Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

13. Notes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, May 3, 1982, 9:45 a.m.

[State absent when President arrives]

Pres: tells stories . . . $120 tickets—12,000 pennies

Judge Clark: units of account & insert to be discussed today—hold on verification—90% agreement . . . do we limit TW directly or indirectly—Bud McF will review charts²

Bud McFarlane: criteria = (1) carry out strategy (2) deep cuts (3) equality (4) easily understanding (5) satisfy allies (6) allow for stability—all agree (1) substantial difference from SALT II (2) 5000 warheads (3) focus on ICBM (4) treat bombers differently . . . ultimately 250 on each side (5) limit TW, but how ??—STATE & JCS . . . 5000 W/H → substantial cut in TW (down to 2–3 M kg)—easily understandable, deep reductions—cons w/WH = breakout (even w/only modest TW advantage) . . . penaids . . . accuracy or yield advantage—cons w/ TW = understandability . . . verifiability . . . Soviets alone called to reduce to 2M (we’d increase) . . . Soviets may also wish to limit bomber P/L

Adm Inman: cannot give certainty w/o onsite inspection, but can give high confidence—(reviews factors that allows high confidence)—moderate-to-high w/ mobile ICBMs, high w/ fixed, for W/Hs . . . (review other measures)

high = <10%	}	confidence
moderate = 25–50%

Judge Clark: roundtable discussion

Haig: (praise Bud’s summary) . . . must focus on both military and political aspects . . . all agree on BM 5000 W/Hs (= ¹/3 reduction from current levels—no more than half could be ICBM W/Hs—require Soviets to do 60% reduction in their best systems)—3 major problems w/ TW: (1) TW above current levels . . . 1.3 to 2 . . . paper equivalence but real disparity (2) 65% cut for Soviets in TW . . . not credible (3) hard to verify TW . . . 1M kg uncertainty equivalent to 180 SS–18s—ceiling of 850 missiles is most significant guard against breakout—go beyond satellites for verification, but wait on decision after fix position

5000/2500

850/250

Weinberger: vital disagreement (passes out chart)³—if we just limit warheads, we’d play into hands of Kennedy & Hatfield—not the relevant measure, since yield is the real measure, and one gets at yield through TW—it can be easily understood—not relevant that Soviets wouldn’t like proposal . . . (analogy to) what Soviets are doing at INF now—verification uncertainties affect every proposal—*speech should be specific

Hayward: should I discuss certification and position? (A = . . . do both . . .)—T/W important, but JCS think we should get at it indirectly . . . combination of (2500 ICBM ? or 5000 BM) W/Hs & 850 missiles gets our big cut—if you take T/W as principal indicator, you’ll end up less . . . we’ll end up w/ imbalance in T/W, no matter what our position is

Rostow: important difference in principle remains—recommend in speeches you talk about # of warheads and their destructive capacity, w/o going into detail on how we measure that—we essentially agree w/OSD position . . . (refer to Chart) (slight confusion as people shuffle paper) . . . most fundamental objection to State/JCS position is that it would be profoundly destabilizing (fewer aimpoints would encourage larger warheads) . . . press in direction of smaller warheads, which would decrease attractiveness of 1st strike—Committee on the Present Danger’s experience was that people had strong views on reaching agreement, but did not understand details . . . that’s not the function of the American people—cites (—?) that Soviets prepared to negotiate on T/W—my former memo was that unless we restore . . . —START & INF are not the centerpiece of our foreign policy—Soviets will have no motivation to enter into agreement unless we convince⁴ course carries substantial risk—we haven’t solved the MX problem, established a strong mil presence SWA, etc.—we’re all recommending the same goal of equal deterrence

(Jean Kirkpatrick leaves)

Gen Rowny: are the goals understandable & can we negotiate?—my preference is that we set goals and then phase—are goals plausible? . . . set goals, then do the “possible” first—will they come down? . . . we’re giving up SLBMs later on . . . they fear D–5 . . . we give up something in long run, ask them to give up something in the short run

Judge Clark: evidence is in for your later decision—move to START insert for May 9th⁵

Weinberger: 3 quick points—U.S. cut vs. add to get to parity—Soviets did negotiate in INF where only they cut

Judge Clark: insert . . . comments?

Rostow: add consultation w/ Cong’l leaders (. . . to allies)

Weinberger: add onsite verification

Haig: disagree . . . not before we agree on what to verify

Rostow: save verification for later speech

Hayward: Chiefs don’t have issue that onsite should be in or out of speech . . . more worried select choice where only onsite would work

Baker: are we checking on prior statements by Pres Reagan re: verification, etc.

Inman: sooner or later you’ll have to decide what degree of confidence you want

Haig: you’re faced w/sharply divergent views—campaign statement for longterm goal excellent (don’t pose threat to one another)—add to that now that we’ll proceed over time to that goal—taking 2500 warheads away will drive them to smaller missiles—put equal T/W forth at a later stage—capture essence of both positions but in a more realistic way—Soviets won’t negotiate T/W

Weinberger: on phased approach, comment that comes to mind is that in long run all will be dead—Soviets will negotiate TW

Judge Clark: (cites Gelb article of yesterday . . . rendition of 16 Apr 16 mtg. et al)⁶—compulsion to give argument to press a mystery to me

Rostow: another mtg?

Clark: yes, on interim measures, after Pres. decides.

Pres: if W/Hs, do you not automatically achieve ↓ TW? (Haig: almost same—Weinberger: no—Rostow: no . . . Haig: require they do all, we do nothing—Wein.: INF . . . never get them to table)

1. Source: Ronald Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Meeting Files, NSC00049 05/03/1982 [START]. Top Secret. Drafted by Wheeler. Brackets and ellipses are in the original. The original text is handwritten. The editor transcribed the portion of the text here specifically for this volume. An image of the note is Appendix A. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place in the Cabinet Room and ended at 10:52 a.m. No formal minutes of this meeting were found.
2. Not attached.
3. Not attached.
4. One line was cut off in the copy of this document in the file.
5. See footnote 5, Document 11.
6. Reference is to Leslie H. Gelb, “U.S. Forging a New Concept For Curbing Strategic Arms,” New York Times, May 2, 1982, p. 1.