Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

203. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 8, 1987, 1:15–2:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Review of United States Arms Control Positions (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Vice President

• State

  • Secretary George Shultz
  • Counselor Max Kampelman
  • Rozanne Ridgway

• Treasury

  • Secretary James Baker

• Defense

  • Secretary Caspar Weinberger
  • Mr. Frank Gaffney

• Energy

  • Secretary John Herrington

• OMB

  • Mr. James Miller

• ACDA

  • Mr. Kenneth Adelman

• CIA

  • Mr. William Webster
  • Mr. Robert Gates

• JCS

  • General Robert Herres
  • Vice Admiral Jonathan Howe

• White House

  • Chief of Staff Howard Baker
  • Frank C. Carlucci
  • Colin Powell

• NSC

  • Robert E. Linhard
  • Fritz Ermarth

• OSTP

  • William Graham

• Special Advisors to the President

  • Ambassador Paul Nitze
  • Ambassador Edward Rowny

Minutes

The meeting opened at 1:15 p.m. in the Situation Room. The agenda was as shown at Tab A.² (U)

Mr. Carlucci: This is a meeting we have all been waiting for; an opportunity to review our options prior to Secretary Shultz’s meeting with his counterpart. Mr. President, would you care to make any initial remarks before we begin? (C)

The President: For several years we’ve had consistent arms reduction goals: to get verifiable deep reductions and to preserve our ability to move to a safer world through SDI. It appears we are near agreement in INF. Now we must finish the task in other areas. I don’t accept the suggestions of some that it is too late for us to get a START agreement before I leave office. I want a START agreement, but only if it is a good one, one we can verify and which enhances our security. At the same time, I believe fully in our policy of seeking a stable transition to strategic defenses. We must set the stage for one day deploying effective defenses, and seek to do so in a manner that will strengthen strategic stability. George’s meeting next week is a chance to move toward these two goals. I want your thoughts today on how we can best use that meeting. Are we better served by movement in our position, or are our current positions the best way to gain our objectives? I’m looking forward to your views so we can help prepare George for his discussions. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: We have a host of arms control issues we could consider. I would hope we could resolve some at the cabinet or sub-cabinet level with paper and we could therefore try to keep this meeting on START and Defense and Space issues. We need to look at all the issues in the context of our overall strategy. We have done papers³ on each of the areas with options. As we go through the upcoming week, we will want to bring many of these options to decision. With that introduction, let me ask Secretary Shultz if he wants to frame the way he intends to approach his upcoming meetings with Shevardnadze. (S)

Secretary Shultz: The President has had success in imposing the full US agenda on the Soviets and we will come into this next meeting with Shevardnadze covering our entire four-part agenda. This will not be an arms control meeting only, and I know, Mr. President, you will do the same in your meeting. Mr. President, you should compare the situation today to that which we faced in 1984 when you invited Gromyko to come down from the UNGA the first time. At that time, there was little going on in any of the areas. Now, however, there is a lot going on in each of the four areas, human rights, bilateral, regional issues, and arms control. (C)

On arms control, with respect to INF, the major points are basically agreed to. We have a verification regime that is more intrusive than any other we have ever negotiated. Even after adjusting that regime to reflect zero-zero, we should be able to move to put the verification in place. However Mr. President, we are not doing right by our negotiators. We need decisions now in the INF areas. There are four or five issues of the second order that are just hanging us up. We need to make decisions and get the Treaty on the table before Shevardnadze gets here. I would like to make sure we have that done so that I can focus the conversations with Shevardnadze on START, not on INF. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: I understand the decision paper is ready but we’ve just gotten it. (C)

Secretary Shultz: Well, can we have decisions today? I would like to get this behind us so that we can go on further in the agenda. (C)

Secretary Weinberger: Reaching quick decisions under the pressure of a meeting is not a good way to proceed. (U)

Mr. Carlucci: Cap, I think we can clear the decks by tomorrow. We are close to closure on most issues and we need another day or so to make sure that our staff has a chance to consider the paperwork received. Why don’t we go ahead now and discuss START. George, would you like to start? (C)

Secretary Shultz: No, I think I would rather not. Let’s let the others speak. (C)

The President: With respect to INF issues, as I understand it, we are talking about our positions, not a problem with the Soviets. We need to step up to what we need to agree. Maybe we ought to stick in a few give aways at the same time; but we ought to press forward on decisions. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: We will bring a decision paper to you by tomorrow. Now, let’s turn to START. Secretary Shultz, would you like to open the remarks? (S)

Secretary Shultz: No, I’d rather listen to others speak. (C)

Mr. Carlucci turned to Fritz Ermarth and asked him to put up the first chart (Tab B), which was on START options. (U)

