Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

205. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council¹

Washington, September 10, 1987

[Omitted here is material related to INF, nuclear testing, chemical weapons, and conventional arms]

ARMS CONTROL DECISIONS

START.

a. Mobiles. The US will consider permitting mobile ICBMs in a START agreement at/near end-game on the negotiations if needed to conclude an agreement that is otherwise in our interests and provided that the Soviets are prepared to work with us in good faith to agree on acceptable associated verification measures.

While the US should not signal flexibility on mobiles to the Soviet Union at this time, an internal assessment should be done to determine the best possible approaches for verifying limits on road and rail mobile ICBMs.

b. Sub-limits. The US will be prepared to respond to Soviet flexibility in START by showing some flexibility on sub-limits. There should be no flexibility shown on:

6000 warheads on ballistic missiles & ALCMs (+ compensation for bomber weapons under the Reykjavik bomber counting rule.)

1600 total ballistic missiles and heavy bombers

4800 warheads on ballistic missiles

1540 warheads on heavy ICBMs

In showing flexibility, the initial move should be the relaxing of our current proposal of a sub-limit of 3300 on total warheads on ICBMs to 3600 warheads on ICBMs. (This sublimit should not be extended to apply to warheads on SLBMs as well).

c. SLCM. The best the US can do in this area is to offer to make unilateral statements about the existing and planned nuclear SLCM forces of both sides.

DEFENSE & SPACE

a. Bottom Line. Protect the promise of SDI at all costs. Regardless of whether the US forswears its pursuit of active defenses against ballistic missiles, none doubt that the Soviets are now and will continue to dig the massive, deep shelters that they are permitted to build under the terms of the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union will defend those things it values most. The issue for the future is whether the US will be permitted to protect what it values. A future effective SDI deployment program (not merely the existence of an SDI research program) is the basis for a more secure future for the US and her Allies.

b. No Framework Agreements. We should avoid any “framework agreements” that cover the START and Defense and Space area since they will effectively put in place anticipated restrictions on SDI on us while not being sufficient to allow us to see START reductions begin.

c. 6 Month Notification Prior to Deployment. As needed, we can add to our current position a provision calling for a “6 month notification of either side’s intent to deploy defenses not currently permitted” after 1 January 1995 when each side can choose to deploy such defenses.

[Omitted here is material related to INF, nuclear testing, chemical weapons, and conventional arms.]

INF

a. Overall. The INF Treaty is a major accomplishment. We should resolve the remaining “minor” issues as quickly as possible so that we can get this Treaty ratified and implemented while you are still in office.

b. Status. We have resolved most of the critical issues associated with this Treaty. While a lot of details still need to be ironed out (e.g., the schedule of reductions, details of verification, status of flight testing, etc.), the only remaining major issue between the US and Soviet Union has to do with the US warheads provided under an existing program of cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany for their Pershing IA missiles.

c. US Warheads for German Pershing IA Missiles. We cannot undercut the basic principle that such existing programs of cooperation are not subject to bilateral negotiation. Provided that the Soviet Union can be satisfied by the statement made by Chancellor Kohl that the German PIAs will be eliminated, and the subsequent statements by US spokesmen that in such a circumstance, the US warheads would be withdrawn, we should be able to conclude a Treaty in this area this fall. This being the case, we should do what we can to conclude this treaty.

d. Reduction Schedule. We wanted to eliminate the missiles involved as quickly as possible. The current plan, proposed by the JCS and agreed by all agencies, would have the missiles destroyed within 3 years. We are about to discuss the details with our allies.

e. New Draft Treaty. We hope to be in a position to table a new treaty by next Monday.² To do so, needed to make the following decisions:

1. To clarify that this treaty only covers SRINF/LRINF missiles designed to attack targets on the surface of the earth (and not ABM, ASAT or air defense missiles that could fly to similar ranges).

2. No flight testing after treaty is signed. This would include using the launching of these missiles (e.g., US Pershings) to “destroy” them. Therefore, we can’t use Pershings for other testing, spacelaunch vehicles, or as targets for SDI experiments.

3. Permit research and development missiles for other purposes as long as they

(1) are not existing types of SRINF/LRINF missiles;

(2) are limited in number; and

(3) are not used to develop new SRINF/LRINF missiles.

4. Ban all armed ground launched cruise missiles (including those which are conventionally armed) beyond 500 kilometers. This is needed for verification, but it does foreclose future US/NATO options for advanced conventionally armed cruise missiles at these longer ranges. (SecDef objects strongly to this decision and it may cause complaint from some conservatives.)

1. Source: Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, The President (09/10/1987–10/31/1987). Top Secret; Sensitive. Reagan wrote in the upper left-hand corner: “OK RR.”
2. September 14.