113. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Ridgway) to Secretary of State Shultz1

Mr. Secretary:

I asked Jim Timbie to do a preliminary analysis of the Soviet proposal2 (attached). Two bottom lines: (1) reductions in the Soviets’ own forces are real, but the deal is inequitable as our forces would be affected even more; (2) the vulnerability of U.S. ICBMs would increase; we could not go mobile with our existing ICBMs as new types are barred.

However, as Bud commented last night, this is the Soviets’ ingoing position and there are elements we can work with.

Rozanne L. Ridgway3
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Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State4

Preliminary Analysis of the Soviet Proposal

From the outlines of the Soviet counterproposal that Shevardnadze has sketched, it is possible to make preliminary assessments of the forces on both sides that would likely result from such an approach:

Soviet Forces

The Soviets would probably allocate their 6000 “charges” roughly as follows:

—3500 ICBM warheads. This would represent a substantial cut from the current level of about 6500 and projected levels of 10,000–12,000 by the mid-1990’s.
—2000 SLBM warheads. This is a bit below current levels, and about half the projected 1990’s level.
—500 bomber weapons. Again below current (750) and projected (1200) levels.

So the reductions would be real. The character of the force, however, would not change. It would continue to be dominated by large ICBMs. The Soviets would no doubt keep and modernize a large number of SS–18’s, and continue deployment of SS–24’s and SS–25’s (despite the freeze on new systems).

As for INF, the Soviets probably project British and French missile forces will have 1000–1200 warheads when their MIRV programs are complete, so they could keep up to 400 SS–20’s.

US Forces

The 6000 limit is probably intended to apply to US theater-nuclear forces (GLCM, P–II, F–111, carrier-based aircraft, etc.) as well as strategic forces. Since there is no chance the US would accept this approach (which the Soviets have advanced off-and-on since 1969), it would be pointless to include such forces in an illustrative US total. It should be borne in mind, however, that the apparent Soviet proposal would count such forces against the 6000 limit.

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Even confined to strategic forces alone, a ceiling of 6000 charges would squeeze the US much harder than the Soviets, because we rely much more on bombers, and the bombers need large numbers of weapons to overcome defenses. A representative US force might be:

—1000 ICBM warheads (½ the current total and 1/3 the projected total with 100 M-X)
—3000 SLBM RVs (about ½ the current total)
—2000 bomber weapons (ALCMs, SRAM, bombs). This would be less than half the current total. There would be no constraints on modernization or expansion of the defenses bombers face.

The modernization constraint would preclude the small ICBM, the D–5 SLBM, and possibly the M–X. GLCM and P–II would either be withdrawn from Europe or counted against the 6000 limit.

The net result of the use of charges as the primary unit of account, and inequitable treatment of theater forces, is that the Soviet proposal would force much deeper reductions for the US than for the Soviets. We could keep a substantial force of SLBMs (but could not give them hard-target capability), but only at the expense of drastic ICBM and bomber reductions. Our confidence in bomber penetration would be reduced.

Other Comments

Some elements of the Soviet proposal (SLCM ban, ASAT ban) would be extremely difficult to verify, and many other important provisions would require cooperative measures for verification.

The Soviet strategic defense program would continue. The US strategic defense initiative would be drastically curtailed.

  1. Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, Box 21, 1985 Sept Mtg w/ Shev. Secret.
  2. Reference is to Gorbachev’s letter of September 12, which Shevardnadze handed Reagan in a September 27 meeting in the White House, following a meeting with Shultz on September 25. In it, Gorbachev proposed that “the two sides agree to a complete ban on space attack weapons and a truly radical reduction, say by 50 percent, of their corresponding nuclear arms.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State Files, USSR: General Secretary Gorbachev (851009)) The letter and memoranda of these conversations are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Documents 84, 99, and 105.
  3. Ridgway signed the letter “Roz” above her typed signature.
  4. Secret. Drafted by Timbie.