Office of the Historian

11. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan1

Washington, May 2, 1982

SUBJECT

  • NSC Meeting, Monday, May 3, 1982

Issue: What should be the basic elements of the US negotiating position on START?

FACTS/DISCUSSION: The IG has prepared a paper (Tab D)2 forwarding agency views on: 1) the units to be limited; 2) Interim Restraints to be applied or sought during the negotiations; and 3) Other Issues.

The issues of Interim Restraints and Other Issues will need to be addressed in the weeks ahead before we begin negotiations. No decisions on these can or should be made prior to deciding the unit of account issue. The main issue and focus of today’s meeting will be on what the basic units to be limited by a START agreement should be. Decisions will be incorporated in a draft NSDD.

All agencies are agreed that the START units of limitation should be radically different from the launcher focus of SALT. All are agreed that there should be a ceiling of 5,000 warheads (about a 1/3 cut from today’s US levels) with possible further reductions down the road. All are agreed that bombers should be treated differently from missiles, and that there should be an eventual ceiling of some 250 bombers on each side. All are agreed that there must be limits on throwweight as a vital component of military capability and as the category which most clearly gives the Soviet Union strategic advantages. There is disagreement on how throwweight should be limited, with some favoring [Page 39] direct limits (e.g., an overall ceiling), and others favoring indirect limits, as on ICBMs, warhead weight, etc. There is also disagreement on how the individual agency proposals meet your arms control criteria.

At Tab A is a chart3 summarizing the various agency approaches on the unit of limitations issues. At Tab B is a chart4 comparing the agency positions in terms of their impact on the throwweight limitations question.

A final issue, is what should be said in your May 9 speech about the US position and the initiation of START. The draft insert at Tab C,5 prepared by the START IG, appears to offer an appropriate approach.

  1. Source: National Security Council, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box SR—101, NSC 00049, RWR 5/03/82 START. Top Secret. Prepared by Kraemer and Linhard. An unknown hand wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “PRESIDENT HAS SEEN.”↩
  2. Not attached.↩
  3. Attached but not printed is an undated chart entitled “Agency Views on START Negotiation Position.”↩
  4. Attached but not printed is an undated chart.↩
  5. Attached but not printed is an undated draft paper entitled “President’s May 9 speech—START Insert.”↩