a prolonged and divisive debate over the future status of the SALT II treaty. There are a number of valid reasons why we do not wish to ratify or renegotiate SALT II, including its unequal treatment of heavy ICBMs, its failure to capture Backfire, and its deficiencies with respect to verification. None of these major problems can be addressed in the context of an interim restraint regime without opening a new negotiation with the Soviets—which would inevitably divert us from the priority task of strategic arms reductions to which the President has committed his Administration.

On the other hand, to reject any form of interim restraint—or to declare a policy to which the Soviets would not adhere—would free the USSR to take steps, such as the deployment of additional MIRVed ICBMs, which the Intelligence Community considers likely, and which we could not match in the short term. The intentional ambiguity in our current policy—which does not assert that we will “adhere to” existing agreements—provides flexibility to continue our own strategic force modernization while both inhibiting possible Soviet moves and most effectively defusing the SALT II issue politically.

An option which seeks to pick and choose among existing particular SALT provisions would in effect leave the Soviets unconstrained and thus would heighten debate in the U.S. and Europe over the wisdom of not ratifying SALT II. In addition, this approach would suggest that the Administration’s opposition to SALT II stems primarily from the concern that the treaty would inhibit MX basing options—which is not the case. In so narrowing the basis for our opposition to SALT II, the approach would undercut our ability to make our case against ratification, while at the same time stimulating increased opposition to the eventual MX basing scheme.

2) A new but temporary restraint that would supplement our current policy. The U.S. could initiate START negotiations with a public proposal not to increase the total number of ballistic missile warheads beyond the number currently deployed by either side, provided the Soviet Union exercised the same restraint. This proposal to “cap” ballistic missile warheads could allow the Administration to capture the political initiative, respond to the groundswell of demand for real arms control, and allow us to distance ourselves from SALT II.

Under such a missile warhead cap, modernization within existing ballistic missile warhead numbers would be permitted. We would continue to deploy new SLBMs on Trident submarines; and after 1986, MX would begin to be deployed. Without a cap, these deployments would be a net addition to currently deployed systems; but under a missile warhead “cap”, old systems would be replaced with more survivable new systems.

The Soviets would, however, be unlikely to accept such a proposal; in all probability they would reject it as inequitable or make a counter-proposal which could, for example, include a cap on bomber weapons. In addition, this could require extensive negotiations which would distract from the principal negotiating effort.

3) A new policy that expresses U.S. determination to achieve strategic stability by a combination of modernization and arms control, and that distances the Administration from acceptance of SALT I and II. OSD has provided the following rationale:

This policy would be stated as follows: In order to enhance strategic stability the United States will modernize its strategic forces while negotiating for substantial reductions. It will continue to respect those provisions of existing agreements that do not adversely affect the President’s program of stategic force modernization which is essential to protecting the U.S. deterrent and achieving stability and strategic arms reductions.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense believes that the proposal of some other agencies to extend the policy adopted during the Administration’s review of START policy runs a significant risk of committing us to abide by SALT I and II for the indefinite future. This would leave the administration vulnerable to the charge that despite the argument that it is seriously flawed, it had tacitly accepted SALT II after all.

In the event a START treaty has not been concluded by 1984, critics will argue that the stubborn refusal to ratify SALT II has doomed the prospects for an arms limitation treaty, stimulated a world wide anti-nuclear movement affecting the U.S. and it allies, and yielded the arms-control initiative to the Soviet Union.

The argument that, “Since we are abiding by SALT II, why not ratify it and cause the Soviets to make the 10% reduction the treaty requires?” has broad (and growing) appeal to which we will lack a simple but persuasive answer unless we clearly establish the basis on which we continue to oppose the SALT II treaty.

OSD believes that there is a simple, coherent basis upon which to distance the Administration from SALT II: it may conflict with the President’s modernization program. The most important example is the deployment of a survivable MX missile. If it entails the construction of new, fixed ICBM launchers, as “Dense Pack” may well, deployment of the MX would almost certainly violate SALT II.

Once the Administration has adopted a post-review policy of adhering to SALT II there will be no turning-point opportunity to alter that policy. The initiation of START may well be the last logical opportunity to establish a policy we can sustain through 1984.

A policy of adherence to SALT II so long as the Soviets show “similar restraint” has the additional unfortunate connotation that current Soviet behavior does in fact exhibit “restraint.” The fact is that the Soviet strategic build-up continues relentlessly. We ought not to contribute to the legitimacy of their claim to moderation or restraint.

