184. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz’s Delegation to the Department of State and the White House1

SECTO 4033. Subject: Soviet INF Proposal

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Soviet press reports and Max Kampelman’s discussions with Vorontsov indicate the new Soviet INF position is as follows:

—The INF negotiations will be separated from START and Defense and Space, and proceed “without delay.”

—Their position will be the one developed at Reykjavik, i.e. 100 INF missile warheads worldwide, with none in Europe. The Soviet 100 warheads would be in Soviet Asia; our 100 warheads would be in the United States.

—They propose to leave the INF Negotiating Groups in Geneva after the scheduled recess on March 4 to begin negotiations on a treaty text.

3. This is a welcome development, and reflects Soviet agreement to our long-held position that progress on reductions in offensive forces should not be held hostage to agreements in other areas such as defense and space. While this is a success for our strategy, the upcoming negotiations will not be easy. Vorontsov is already indicating to Max that there is a “fully prepared accord” on INF, indicating the Soviets will push for quick translation of the Reykjavik outline into a treaty. There remain a number of difficult and important points that must be nailed down, including treatment of shorter-range missiles, verification and inspection, location of the remaining 100 warheads, and the right to convert Pershing II’s to shorter-range Pershing IB’s. All of these points are currently in dispute in Geneva, and the Soviets can be expected to accuse us of foot-dragging to get their way on them.

4. In addition, Vorontsov has suggested that when the INF treaty is signed, accords also be completed on the elements of agreements on START and Defense and Space, indications the Soviets may continue to link implementation of an INF agreement on constraints on SDI. And, of course, many allies will be ambivalent about these developments, welcoming the success of our negotiating efforts but reluctant to with[Page 809]draw the INF missiles from Europe that were recently introduced only with great effort. The Germans will also follow closely the handling of shorter-range missiles.

5. We have nearly completed our own draft INF treaty text, and we should table it this week in Geneva. The allies were all given the text over the weekend. With our draft text on the table we will be well-positioned for the stepped-up pace of negotiations.

6. I believe this move by Gorbachev to proceed separately on an INF treaty is the sort of progress we told them was necessary for me to go to Moscow. If arrangements can be made, I think it would be useful for you to announce my trip and its general mandate in your March 9 speech on U.S.-Soviet relations.2 If you agree, I will have our charge in Moscow take the timing up with the Soviets right away.

7. We will not want to build expectations too high.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N/A. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. On February 27, Shultz departed Washington for Hong Kong. He spent March 1–6 in Beijing, Guelin, Dalian, Shanghai, and Qufu, meeting with Chairman Deng Xiaoping, Premier Zhao Ziyang, and other Chinese officials. He spent part of March 6 in Seoul, before departing for Tokyo, and returning home on March 7.
  2. On March 6, Reagan announced that Shultz would go to Moscow to meet with Shevardnadze from April 13–16. (“Statement on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Reductions,” March 6,” Public Papers: Reagan, 1987 vol. I, pp. 218–219)