Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

206. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 14, 1987

SUBJECT

• Avoiding Arms Reduction “Framework Agreements”

Last week, as part of the paper² which addressed arms reduction strategy options, I strongly recommended that you should avoid any commitment to develop a “framework agreement” covering the START and Defense & Space areas. However, in our subsequent discussions,³ we really didn’t spend enough time on this critical point. Shevardnadze may attempt to make a US commitment to a “framework agreement” a precondition for a summit. Additionally, in reviewing our options with George Shultz, my recommendation against making such a commitment seemed to give him some concern.

By a “framework agreement” I mean something that could have the political effect of binding the US to some course of action. It most likely would take the form of a free-standing document, like the “Statement of General Principles” Gorbachev proposed to you in Reykjavik. It would most likely commit the US and USSR to conclude a START Treaty and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for some period of time.

We can record progress at a summit without signing a framework agreement. For example, a summit communique could record agreement to instruct negotiators to pursue Treaties incorporating the same outcomes. What we must avoid is any statement, announcement or agreement that can be used by the Soviets politically to bind our hands with respect to the SDI program while not legally binding the Soviets to begin START reductions because:

First, a framework agreement could block SDI while not getting reductions. Such agreements are basically political instruments. As such, they can politically block new options (like moving to the deployment of SDI); but neither side would begin reducing existing forces until there is a signed and ratified treaty.

Second, a framework agreement at this time could also remove Soviet incentive to conclude a START Treaty. If the Soviets can block SDI without having to begin the reductions of strategic forces until a START Treaty is signed, what is their incentive to conclude such a treaty on US terms? They could haggle as long as it takes to get a START Treaty on their terms, and simply wait for the next Administration to give them a better START deal.

Finally, a framework agreement could allow the Soviets to manipulate the US domestic political scene. As long as there is the prospect of concluding a START Treaty, the political opposition must be responsible in handling arms reduction issues. The Soviets understand this. The Soviets could feed the idea that a framework agreement is all that can be achieved during the remainder of your Administration. This would open you to criticism for not getting a START Treaty, for the terms of the framework agreement, and for signing such an agreement in the first place. This would then increase pressure to conclude a START Treaty on Soviet terms during your Administration.

Our primary concerns should be the first two listed above. We should not risk blocking SDI or reducing Soviet incentives to negotiate a good START agreement. The third reason is relevant because it could provide Soviet leverage to force you into a bad START agreement.

The Soviets understand that if the meetings with Shevardnadze end without the announcement of a fall summit, the US press will term the meeting a failure. They will use this to get things they want including:

(1) a US agreement to include in the INF Treaty text, or in a document that could be associated with that Treaty, some provision covering the US warheads for German Pershing IA missiles; and

(2) US agreement that we will conclude both an INF Treaty and a “framework agreement” covering START and Defense & Space at a fall summit.

We must be prepared for the Shevardnadze meetings to come down to the Soviets giving us a choice on Thursday⁴ of either accepting these terms or not getting an agreed announcement of a summit. While a summit announcement would be useful, accepting either of the above terms as the price for obtaining such an announcement would be disastrous over the long run.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, Presidential Arms Control Small Group Meeting, September 9, 1987. Secret; Sensitive. Copied to Bush and Senator Baker. Powell initialed for Carlucci. A stamped notation indicates Reagan saw the memorandum on September 15. Reagan initialed the top of the memorandum.
2. See Document 205.
3. Not further identified.
4. September 17.