Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

187. Memorandum From the Counselor-Designate of the Department of State (Kampelman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, April 3, 1987

I was released from the hospital on Monday² and am feeling well enough to put down in writing for you my observations for Moscow and beyond. These are my personal views and concerns designed to be helpful to you and to anybody you care to share them with. They are not written for distribution, or as an effort to initiate any interagency discussion now for policy review:

I. MOSCOW

A. My doctors have asked me not to accompany you on the April 11 trip. I regret not being readily available to you on the scene, but we are not yet at that final crunch where we will be exercising final judgments.

B. When I was last in the Department, I learned you were seriously considering participating for a brief period at the Monday evening³ Moscow seder services planned by a member of our embassy staff. If so, I would be grateful if you would pass on my best wishes to those of the Moscow Jewish community who attend.

C. It is quite possible that Vorontsov may request an Eighth Round opening date later than April 23. The Soviets may need the time to complete their treaty drafts, or to work on what might come out of your sessions with Shevardnadze. My inclination has always been to avoid arguments on these kinds of peripheral issues. In this case, I would have a strong personal interest in having the opening postponed for at least one week and possibly two. Ron can also use the time to get his treaty draft through our processes.

II. POLICY

You may recall my conclusion last summer that we had just entered the beginning of what would be a long and arduous “end game.” That was so. The Soviets want an agreement. Whether Gorbachev “needs” one is beyond our ken and leads us to unnecessary theological discourse. I am convinced, however, that it would be an error to assume that any “need” is free of serious national interest limits.

There is concern in Washington about a “grand compromise.” I don’t share it. This was implicit in your Gromyko discussions. In effect, it means a package deal. This is by no means a danger to us if we keep our requirements always in mind.

A. INF

We should keep to the Reykjavik formula of reductions even though we have other preferences. We have a shot at “zero” global limits, or, possibly 100–100 with a global limit of 200, but only if we don’t appear to be demandeurs. Our chief problem here is with the shorter range. I am convinced that a package can include significant reductions in the 12s, 22s and 23s—possibly to zero. Karpov did not drop this thought at lunch without a basis for it. This would eliminate the “conversion” problem and give the Soviets political credit in Europe at very little military cost. I believe this INF issue is tailormade for summit or pre-summit discussions.

B. START

We should inform the Soviets that it would be short-sighted for us not to proceed with our 6,000 warhead and 1,600 launcher ceilings. The remaining sublimit issue can be solved if we remain firm. They can accept our 4,800 ballistic missile sublimit and some modification of our 3,300 ICBM limit. We have the 50% cut in their SS–18s. We will have to drop our mobile ban as part of a deal. Ron has some thoughts as to how to button it all up when the time is at hand. It would be a mistake for us to settle for an INF treaty alone.

C. DEFENSE AND SPACE

We cannot obtain the 50% START reductions without an agreement on SPACE. This will have to be made clear to the President. I don’t believe we have to or should be willing to pay a costly SDI price; and, indeed, if we handle ourselves carefully we can use an agreement to help restore a bipartisan SDI consensus in our country. The crux of the deal can be a 10-year non-deployment commitment, the one attributed to Gorbachev and Dobrynin by Jack Matlock’s friend.⁴ (The Senator familiar with these talks is convinced we should hold their feet to the fire here.) Gorbachev’s February 28 statement⁵ supports this conclusion. They will try to do better for themselves in the tough negotiations but we can hold tight. We should be willing to bargain on a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty within that 10-year period. This package, however, will be difficult to put together if the Soviets believe they can get us to restrict our testing significantly. (My problem here with detailed “quantification” formuli is that Washington is not and will not be able to resolve this issue in a timely fashion, and we should not lead the Soviets to miscalculate.) That is why I want to kick this can to a follow-up negotiation. I am aware that a commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty is relative or empty while we differ as to what the Treaty provides. I am, therefore, attracted by Ken Adelman’s particular cosmetic proposal that until we resolve the issue in the later negotiations, we pledge not to test weapons in space aimed at targets on earth. We should also try to find a way to reaffirm the President’s commitment that SDI is purely defensive.

III. CONCLUSION

You and I know that arms reduction and control are only one aspect of U.S.-Soviet relations. Our ultimate task is to help stabilize these relations so that we patiently and experientially persuade the Soviets that it is in their interest to become responsible members of the international community. Negotiations and agreements between us help, but even should we come to a full Geneva accord in these negotiations, we will still be much nearer to the beginning than to the end of the process.

I have raised with both Karpov and Vorontsov the desirability of arranging for a continuum of arms negotiations between us with one set of agreements relating to a new set of negotiations. You will recall that in Madrid we established a whole series of CSCE discussions leading to Vienna which have proved to be helpful.

As I see it, here is the list of future talks that seem to be evolving:

1. New talks on the shorter range missiles;

2. Reductions in INF to zero worldwide if we don’t achieve it now;

3. Negotiations on further cuts in offensive START missiles;

4. In-depth exploration of the offense-defense relationship as we reduce offensive strategic missiles, particularly in the light of rapidly developing technology. (The Soviets will be sensitive about the wording of this task, because we will want to explain to the Congress and our public that this, in effect, strengthens the legitimacy of SDI); and

5. Detailed negotiations to clarify existing differences between us as to what the ABM Treaty means. We can do so under Agreed Statement D, although the Soviets may wish to justify it under their own terms. These talks should be of limited duration, perhaps a year. (If we assume NST treaties effective, after ratification, September or October 1988, the new negotiations should begin with a new administration in February 1989). It is in our interest as well as the Soviet’s to deal with these issues and not permit open sores to fester too long.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, 1987 MAR.–APR. U.S.-Soviet Mtg. w/Gorbachev. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitiated copy. A stamped notation indicates that Shultz saw the memorandum. Kampelman sent the memorandum to Levitsky under cover of an April 3 note: “I’d appreciate it if the Secretary could have this for his weekend reading. Note my initial paragraph. I am not anxious for wide distribution so that those with whom the Secretary wishes to share it should keep it close hold.” (Ibid.)
2. March 30. Kampelman was recovering from a heart attack.
3. April 13.
4. Not further identified.
5. In telegram 02986 from Moscow, March 2, Combs reported on Gorbachev’s February 28 announcement that he was “delinking” Soviet pursuit of an INF accord from efforts to reaffirm the ABM Treaty. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870172–0717)