18. Memorandum for the Record1
SUBJECT
- Secretary’s Appearance Before the SFRC on Arms Control, 11 May 1982
—Senator Percy opened the hearing by highlighting the historic nature of the arms control discussions before the SFRC in the past weeks. He commented at length on his own role in urging an early resumption of arms control discussions and commented most favorably on the President’s Eureka College speech of Sunday May 9.2
—Speaking for the minority, Senator Pell greeted the President’s May 9 speech with mild enthusiasm, and he commended the nuclear freeze movement which he believed led the Administration to open START talks. Pell noted that the American people are frightened and that while the May 9 proposals go part of the way, he believes it is necessary to impose an immediate freeze on nuclear weapons and to publicly announce observance of SALT II pending a new agreement. Senator Pell was also highly laudatory of the Secretary’s efforts in the Falkland crisis.
—The Secretary began his opening statement at 9:44 and finished at 9:57. His reading was somewhat listless, but the statement itself was rather listless.
—Percy’s questions related to the question of verification and how we might adequately insure Soviet compliance with a START agreement. The Secretary replied that the United States would probably need to go beyond purely national technical means. Percy was also quite vocal in his support of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). He stated that for 16 months he has been asking for the Administration position on these two treaties and has as yet received no reply. The Senator believes that the signing of TTBT and PNET would add to the means by which we might verify Soviet compliance with a START agreement. The Secretary replied that these two treaties were broader than simple bilateral treaties between the US and the Soviets and for that reason a number of other factors needed to be considered.
[Page 59]—Senator Pell was most interested in the links between Phase 1 of the new nine proposals and Phase 2;3 i.e. is an agreement on launchers and missiles a prerequisite for a subsequent agreement on throw weight? The Secretary noted that the two were linked and that he hoped to proceed toward a Phase 1 agreement with some degree of alacrity, which would then serve as the basis for a Phase 2 agreement. Pell also asked about adherence to SALT II and went so far as to suggest that it be resubmitted for ratification. The Secretary said that frankly SALT II was dead and we had told the Soviets this on many occasions. It therefore made little sense to reintroduce it. As far as adherence to SALT II limits was concerned, to the best of our knowledge the Soviets have adhered.
—Senator Hayakawa asked if we were adequately communicating to the Soviets the desires of the American people for peace, stability and harmony. The Secretary replied by noting that we are in a competitive relationship and that our values clash rather sharply with those of the Soviets. He thought that it would be a great delusion that by merely improving the atmospherics we could improve this underlying competition. In this sense the Secretary noted detente in itself was an illusion. On the other hand, an accurate realization of the nature and depth of the competitive relationship does not mean that we cannot speak with and deal with the Soviets on an equal basis.
—Senator Biden joined Senator Pell in his praise for the Secretary’s efforts on the Falklands. He noted that he very often disagreed with the Secretary but that he was proud of his contribution in the current situation. Biden then began a fairly lengthy refutation of the Secretary’s statements about SALT II. He used the eight points cited in the opening statement to show that in his opinion SALT II was a good arms control agreement. He challenged the Secretary to use his own eight points to counter this argument. The Secretary in his reply chose to focus on Point 3, i.e. “A START agreement must promote strategic stability by reducing the vulnerability of US strategic forces.” The Secretary explained that a major flaw in SALT II was the fact that it allowed the Soviets to retain a significant hard-target kill capability and that it offered dangerous break-out potential upon its expiration in 1985 had it been ratified.
—Senator Lugar was interested in the timing of the Administration’s announcement on START, particularly its relationship to Poland. The Secretary noted that owing to the tremendous stakes involved arms control was something of a “special category” in relation to linkage, but that it is impossible to completely divorce arms control prospects from Soviet global behavior.
