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1. Memorandum From Richard Pipes of the National Security Council Staff to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Rostow)1

Washington, July 29, 1981

SUBJECT

  • Preliminary START Discussions

In accord with your wishes, here is a brief statement of my views on a possible opening phase of START 2 consultations with the Russians, preceding the initiation of formal negotiations on arms reductions. (S)

SALT was a sort of bastard child of our short-lived love affair with the Soviet Union. One of its basic faults was that the theoretical premises of limiting nuclear arms were never analyzed: we simply adopted the MAD doctrine, assumed the Russians shared it too, and proceeded to negotiate caps on launchers and ABM. This hasty approach proved to have been most unfortunate. This time we may want to precede actual bean-counting exercises—which, according to your own testimony, may be months off—with semi-formal discussions with the Russians concerning some fundamentals, to wit:

—Strategic doctrine.

—Units of measurement of arms control.

—The data base and exchange of data information.

—Verification.

—Means to improve prevention of accidental war. (S)

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The advantages of this kind of exchanges, which could begin on short notice, would be two-fold:

—One might learn something useful.

—We would seize the initiative in arms control talks and deflect some of the heat from us (especially if Moscow should refuse to participate in such an exchange of views). (S)

My notion is that these talks would lead to no agreement: they would be meant to clarify our mutual approaches to issues that are indeed fundamental to effective arms control. Participants should include high arms control representatives from both sides (but not the eventual negotiators) and have a set agenda lasting, say, something on the order of three to four weeks. (S)

Carnes Lord concurs; Robert Schweitzer will comment separately.3

  1. Source: Reagan Library, Matlock Files, USSR—START 1/2. Secret. Sent through Allen, who did not initial the memorandum.↩
  2. In May 22 meeting of the National Security Council, Allen said: “We’ve all been imprisoned by the SALT language. We need some new categories, e.g., Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. They would be known as START.” See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988 vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Document 56.↩
  3. Not found.↩