Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

106. Memorandum From the Special Counsel to the Head of the Delegation and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms (Mobbs) to the Head of the Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms (Kampelman)¹

Washington, May 21, 1985

SUBJECT

• Tiger Team Report

Attached is a report of even date by the “Tiger Team” on the U.S.-Soviet Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms.

This report generally represents a consensus of views among the members of the team except as otherwise noted. There has been no effort, however, to obtain formal agency clearances on the views expressed in the report.

Michael H. Mobbs
Special Counsel to the Head of the Delegation and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of Defense²

Washington, May 21, 1985

I. Scope and Purpose

This “Tiger Team” was convened at the request of Ambassador Kampelman to prepare a report anticipating the likely Soviet approach in the negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms through the end of 1985, assuming that the possibility of some sort of major US-Soviet meeting this fall will significantly influence what the Soviets do in Geneva.

For the purposes of this report we have assumed that a fall “special event” will take place, although the general conclusions we have reached remain valid even if it does not. This report considers possible Soviet objectives and strategy over the coming months that could lay the foundation for a fall “peace offensive.” The report addresses both the private and propaganda aspects of the likely Soviet strategy. We also discuss certain considerations for US handling of possible Soviet approaches.

This report supplements the Tiger Team report of 15 February 1985 on the same subject.³ The present report does not alter the key judgments of the earlier one.

II. The Importance of the Fall

We believe the fall will be an important period for the current arms control negotiations. A number of events, including the US interim restraint decision, the fall UNGA session, NATO ministerial meetings, the Dutch deployment decision, the Belgian election, and a possible “summit”, will combine to create an atmosphere of rising public expectation for progress in arms control, pressures for conciliatory gestures by the West, and intense propaganda moves by the Soviets. There will be tremendous pressure for the United States to make concessions and little or no such pressure on the Soviet Union. With some minor adjustments to their current position the Soviets could pressure the United States for this type of movement.

Such pressure is likely to be even greater if any high-level meeting on the fringes of the UNGA or a summit between President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev takes place. Public expectations will be high and politicians in Europe and elsewhere will be anxious to demonstrate to their publics that they are doing everything possible to improve East-West relations. The Soviets will try to promote the view that a fundamental improvement is possible if only the United States is prepared to be flexible, especially by placing limits on the Strategic Defense Initiative. Such an environment obviously will be a risky one in which to conduct arms control negotiations.

III. Soviet Objectives and Strategy

We expect Soviet strategy to be primarily political and propagandistic in this coming period. US experience in Round One with the Gorbachev moratorium proposal and the numerous Soviet breaches of confidentiality support this view. Soviet Round Two activities will be consistent with their strategy to use the fall for a major “peace” offensive.

We expect the Soviets to step up their propaganda activity in the coming months in support of three main objectives:

First, the Soviets will seek to present the USSR and its new CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev as peacemakers. The primary audiences for this propaganda campaign will be the European and US publics and elites and the international media. The Soviets probably believe that the SDI and INF issues give them a strong opportunity to play this role. Moreover, if a summit meeting is in the offing, public expectations for a breakthrough in arms control will be high. The Soviets will attempt to exploit those expectations and use that opportunity to portray Gorbachev as a progressive, peace-loving leader.

A second Soviet objective will be to exert pressure against US defense funding. The Soviets will do this by attempting to influence Congressional and US public opinion. Key appropriation votes for major weapons systems under discussion in Geneva will be cast this fall. Recent votes on the defense budget, and particularly on SDI, should buoy Soviet expectations.

A third, related objective will be to concentrate maximum pressure on the US negotiating position in Geneva. The Soviets will continue to portray US positions as intransigent and counterproductive while hailing their own positions as constructive and flexible. It is unlikely, in our view, that the Soviets will do anything in this period that would lead to a sound agreement.

IV. Soviet Tactics

A. Round Two

The Soviets will likely adopt one of two main approaches vis-a-vis Round Two negotiations as part of their posturing for the capstone events of September. Whichever option the Soviets take, we should not expect anything bold in Round Two that would steal Gorbachev’s (or Gromyko’s) thunder at the UNGA or at a possible summit. Instead, the Soviets will seek to set the stage for the fall by promoting the appearance of Soviet flexibility and US intransigence.