It is difficult for anyone not a proponent of SALT II to argue with the formulation we propose. It does not say that we will depart from the SALT II limits. It does say that we will be guided by the requirements for modernization, stability and arms control. And it implies, quite properly in our view, that if those objectives cannot be reached within the confines of SALT II, we will depart from SALT II. Such a formulation would protect the MX no matter how based. And it would give the Administration a far more plausible argument than it now has for refusing to ratify SALT II.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

After considering the merits of these three interim restraint options, the START Interagency Group was unable to reach a consensus. OSD and the START Negotiator believe that our policy should be Option 3, distancing the U.S. from SALT by stressing national security requirements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, State, and ACDA support Option 1, agreeing that this policy should be reviewed regularly to ensure that it remains in the U.S. interest.

The Option 2 cap on warheads would have some military advantages over Option 1, if the verification, negotiating, and political drawbacks could be overcome. It is the opinion of the Interagency Group that these drawbacks outweigh the military advantages.

Recommendations:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, State, and ACDA recommend that the interim restraint policy of the U.S. be Option 1, continuing our current policy of not undercutting existing SALT agreements provided the Soviets exercise similar restraint.⁵

OSD and the START Negotiator recommend that the interim restraint policy of the U.S. be Option 3, distancing the U.S. from SALT by stressing national security requirements.⁶

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council ⁷

Washington, undated

INTERIM RESTRAINTS—ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE

As we seek to achieve a more stable nuclear balance at reduced levels of forces, the United States will take no actions, for the time being, which would undercut existing agreements as long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint.

This policy, however, is conscious of the fact that SALT II is not an acceptable foundation for a final, equal, and verifiable arms reductions agreement between ourselves and the Soviet Union. For reasons cited on many occasions in numerous fora, we believe it would be a major mistake and a diversion from arms reduction efforts to attempt to formalize the SALT II Treaty agreement’s high ceilings and serious inequalities.

At the same time, we believe that increased nuclear stability at reduced force levels is the most basic of U.S. objectives, and that actions necessary to ensure the survivability of our ICBM forces are fully consistent with existing agreement. Protecting the survivability of our ICBM force was a goal in previous negotiations, and remains an essential prerequisite to our security at reduced force levels.

Tab B

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council ⁸

Washington, undated

Background/Talking Points—CONSENSUS POSITIONS

Issue: Should the consensus positions listed in this paper be approved for use in formulating the US START position?

Facts: There is full Interdepartmental consensus on the group of issues listed in the attached paper.

Discussion: None.

Suggested Talking Points

—Turning to the paper entitled “Consensus START Issues,” I think that if there is consensus, we should approve the recommendation of the paper without further discussion.

—Does anyone have any further difficulty with the positions recommended in this paper?

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the START IG ⁹

Washington, undated

CONSENSUS START ISSUES

There is interagency consensus on the following positions for inclusion in the US position on START.

1. Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs)

The US should not seek special limits on ALCMs themselves. ALCM carriers should not be subject to restrictions beyond those applicable to other heavy bombers. All agencies agree that the US should not propose limits on maximum ALCM loadings per bomber in our START proposal. (Some believe that we might eventually consider accepting such limits consistent with our force requirements in return for significant Soviet concessions.)

2. Access to Flight Test Data

Access to flight test telemetry is essential to the verification of certain START limitations. All agencies agree that the US should seek a ban on all telemetry encryption in flight tests of START-limited systems. Additional measures to ensure access to relevant flight test data may also be required. Decisions on additional measures should be made after the provisions of a START agreement become more clear. Such decisions should balance the value of additional information for monitoring Soviet START-limited activities against the impact of reciprocal measures on US flight test practices.

3. Missile Flight Tests

The US should not seek a limitation which would set an annual quota of missile flight tests.

4. Bomber Pre-Launch Survivability

One potentially useful limitation appears to be a ban on “depressed trajectory” SLBM flight tests. However, because of verification problems and the possible implications for certain US systems (e.g., flight tests of Trident II), we should not propose a ban on such testing pending further review.

5. Limits on Air Defenses

We do not envisage air defense limitations in a START agreement. We should, however, use the lack of constraints on Soviet air defenses to achieve preferential treatment of US bombers and their weapons in START.

6. Limits on Civil Defense

Although the Soviet Union has a considerably more active civil defense program than the US, we should not seek civil defense limitations in START. Such limitations would be very difficult to negotiate or verify and could inhibit US civil defense programs.

7. Limits on Anti-Submarine Warfare Capabilities

As there appears to be no compelling US security requirement for ASW limitations, they should not be included in our START proposal.

RECOMMENDATION: All agencies recommend that these positions be approved for use in formulating the US START position.¹⁰

Tab C

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council¹¹

Washington, undated

Background/Talking Points—MOBILE ICBMs

Issue: What should be the US position with respect to the treatment of mobile ICBMs?

Facts:—The MX program currently does not require a fully land-mobile missile transporter-erector-launcher for any of its deceptive basing options. The transporter being designed could not erect and launch the missile.