Mr. Carlucci: Looking at the chart, the most momentous decision we face is the one involving mobile missiles. The Soviets have put a heavy emphasis here. The assessments are that we have reasonable verification of mobile missiles if they are in a deployed, peacetime mode, but that it would be very, very low in a non-deployed mode. Bob Gates, isn’t that correct? (Mr Webster had not yet arrived in the room and Mr. Gates was acting as the DCI.) (S)

Mr. Gates: Yes. (U)

Mr. Carlucci: I think that the chart correctly reflects the State position. (U)

Mr. Shultz: I don’t want to be associated with any position or any views. I don’t feel that’s it appropriate for me to be associated with any view in a group like this. All that will happen is that it will leak and it will undercut my position with Shevardnadze. I propose, Mr. President, that I will provide you my views privately. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: Can someone in the room talk from the Department of State for the Department? (C)

Mr. Shultz: What I am talking about is the problem with the process. You’ve got to find another way to work the process. (S)

Mr. Weinberger: That’s ridiculous. We must be able to meet and discuss issues. (C)

Mr. Carlucci: Can anyone explain the State position? (C)

Mr. Shultz: I have no intention of telling you my position. You know my rationale. And, by the way, Frank, you know the rationale for the State position. Why don’t you review it? (S)

Mr. Carlucci at this point started to begin to review the State rationale when he was interrupted by Mr. Weinberger. (U)

Mr. Weinberger: The treatment of mobile ICBMs is the most fundamental issue. Our position now is that we should have no mobiles. There is no way we can verify them, and to move now would just mean that we would get nothing for it. I think that we should have a firm position not to allow mobiles. We had such a position in the past. Nothing has changed and no one can tell me what we’ll get for it. So I have to ask—what is compelling us to move for a change? (S)

Mr. Carlucci: I would note that we are pursuing mobiles ourselves. (S)

Mr. Weinberger: If we could ban them there would be no need for us to move to mobiles. This would be a much better situation. If we move in this general area, once again I don’t know what we’re going to get for it, Mr. President. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: It may be that it is the necessary step to get a START agreement. (C)

Secretary Weinberger: That may be the case, but then we will get an unverifiable agreement. (C)

Mr. Carlucci: Do you really believe that? I mean is it really that bad? We have some verification on deployed missiles. (C)

Mr. Weinberger: We can verify current deployments but we can’t verify total capability. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: Let’s stop for a second and get the DCI’s view. (U)

Mr. Gates: Mr. Webster isn’t here yet, but he has written out the points⁴ he wanted to make. (U)

[3 paragraphs (19 lines) not declassified]

Overall, we are able to monitor some aspects of a mobile missile agreement well, and others poorly. The policy agencies must make the judgments of military risk associated with our monitoring capabilities and our uncertainties. The singular question becomes, “How much risk are you willing to take?” (S)

Mr. Adelman: Mr. President, I would note that the problems that we face in START are similar to the problems we will face in INF verifying SS–20s. (S)

Ambassador Kampelman: Obviously I am not speaking for State. (laughter) There is no reason for us to move in mobiles now without getting something in return from the Soviets. We don’t need to go unless we get something appropriate. But the negotiators need to know if the situation permits or requires, that you’re going to give them some flexibility. I’m not making a suggestion that we decide today, but we ought to know that in return for sub-limits or in view of our interest in deploying US mobiles, that we do want to have the ability to entertain the possibility of moving on mobiles in that context. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: We all agree that no one is proposing that we just put mobiles on the table. Isn’t that clear? (S)

Mr. Weinberger: That’s good, and I agree, but you’ve got to remember that sub-limits are not verifiable if mobiles can be produced. A ban is needed, not anything else. If we don’t have a ban, nothing is verifiable. We should not give up things to get a Treaty that is not verifiable. (S)

The President: Well, Cap, I think we have to figure that they’re going to have mobiles, whether we ban them or not, and we will have to have them too. (S)

Secretary Weinberger: It’s a little harder for them to have mobiles if we ban them. If there is no ban, it will be impossible to verify any sub-limits. For example, in the INF area, because there is a ban, if we find any missiles it is a clear, naked violation. If there is no ban, it is easier for them to have violations under the sub-limits to have more missiles that are mobile than those permitted by a treaty. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: Well, let’s concede then that they can or will cheat. The President’s point, though, is if they’re not banned, we can have some too. (S)

Secretary Weinberger: True, but our exercising the right to make such deployments will be very, very tough with Congress. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: Would a situation in which there is no ban be easier, by that I mean no ban and no agreement? (C)