Under one possible approach the Soviet delegation would return to Geneva with similar instructions and the same intransigent style they demonstrated in Round One. The result of the May 15 Shultz-Gromyko meeting⁴ appears to be consistent with this option. They would continue to press the SDI issue, the necessity of banning research into “space-strike arms”, and the “linkage” between limitations on “space-strike” arms and reductions in offensive nuclear forces. They might seek to take the offensive on the compliance issue by continuing to elaborate their view that SDI is a violation of the ABM Treaty and might also suggest that both sides work to draw a clearer distinction between research and development in the ABM Treaty. This theme could resonate in allied capitals and in Congress. In fact, Senator Gore has already proposed, at the recent Carter forum on arms control in Atlanta, that the United States and the Soviets clarify the distinction between research and development.

This approach would entail few or no substantive Soviet initiatives in Geneva, even though the Soviets might outline some “new” initiatives prior to the UNGA. Such initiatives would be followed by a Soviet challenge to the United States that would urge “constructive” consideration of Soviet proposals in the negotiations. For example, the Soviets might, in keeping with past practices, table a statement of basic principles to set the stage for a draft treaty in a subsequent round.

Under another possible approach the Soviets might return to Geneva with instructions for more active negotiations in order to set the stage for their fall “peace” offensive. For instance, they might move their negotiating stance back toward their 1983 positions in both START and INF (i.e., falling off the various regressions that emerged in their negotiating position). They would then attempt to portray such steps as major Soviet concessions. The Soviets also might single out INF, and expand on the suggestion that a separate agreement is possible. For example, the Soviets might say that they could live with some level of US INF deployments without actually tabling anything concrete.

In Defense and Space, the Soviets could alter their strategy toward SDI slightly by probing the US concept of the transition and the offense-defense relationship. This would allow them to tell the world that they have “seriously” studied the US program and have had their worst suspicions confirmed, i.e., that the United States is planning to make itself immune to retaliation in preparation for a first strike against the Soviet Union and its allies. They could also claim that the United States is withholding vital information about SDI and that, therefore, President Reagan’s promise to share technology with them is a fraud.

Under another variation the Soviets might back away from their proposed ban on research to bring themselves more into line with Western criticism of SDI and to lay the groundwork for a major space initiative in the fall.

We think the Soviets will view START as the most attractive area for a “new” initiative. Such a move could involve a tabling of some concrete elements of their position, including perhaps a number for their SNDV aggregate, SNDV sublimits, a specific overall warhead limit, or a proposal to count (instead of ban) all long-range cruise missiles under such a limit. An initiative along these lines would create the impression of Soviet flexibility, would not involve a concession on principle, and would be easier to condition on US concessions in SDI than would a move in INF.

B. Round Three and the Fall

Irrespective of which option the Soviets choose in Round Two, their posture will be crafted to take full advantage of their fall initiatives. We anticipate that a more “substantive” Soviet effort could emerge in Round Three as the Soviets attempt to convert their “peace” offensive into real negotiating leverage. The Soviets will use the major events of the fall to place the weight of public expectations squarely on the United States and thereby attempt to put the United States on the defensive.

Leading up to and including his U.N. appearance, Gorbachev will attempt to wrap himself in the mantle of peaceful statesman and dynamic world leader. A Soviet peace offensive culminating in an arms control initiative in the fall will help maintain his relatively positive public image.

The Soviets have a number of options for creating a “splash” this fall at the U.N. We can expect that old Soviet U.N. initiatives—no-first-use, nuclear freeze, ratification of TTBT/PNET, etc.—will form the window dressing for any new initiative. Dull and uninspiring Soviet initiatives, however, will be insufficient to generate the public and allied pressure necessary to advance Soviet objectives.

We expect any Soviet initiative to contain a number of “nuggets” that would superficially demonstrate Soviet flexibility without substantive concessions on any major US concern. This tactic would seek to keep the United States on the defensive without compromising the Soviet position. If the United States did not respond positively, the Soviets would label it as intransigent. If the United States did respond positively, the Soviets would attempt to pocket any substantive concession in the US response. US responses would continue to be scrutinized more closely for their “fairness” by the media and the Allies than would any Soviet initiatives.