[Page 60]—Senator Glenn was concerned with the Secretary’s statement that SALT II is now dead and that the Soviets had been so informed. The Secretary noted that no formal announcement had been required, but that we had repeatedly told the Soviets over the past 16 months that SALT II could not pass the US Senate and that this Administration would not reintroduce it. Senator Glenn then raised the issue of Phase 2 limitations and how Phase 1 limitations would affect throw weight. He seemed concerned that the Soviets could retain a substantial throw-weight advantage under Phase 1 provisions which applied only to numerical limits. The Secretary responded by saying that there was an indirect relationship between numerical limits on launchers and warheads and throw weight. He then attempted to explain to Senator Glenn how this relationship would come to pass, but was unable to persuade the Senator. The Secretary noted that in a closed format the Senator would be assured that significant reductions in throw weight would occur when numerical limits were applied. (FYI: The Secretary offered to have Rick Burt brief Senator Glenn and any others who chose on the technical details of our proposal, but it was fairly clear that Senator Glenn with a bit of help from Senator Percy expects the Secretary to offer this briefing himself.)
—Senator Mathias was primarily concerned with the issue of verification, and the Secretary again noted that we would probably have to go beyond purely national technical means. Mathias also raised the question of the focus of Phase 1 on ICBMs. The Secretary said that this was the case because the Soviet land-based ICBM force was the most destabilizing element in the current balance and therefore must be the first priority on any START agreement. The Secretary cautioned, however, that the opening of START talks must not in any way detract from support for the President’s defense modernization program.
—Senator Sarbanes discussed the relative merits of SALT II vis-a-vis START, and pressed the Secretary on the President’s statements on Soviet superiority. The Secretary said that it is unanimously agreed in all Executive Branch agencies that the US is in an increasingly disadvantageous position in a number of key areas in the strategic balance. The Secretary also added that he saw three major flaws with SALT II: 1) Its reliance upon Soviet-supplied telemetry information as a means of verification; 2) its provisions to allow growth of the destabilizing land-based ICBM force; and 3) termination break-out potential when the treaty would have expired in 1985.
—Senator Helms appeared briefly to raise the issue of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba. He pressed the Secretary on the question several times, and the Secretary said that he was willing to rest on the intelligence community’s assessment that no such weapons existed, in so far as one can rest at all on an intelligence community assessment. [Page 61] The Senator also asked if the British task force near the Falkland Islands was armed with nuclear weapons. The Secretary explained that he did not know the answer to this and would not give it in this forum if he knew it. Helms hence suggested moving into executive session, but was refused by Senator Percy, at which time Helms left.
—Senator Tsongas was primarily interested in the intramural politics behind the START proposal, noting that Team A, Burt, Haig and the Joint Chiefs had won out over Team B, Perle, Rostow and Weinberger. Tsongas wondered if we might now see attempts to sabotage the agreement by the defeated Team B. Tsongas was also interested in the effects of Brezhnev’s expected passing on the negotiations.4 The Secretary brushed off the questions about intramural disputes, and regarding Brezhnev noted that we must be prepared to deal with whatever Soviet leadership is in power.
—Senator Kassebaum urged rapid action on Phase 1 of START, since it had taken 16 months for us to get this far.
—Senator Dodd posed some technical questions about force level measurements and our future ability to monitor compliance with a throw-weight agreement.
—Senator Specter, a guest of the Committee, raised some closing questions about his resolution calling for an early Reagan-Brezhnev summit. (FYI: This resolution is tacked on as an amendment to the DOD authorization bill, a fact which appears to upset Percy and other members of the SFRC.) The Secretary noted the noble sentiments behind Specter’s proposal, but said that he generally prefers to be without such resolutions. The Secretary felt that the President would have a summit with Brezhnev as soon as it was feasible and worthwhile to do so, and that Congressional resolutions urging a more rapid approach could send the wrong signals to the Soviets.
Summary
This opening hearing on the May 9 START proposals was largely non-contentious, though it is clear that a great deal of explanatory work needs to be done. The Secretary acquitted himself admirably and seemed confident of and comfortable with the broad structure of our new START policy, though understandably not yet fluent in detail. Attached to this memorandum are notes which identify more specifically those problem areas which will need to be dealt with in our START explanatory efforts.
- Source: Library of Congress, Haig Papers, Day File, Box CL 77, May 11, 1982. No classification marking. Drafted by Schuette. Haig’s opening statement is in the Department of State Bulletin, June 1982, p. 44–45.↩
- See Document 17.↩
- For the nine elements of Phase 1 and four elements of Phase 2, see Document 19.↩
- Brezhnev died on November 10, 1982.↩
- Printed from a copy bearing this typed signature.↩
- Confidential. Drafted by Schuette.↩