Secretary Shultz: I would note that the only missiles that people want these days are mobile. Ours are mobile at sea and they are survivable. Mobile missiles are less of a threat to bring on a first strike because they are not targetable. The resistance that we are having to MX is not to the missile, it’s to a missile that is not survivable. The rail mobility may be an answer for MX, and road mobility for Midgetman. If it were not vulnerable being put in silos, it would be more politically supportable. If you confine us both to fixed ICBMs, you are building a very destabilizing force. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: Well, doesn’t our insistence then on a ban on mobiles drive the Soviets to sea? (S)

Mr. Weinberger: We’re at sea already. But we also have many fixed ICBMs today. The Soviets have mobile missiles on land and we do not. It’s going to be very hard for us to get mobile missiles on land. Therefore, there is a relative advantage to us if we can get them to agree to a ban. Trading a ban for sublimits is an empty trade because the sub-limits will become unverifiable. (S)

Secretary Shultz: It is very easy for the Soviets to deploy more missiles and it is hard for us. Therefore a START Agreement may be very, very important for us. First of all, INF will look very naked if long-range strategic missiles can replace the targeting that is provided by INF missiles that will make it an empty agreement. And second, given that they deploy missiles much more easily than we do, an unconstrained world would not be good for us. The numbers that we got at Reykjavik for START are very good, Mr. President—6000, the 1540, which was half of the heavy force and a bomber counting rule that is very, very, good. The Soviets are on-again off-again with the 4800 sub-limit. If we can get those four, that is 6,000, 1540, the bomber counting rule and 4800, those numbers by themselves buy you a very good agreement if we can get them. We shouldn’t overlook how important a START Agreement is if these numbers are in. Our problem is that we have a very limited political capability to deploy missiles. When it does come to making deployment decisions, in my view it will be easier if our missiles are mobile. (TS)

Mr. Weinberger: I have no doubt that I agree with you on the need for START. But that is no reason for us to give in to Soviet demands. We’ve got a good agreement in INF because we hung tough and we can do the same in START. All for sub-limits, but we need what we proposed as a whole. The argument is not only on mobile missiles and verification, but it is also the fact that they have mobile missiles now and we don’t. We need to ensure that we will have enough stuff left after an agreement to provide for deterrence. I feel they want a START Agreement and I believe we will get a good one if we’ll just hold. As far as giving flexibility to a negotiator, I think that is simply another way of telling him he can give up on the issues. (S)

Mr. Adelman: Mr. President, I see no evidence at all the Soviets are interested in START. It is very unlikely you are going to get an agreement on this area in this Administration under the terms we are asking. What we need to worry about is thinking about the precedents for the future and for this reason we should not go any further because probably we are not going to get an agreement. (S)

Ambassador Rowny: It’s in our interest to push for START now. We can defer the issue of what to do about mobiles very safely. That is not a make or break issue. (S)

The President: You’ve got to remember that the whole thing was borne of the idea that the world needs to get rid of nuclear weapons. We’ve got to remember that we can’t win a nuclear war and we can’t fight one. The Soviets don’t want to win by war but by threat of war. They want to issue ultimatums to which we have to give in. If we could just talk about the basic steps we need to take to break the log jam and avoid the possibility of war. I mean, think about it. Where would the survivors of the war live? Major areas of the world would be uninhabitable. We need to keep it in mind that that’s what we’re about. We are about bringing together steps to bring us closer to the recognition that we need to do away with nuclear weapons. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: Well where then can we get some motion in this area? (C)

Ambassador Rowny: No motion is needed on mobiles. We may be able to get some motion on sub-limits. The 1650 sub-limit is the problem. If we could get rid of that lower sublimit we may be able to move the Soviets. SLCMs are also not an area that we need to do anything about. The crucial issue is Defense and Space. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: O.K., on sub-limits, let me see if I can at least summarize what I think I have heard. We all agree that 4800 is needed. We’ve seen some flexibility on the 3300 number before. Everyone has questions on all the others. I guess that’s the best summary I can give. Let’s move to Defense and Space. (TS)

The President: I have a friend who tells me that in the Soviet Union their right-wingers are starting to call Gorbachev “Mr. Yes” because he agrees with everything that I propose. (U)

Mr. Carlucci: Our current position is shown on the chart (Tab C). The options are as listed. (U)