—The National Intelligence Estimate¹² notes that the Soviets do possess land-mobile ballistic systems (i.e., the SS–16 and the SS–20) and it projects a new land-mobile ICBM under development.

—Some feel that the US should keep open its option to develop and deploy a small, mobile ICBM in the future as a means of ensuring the survivability of the land-based ICBM force.

Discussion: While four options are discussed in the paper developed by the Interdepartmental Group, only two are supported by agencies.

1. All agencies recommend that we make no proposals with regard to mobile ICBMs in our initial position. All feel that we should wait at least until we are more certain about the final MX basing options.

2. The Chairman of the START Delegation suggests that we should propose a ban on mobile ICBMs with a definition of mobility that would exclude deceptive basing options from prohibition.

—The advantages and disadvantages of both positions are included in the attached paper.

Suggested Talking Points:

—The paper provided on this issue indicates that everyone except Ed Rowny supports the position that we make no proposals with regard to mobile ICBMs in our initial position.

—Ed suggests that we draw a distinction between the transportability that is needed to protect a deceptive basing option for MX and the true mobility of an SS–16 type, land-mobile ICBM.

—He would like us to propose a ban on SS–16 type land-mobile ICBMs and permit the transportability needed for deceptive basing.

—The paper does provide a full treatment of this issue. Once again, are there any additional arguments or points that need to be made?

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the START IG ¹³

Washington, undated

Mobile ICBMs

Background Considerations

The US was unable to gain Soviet acceptance of a land-mobile ban in the 1972 Interim Agreement, but stated unilaterally that it would regard Soviet mobile deployments to be inconsistent with the Agreement.

Mobile ICBMs were banned for the duration of the SALT II Protocol, but would have been permitted under the Treaty itself after expiration of the Protocol. Toward the end of the SALT II negotiations, the US put the Soviets on notice that it intended to deploy mobile ICBM launchers in the MPS deceptive-basing system then under consideration.

Until final decisions are taken on MX basing, which are not likely before the opening of START, we will not know whether the US will be required to deploy mobile ICBMs. Some MX deployment options may call for transporting the missile in its cannister between permanent hardened facilities. In addition, we may wish to protect the option to deploy systems in the future for other new ICBMs.

The Soviets have developed and will probably soon test a small, solid-propellant ICBM that would be suitable for off-road mobile deployment (similar to the SS–20 IRBMs basing arrangement). They have also developed a medium, solid-propellant missile that could conceivably be deployed as a mobile, perhaps deceptively based. And unlike the US, the Soviets do not face public opinion constraints on their mobile programs.

Even with intrusive verification measures, there could be substantial uncertainties in our estimates of the number of Soviet mobile ICBMs. The degree of monitoring uncertainty would depend on such factors as the basing arrangement employed, the number of mobiles deployed, and the effectiveness of agreed collateral constraints and cooperative verification measures.

Options

1. Propose a ban on mobile ICBMs.

Among the advantages of a mobile ban are that it would avoid the verification difficulties associated with counting mobiles; it would close off a deployment option that the Soviets were in a much better position to use than the US; and it would make it easier for us to disrupt Soviet ICBM refire operations by targeting (fixed) ICBM launchers.

Among the disadvantages are that it would close off future US mobile options for MX or a smaller ICBM; it would prevent the Soviets from moving to a more survivable land-basing system which it can be argued would have a destabilizing effect; and, by constraining Soviet efforts to promote the survivability of their ICBM force, it could make them reluctant to accept significant reductions.

2. Propose a ban on mobile ICBMs with a definition of mobility that excluded deceptive basing from the prohibition.

Among the advantages, this would define mobility and transportability so as to ban SS–20-type deployments of ICBMs while permitting the kind of basing approach we might wish to employ. Among the disadvantages, it would legitimize Soviet deceptive basing which, depending on the cooperative measures worked out, might be difficult to verify. And given previous US treatment of deceptive basing as a mobile concept, it would be difficult to gain acceptance of the proposed definition.

3. Propose that mobiles be permitted, but only in accordance with certain requirements designed to facilitate verification.

Under this approach, the Treaty would have to specify criteria for permitted mobile deployments (e.g., central basing, data exchanges) and call for additional collateral constraints and cooperative measures to promote verifiability.

The advantages of this option are that it would give us flexibility for MX or future mobile ICBM basing; it could provide for stringent measures to count Soviet mobiles; and it would enable the Soviets to move to more survivable ICBM basing which could have a stabilizing effect.

The disadvantages are that it would involve greater verification uncertainties than a ban; it would provide an option that the Soviets are more likely to exploit; and it might lead to disagreements on what is verifiable. It could also complicate the serious problem of dealing with refires and reconstitution.

