12. Memorandum From the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (Ikle) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger1

False Arguments Against OSD Approach

1. Slippage in Negotiation.

Argument: Soviets are unlikely to accept 2 million kg throw-weight limit; if a compromise is reached at, say 3.5 million, US won’t be able to reach Soviet throw-weight.

Answer: Slippage might be even more likely with State’s approach: Soviets may not accept all the collateral constraints and insist on higher launcher number, as a result of which Soviet throw-weights could far exceed ours.

2. “Unverifiability” of Throw-weight.

Argument: There is a 20% uncertainty of throw-weight verification, which could cover the entire SS-18 force.

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Answer: The uncertainty level in throw-weight might be even more pronounced with State’s indirect approach if the complicated collateral constraints don’t quite work as supposed to.

Also, OSD not opposed to a collateral verification constraint limiting launchers.

3. Throw-weight Better Approached Indirectly.

Argument: Direct approach offends Soviets, or is not comprehensible to public.

Answer: Soviets fully understand throw-weight and have recently indicated they expect us to propose throw-weight limits. Also, there has been a great deal of Congressional and expert debate, so that public will readily receive a clear explanation on the basis of the media reaction.

To aim indirectly at throw-weight restrictions will be more confusing to public; it will lack simplicity because of all the collateral constraints about “new types” of missiles that are prohibited, etc., and will seem rather disingenuous. (Are the Soviets supposed not to notice that they are being asked “indirectly” to cut back sharply on throw-weight?)

Fred C. Ikle2
  1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR—101, NSC 00049, RWR 5/03/82 START. Secret.
  2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.