Mr. Weinberger: We have to be very careful in this area, Mr. President, because what we want to do is get rid of nuclear weapons, and if we handle this badly, we will not be able to get rid of them. We can’t live with nuclear weapons if they are used. We can’t get rid of them because there are no defenses against them. We must do nothing to inhibit our ability to defend against nuclear weapons. We need to defend early; we need to defend our continent, not just a few sites. The Soviets want to insist on a lengthy period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in return for START. If the Soviets want a link, we will have to make sure that there is no inhibition on our rights to deploy without any additional negotiations, or further equivocation. The earliest I think we can deploy is 1995. Some of my friends, like Wallop, feel that might be sooner if we put our systems together from a Tru Value hardware catalogue. We need no further restrictions on our right to deploy. We should make every effort to hold firm. No talks for two years or more, no negotiations, no six month notification, none of that. All we are doing with this type of stuff is blocking ourselves in. Anyone who believes that the Soviets will not deploy as soon as they can when they get their system is wrong. (At this point, the President was basically shaking his head “yes”.) All the options are ways to get us to agree but the Soviets have their own objective. Their objective is to block the SDI program. Nothing here is verifiable. And, we can’t do anything before 1995, but what the hell, we don’t need to do anything before that time period either. (TS)

Mr. Carlucci: You know, Cap, under the current ABM Treaty we are free to move to deployment within six months by simply withdrawing. (S)

Mr. Weinberger: Yes, but withdrawing from the ABM Treaty carries a lot of political baggage. We need Soviet agreement that at an appropriate time they can raise no objection to our deployment. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: Do you object to simply giving them six month notice? (C)

Mr. Weinberger: No, not if it’s before 1995. (U)

Mr. Carlucci: We had a non-withdrawal for 1996 at one point, you know. (TS)

Mr. Weinberger: Yes, but we’re walking back from that, and we’re really making progress. (laughter) (U)

The President: Why can’t we agree now that if we get to a point where we want to deploy we will simply make all the information available about each others systems so that we can both have defenses. So that if either side is ready to deploy, both agree to make available to the other all the results of their research. (S)

Secretary Weinberger: I don’t believe that we could ever do that. (C)

General Herres: Mr. President, there is a great risk in exchanging technical data. Much of our technology is easily convertible into other purposes and into an offensive area. (S)

Mr. Adelman: Mr. President, that would be the most massive technical transfer that the western world has ever known. We would make the Toshiba incident⁵ look piddling. If they understood our system that well it would be easy for them to move to countermeasures. (S)

Secretary Weinberger: So, let’s make sure that we not bind ourselves so that we can get there first. They’ve been working for 17 years. (S)

Mr. Adelman: It would be O.K. if we both got there together. (U)

Secretary Weinberger: But we need to get to the point where we are talking about deployments not research. (S)

The President: Once we deploy something, won’t they know about the system? So won’t they try to counter it anyway, so what difference does it make if they get the information and counter it their way or if we simply provide it to them. (S)

Secretary Weinberger: The key here is the price that they are asking for is too high. We ought to just hold tough. (S)

Ambassador Kampelman: At this point, Mr. President, I would like to make a pitch for our negotiators. They have been at it for 30 months and they haven’t given up the store. In the INF area we have a fantastic agreement, or are on the verge of a fantastic agreement. In START we are at 50% without giving up the store and, in principle, we have what we want. No one at the table is considering proposals that would jeopardize US security. And, Mr. President, I would note that in my opinion none of the options that are under consideration on that chart would undermine the SDI program. There is nothing there that can give us or will cause us to give up the SDI program. So we have some negotiating room. I’m not arguing that we need to make a move in Defense and Space unless we get something in START. If they come around in START, we may need to move in Defense and Space. We can evolve our position. For example, now at the end of our period of non-deployment we want the Soviets to agree to legitimize deployment for either of us and the Soviets simply say no. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned that they may be readier to deploy than we are. And the figure of 1995 assumes that we have full funding for SDI. But, on the other hand Mr. President, we have the right to withdraw on 6 months notice from the ABM Treaty and we don’t need any legitimization by the Soviets. At some time we may wish to, simply in emphasizing our right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty on six month notice. (TS)

The President: I don’t want to make this a part of the START Agreement though. (S)

Ambassador Kampelman: START and Defense and Space should not be linked. If the Soviets say O.K. in START, then we could consider options in Defense and Space. We should be able to protect our SDI program. (S)

Secretary Weinberger: All that’s fine, Max, except how do you define the SDI program? (C)

Ambassador Kampelman: I see it as an exploratory research program that may allow us at some point to come to the assessment of the feasibility of deploying defenses. (S)

Secretary Weinberger: That’s what I thought. That’s not the program I see, and we need the unequivocal right to deploy now. (S)

Ambassador Kampelman: Our proposal doesn’t do any damage to that. (C)

Secretary Weinberger: Our proposal should include that we intend to deploy as quickly as we can after the end of withdrawals. (S)