4. Make no proposals with regard to mobile ICBMs in our initial position.

The main advantage of this approach is that it would hold open our options for dealing with mobiles in START at least until after a final decision is made on MX basing and until we know about possible US requirements for a new mobile ICBM. Otherwise, on the one hand, by opting for a ban on mobiles we could be ruling out a system needed for national security. On the other hand, by choosing to allow mobiles, we could be allowing the Soviets freedom to deploy systems which would pose severe verification and refire problems.

The main disadvantage is that it foregoes the opportunity to lay down a strong position from the outset.

Conclusion: All agencies recommend that the US adopt option 4. However, the Chairman of the START delegation supports option 2.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council ¹⁴

Washington, undated

Background/Talking Points—REMAINING WORK

Issue: How will we, and when should we, complete the remaining work necessary to formulate and approve an initial US START position?

Facts: There are items of significance that have yet to be addressed. These include:

—What package of collateral constraints should we propose?

—Should we ban heavy ICBMs like the SS–18?

—Should we propose that heavy ICBMs be reduced first in meeting other constraints?

—Should we limit SS–19/M–X size ICBMs?

—Should we ban new systems larger than the SS–19/M–X?

—Should we limit each side to one new ICBM and one new SLBM?

—Should we ban the construction of new silos (and if so, how do we permit Closely Spaced Basing for M–X)?

—Should we propose counting and type rules in the agreement?

—Should we limit fractionization of missiles?

—Should we propose qualitative constraints on new systems (e.g., warhead weight restrictions)?

—How should we address the issue of ICBM refire/reconstitution?

—What should we propose with respect to the duration of the agreement or agreements reached?

—What is the relationship between the phases of negotiations which we have proposed?

Discussion: As a minimum, a majority of the items listed above must be resolved before we can develop a US first round negotiating position. It would be best if they could be resolved prior to further public discussion of START.

Suggested Talking Points:

—We have a number of significant issues yet to address before we can claim to have a USG position on START.

—Among these we have the issue of what types of additional collateral constraints should we propose—for example, should we attempt to ban heavy ICBMs like the SS–18?

—We also must decide what we wish to propose or not propose with respect to refire missiles.

—I think that we should once again task the Interdepartmental Group to provide for NSC review recommendations on:

—collateral constraints,

—treatment of ICBM refire/reconstitution capability,

—desired duration,

—and any other issues upon which they feel they need senior level guidance prior to the formulation of the initial US START position.

—I think we need this input within the next three weeks at the very latest.

—Are there other items that we should specifically mention in this tasking, or different views on the proper suspense for this work?

Tab E

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council ¹⁵

Washington, undated

RELATIONSHIP OF THE PHASES TO EACH OTHER

Issue: How should we characterize the relationship between the phases of negotiation proposed in our approach?

Facts:—NSDD–33 intentionally did not address the relationship of the phases of negotiations to a single or a series of agreements. This was done to permit Interdepartmental and NSC discussion of the alternatives prior to decision.

—The SIG-level group that developed the press guidance for use prior to the President’s speech specifically discussed this point and agreed not to announce or imply that in proposing phases, we were proposing a series of sequential agreements at this time.

—However, Secretary Haig suggested that we intended a sequence of agreements in his remarks to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 11.¹⁶ Further, Rick Burt briefed the ambassadors of several nations on May 8¹⁷ that the US “would be prepared to sign an agreement incorporating first-phase objectives, without waiting for full negotiation of phase two objectives.”

Discussion: Since Defense, Rowny and others favor a single agreement involving different phases, they are upset by State’s seeking to preempt this issue without waiting for Interdepartmental discussion and NSC decision.

Suggested Talking Points

—The final item on today’s agenda has to do with the relationship between the phases of our announced approach.

—NSDD–33 was intentionally silent on this topic to provide us some time to discuss the implications of a phased approach before deciding the issue.

—Since we have already been pressed on this issue in many quarters, I think it’s important that we use the time remaining to discuss this issue today, even though we do not have the benefit of an IG option paper.

—Could we have your views on this issue? Cap, perhaps you would like to begin?

1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR—101, NSC 49A. Secret. Sent for information. Prepared by Kraemer and Linhard. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “The President has seen.”
2. See Document 19.
3. Secret.
4. Secret.
5. There is no indication of approval or disapproval of either recommendation.
6. There is no indication of approval or disapproval of either recommendation.
7. Secret.
8. Secret.
9. Secret.
10. There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation.
11. Secret.
12. Not further identified.
13. Secret.
14. Secret.
15. Secret.
16. See Document 18.
17. The Department reported on Burt’s May 8 meetings with the ambassadors to the Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom, France, and Italy in telegram 128088 to Bonn, London, Paris, and Rome, May 11. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820004–0544)