I asked Jim Timbie to do a preliminary analysis of the Soviet
proposal2 (attached). Two
bottom lines: (1) reductions in the Soviets’ own forces are real, but
the deal is inequitable as our forces would be affected even more; (2)
the vulnerability of U.S. ICBMs would
increase; we could not go mobile with our existing ICBMs as new types are barred.
However, as Bud commented last night, this is the Soviets’ ingoing
position and there are elements we can work with.
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Department of
State4
Washington, September 28, 1985
Preliminary Analysis of the Soviet
Proposal
From the outlines of the Soviet counterproposal that Shevardnadze has
sketched, it is possible to make preliminary assessments of the
forces on both sides that would likely result from such an
approach:
Soviet Forces
The Soviets would probably allocate their 6000 “charges” roughly as
follows:
| —3500 |
ICBM warheads. This
would represent a substantial cut from the current level of
about 6500 and projected levels of 10,000–12,000 by the
mid-1990’s. |
| —2000 |
SLBM warheads. This is a
bit below current levels, and about half the projected
1990’s level. |
| —500 |
bomber weapons. Again below current (750) and projected
(1200) levels. |
So the reductions would be real. The character of the force, however,
would not change. It would continue to be dominated by large ICBMs. The Soviets would no doubt
keep and modernize a large number of SS–18’s, and continue
deployment of SS–24’s and SS–25’s (despite the freeze on new
systems).
As for INF, the Soviets probably
project British and French missile forces will have 1000–1200
warheads when their MIRV programs
are complete, so they could keep up to 400 SS–20’s.
US Forces
The 6000 limit is probably intended to apply to US theater-nuclear
forces (GLCM, P–II, F–111,
carrier-based aircraft, etc.) as well as strategic forces. Since
there is no chance the US would accept this approach (which the
Soviets have advanced off-and-on since 1969), it would be pointless
to include such forces in an illustrative US total. It should be
borne in mind, however, that the apparent Soviet proposal would
count such forces against the 6000 limit.
[Page 425]
Even confined to strategic forces alone, a ceiling of 6000 charges
would squeeze the US much harder than the Soviets, because we rely
much more on bombers, and the bombers need large numbers of weapons
to overcome defenses. A representative US force might be:
| —1000 |
ICBM warheads (½ the
current total and 1/3 the projected total with 100
M-X) |
| —3000 |
SLBM
RVs (about ½ the current
total) |
| —2000 |
bomber weapons (ALCMs,
SRAM, bombs). This
would be less than half the current total. There would be no
constraints on modernization or expansion of the defenses
bombers face. |
The modernization constraint would preclude the small ICBM, the D–5 SLBM, and possibly the M–X. GLCM and P–II would either be withdrawn from Europe or
counted against the 6000 limit.
The net result of the use of charges as the primary unit of account,
and inequitable treatment of theater forces, is that the Soviet
proposal would force much deeper reductions for the US than for the
Soviets. We could keep a substantial force of SLBMs (but could not give them
hard-target capability), but only at the expense of drastic ICBM and bomber reductions. Our
confidence in bomber penetration would be reduced.
Other Comments
Some elements of the Soviet proposal (SLCM ban, ASAT ban)
would be extremely difficult to verify, and many other important
provisions would require cooperative measures for verification.
The Soviet strategic defense program would continue. The US strategic
defense initiative would be drastically curtailed.