Ambassador Kampelman: Six month withdrawal from the ABM Treaty can still cover that. (S)

Mr. Carlucci: This is going to be a real fun week. We’ll get the issue papers to you, Mr. President, this week for decision. (S)

The President: There has to be an answer to all these questions because some day people are going to ask why we didn’t do something now about getting rid of nuclear weapons. You know, I’ve been reading my Bible and the description of Armageddon talks about destruction, I believe, of many cities and we absolutely need to avoid that. We have to do something now. (U)

Mr. Carlucci: We certainly need to avoid Armageddon. (U)

Secretary Weinberger: The answer is SDI. (U)

The meeting ended at 2:06 p.m.⁶ (U)

Attachment

Chart⁷

Washington, undated

Start Options

OPTION/AGENCY	State	OSD	JCS	ACDA	Others
Mobile ICBMs
1. Firm Decision to Ban		X
2. Firm Decision to Allow	X
3. Defer Decision				X	Rowny, Lehman
Sublimits
1. Current Position (4800 Ballistic Missile, 3300 ICBM, 1650 Heavy/High MIRV ICBM)		X
2. Raise 3300 to 3600	X
3. Raise 3300 to 3600 and Change 1650 to 1540 on Heavy ICBM Only					Lehman
4. Drop 1650 limit					Rowny
5. Drop 3300 and 1650				X
SLCMs
1. Defer ANY Initiative		X			Rowny, Lehman
2. Offer Exchange of Statements	X			X

Attachment

Chart⁸

Washington, undated

Defense and Space Options

OPTION/AGENCY	State	OSD	JCS	ACDA	Negotiator
A. Current Proposal (non-withdrawal through 1994, right to deploy thereafter)		X
B. Extend Non-withdrawal Period				X
C. Six Months Notice of:
1. Withdrawal from ABMT
2. Intent to Deploy
D. Negotiation Period on Transition
E. Ban Tests Against Targets on Earth				X
F. Prohibited Activities

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 0165 09/98/1987. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the Situation Room. In a September 4 memorandum to Carlucci, Brooks, Tobey, and Linhard reported that Shultz is thinking in terms of waiting to see what Shevardnadze brings, and then quickly seeking flexibility. We are urging our State contacts to encourage him to discuss now what specific flexibility he might seek.” “Weinberger,” they continued, “will argue particularly strongly against any falling off our positions on mobile ICBMs or ABM Treaty novation. There has been an unusually acrimonious dispute between OSD and the DCI’s representative on monitoring mobile ICBMs; OSD asserts the Intelligence Communist is far too optimistic in portraying its judgments.” The JCS, meanwhile, had “not yet reached consensus on any position in either START or Defense and Space. They may present some Defense and Space ‘guidelines’ rather than support an option. In START they will probably support no change in mobile ICBM or SLSM positions but will endorse a slight raising (3300 to 3600) of the ICBM sublimit.” Finally, they suggested, Adelman might offer “a whole new approach in some area.” (Ibid.)
2. Attached but not printed is the agenda.
3. In a September 4 memorandum to Bush, Shultz, Baker, Weinberger, Meese, Herrington, Crowe, Miller, Casey, and Adelman, Powell distributed three papers in advance of the NSPG meeting: “GRIP 23D—Overall”; “GRIP 21H—START”; “GRIP 22G—Defense and Space.” (Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control and Disarmament, Lot 01D127, 1969–1990 Subject Records of James P. Timbie, Box 1, START/INF 1987)
4. Not found.
5. Reference is to Toshiba’s sale of machinery to allow the Soviets to fabricate quieter submarine propellers.
6. In a September 10 memorandum to Carlucci and Powell, Graham shared a comment that the press of time prevented him from making at the NSPG meeting: “The President has reported to Congress that ‘compliance with past arms control commitments is an essential prerequisite for future arms control agreements.’ Therefore, any U.S. Defense and Space position must take this into account. In practical terms this means that violations of the ABM Treaty must be resolved as a condition precedent to agreeing to any extension of that treaty. If we fail to insist on this condition we will be twice penalized. First, we would implicitly legitimize a unilateral Soviet advantage already obtained through deliberate noncompliance. Second, the Soviets would be free to exploit the non-withdrawal period to obtain a military advantage over the U.S. by pursuing technological and programmatic activities, such as the deployment of ABM radars, in violation of the treaty. I raise this issue because I find little work underway addressing the issue of existing and prospective Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty. A strong interagency effort in parallel with the pursuit of other Defense and Space issues is strongly needed, and the conclusion of a follow-on agreement would be premature until these matters are resolved.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 0165 09/98/1987.)
7. Secret; Grip.
8. Secret; Grip.