204. Notes of a Meeting1
President’s Meeting with The Vice President, Senator Baker, Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger, Ken Duberstein and Frank Carlucci in Oval Office on September 9, 1987
GPS INF. Me Solved
GPS Importance of Start. You already have key numbers. 6000, 50%, probably 4800.
Do we have room for maneuver? Or is our position immutable?
How I see the 3 big issues that not resolved. Most important have been resolved.
1) Sublimit on ICBM’s. 3300 option before to go to 3600. This sublimit not important—
We don’t want it applied to any leg of our triad. We not confident of ICBM’s in US. Can produce SLBMs. People only comfortable with stability-mobiles.
Submarine is ultimate in mobile system.
Chiefs say shouldn’t have a cap on any leg of our triad.
Soviets will want 1200 at least SLBMs anyway, so why fight for 3300?
2) Sublimit of 1650 on heavies highly fractionated & mobiles. Lehman put in to give away. Too attractive if permit mobiles since they want 1540 heaviest not many mobiles allowed.
We have 25 MX, aspire to 50 rail mobile.
If permit mobiles (Congress wants vote fixed base, nonsurvivable powerful missile). I agree verifying is difficult.
Since USSR has heavy investment in land based mobiles they won’t agree to mirror our force structure. Worthwhile for us to have triad. Good to be hedged. Need capability of deploying MX in rail made important.
If go to mobiles—don’t need the 1540. Capture mobiles in another subceiling.
PSovs want landbased. We shouldn’t endanger negot. by trying reconfigure their force. Let’s not waste bargaining power on [Page 895] trying do that. Set our target on reductions, & let them chase. We should put a limitation on mobile.
My worry on Gloching mobile is they going to have them anyway. Let’s know we going to give & hold out for strong verification. Cap, my fear about mobiles is that they will have them. Better we not have them cheat.
GPS Need to hold 2 sublimits 1540 (don’t merge w/1650) and 4800.
P INF. (I describe GLCM verification issue.) Destabilizing is missile you push button & it blow up. Bomb isn’t the same.
GPS Makes case for declaring all GLCM nuclear.
CWW Makes case against mobiles. Destabilizing, can’t verify. Nothing to gain except getting them in mood to sign treaty very destabilizing. I agree Soviets have them. Legalizing doesn’t deal with them. Need to get rid of them. GPS can listen & bring home w/o committing saying our proposal is on the table.
GPS Argument in US for mobiles and single warhead is that it is stabilizing. Stabilizing because difficult to knock out, like a fixed system does.
Fixed MIRD extremely destabilizing.
CWW Mobile MIRVS more destabilizing!
P Was a flurry when talking MX’s on race track wasn’t it silly to put in fixed silos? Wouldn’t be smarter to move them around?
CWW Mobility ensures survivability!
P What if went with proposal of O? If that is only thing holding agreement. We give in on limited #. They give us the whole deal.
GPS Feel you have is right.
CWW Verification of X# is impossible. Sublimits is not much of a bargain.
P We agree on total # of missiles. It includes mobiles. If we at stalemate (alternative of no treaty unthinkable.) X# can be mobile for both of us.
FC D&S?
GPS Can’t compromise SDI. You have put concepts on table.
1) Non withdrawal for X period. (can agree to period that not a constraint.) Sovs have shifted from R. Now say 10 years. In last 2 or 3 years, there discussions. At end of 10 years return to ABM w/ 6 months’ notice.
Play with time and whether you novate (which means no longer have 6 months’ notice)
From what I know it unlikely be deployed in 10 years. Six months’ notice was good thing to have.
[Page 896]CWW Describes merits of novation. Makes it automatic. Also how nifty SDI is.
P Not too far apart—10 years 1995. What if sign agreement would give 6 months’ notice after January 1, 1995?
CWW After 6 months’ notice either side can deploy (seems to accept!) That is possible formula. I don’t want country to reargue.
GPS Going to have to need money.
Have on table concept of nonwithdrawal. Talking about amount—is there flexibility?
At end of time do we give notice?
JCS concerned, because they think Soviets will deploy.
CWW Let’s stay agreed upon position.
GPS All I want is sense from P of flexibility. I don’t want change in instructions.
CWW Why not argue positions?
GPS I always do.
P If we tie this into Start aren’t we opening linkage? We want to talk Start. If want to talk D&S later ok?
GPS No problem with that as a position. Is a rationale for linkage. Offense & defense are related.
- Source: Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, Secretary Shultz (08/14/1987–11/03/1987) [Meetings with President—Notes]. Secret. Drafted by Carlucci, who initialed the top of the notes. Powell wrote at the top of the notes “CP + REL have seen.” Carlucci’s original handwritten notes are ibid. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place in the Oval Office between 2:33 p.m. and 3:55 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary)↩