An example of the type of initiative the Soviets might propose is an agreement or mutual understanding which would prohibit the development and use of new technologies for military purposes, proposing instead that new technologies be used only for “peaceful” purposes. This would strike a responsive chord with some elements of Western public opinion. This is a minor refinement of the Soviet theme in START which holds that qualitative improvements in offensive weapons should be limited to the utmost. This might be coupled with a small unilateral concession in the START or INF area which would not impact on the Soviet force posture but which would reinforce the image of a Soviet Union interested in arms control.

Gorbachev can be expected both to reaffirm his Geneva moratorium proposal and to issue an urgent appeal to halt the “militarization of outer space,” perhaps embellishing his appeal with additional features. Considering the generally negative Western response to the Soviet moratorium’s proposed ban on “research”, the Soviets may recast their proposal in a way calculated to win greater political support. One such change could be to propose a moratorium on the testing of weapons against objects in space (as in the earlier Tsongas amendment).

Another possible proposal would invite the United States to join the USSR in reaffirming the ABM Treaty. The Soviets realize that such a reaffirmation would be effectively binding only on the United States and that it would, in any case, be unacceptable to the United States because it would engender political complications for the SDI. The Soviets might make a cosmetic move on verification to give the appearance that the USSR is taking into consideration some US concerns on compliance. Dobrynin’s “offer” to consider on-site inspection of the Krasnoyarsk radar may be part of such an approach. In general, however, the Soviet approach to US compliance concerns will probably remain the same: absolute denial of any wrong-doing and recrimination of the United States for alleged arms control violations. The Soviets will also charge that the United States is using the compliance issue to block progress in arms control, a view that will find sympathy with some Allies who are already questioning US conclusions on Soviet non-compliance.

The Soviets will undoubtedly use a US decision to abandon interim restraint as proof of US duplicity toward the arms control process. The Soviets probably also consider the continuation of interim restraint as more beneficial to themselves than to the United States. This is particularly true given that many of the key provisions of SALT II have already been violated by the Soviets. In either case, however, the Soviets will seek to demonstrate US insincerity toward the arms control talks. Whatever the decision on interim restraint, the US should stress publicly, and in all three negotiating groups in Geneva, the profound implications of Soviet non-compliance with SALT II and the ABM Treaty.

Finally, we believe it likely that Gorbachev or his representative will announce at the U.N. his intention to table a new, comprehensive arms control initiative or treaty in Geneva. This move will be designed to demonstrate Soviet efforts to advance the negotiations, but will probably not include a detailed presentation of the treaty terms. The Soviets might, however, provide some numbers and specifics without revealing their entire position. A statement hinting at reductions in Soviet heavy missiles, however unlikely such reductions may in fact be, in exchange for US agreement to limit SDI could be particularly troublesome. We would then expect Soviet negotiators to table a comprehensive proposal that would be consistent with their UNGA announcement, but incompatible with US objectives.

V. US Responses

It would be unrealistic to discuss detailed US responses to every possible Soviet initiative. A general consensus, however, did emerge within our group regarding US negotiating strategy.

We drew a sharp distinction between US responses to genuine Soviet negotiating initiatives and the need to resist being pressured into making concessionary responses as a result of spurious Soviet propaganda activities.

Our basic conclusions and recommendations are based on the premise that the United States has specific objectives and principles that it seeks to achieve, and that these objectives and principles must remain largely independent of Soviet negotiating tactics and propaganda ploys.

A. In Geneva

The United States has clearly outlined its negotiating objectives and strategy in applicable NSDDs. US negotiating positions should not be made hostage to tactical Soviet initiatives such as those described in this report. Moreover, it would be tactically unwise to respond to Soviet propaganda initiatives with US movement in the negotiations because such a response would encourage the Soviets to believe that real concessions will follow “cosmetic” US initiatives. Regardless of Soviet negotiating ploys, the US side should insist on the maximum degree of specificity and request time to study any Soviet proposal without detailed initial comment.

Since US negotiating capital remains thin in all three negotiating areas, our near unanimous recommendation is that the United States maintain its course by continuing a steady, but flexible negotiating style. In accordance with this approach, the United States should reemphasize earlier US proposals which the Soviets have yet to address.

One team member advanced the view that the United States should adopt a more active negotiating approach by proposing minor, non-concessionary initiatives that might offset Soviet propaganda efforts and put the Soviets on the defensive by highlighting their intransigence. For example, presenting more detailed illustrative START and INF outcomes in line with current US principles would create the impression of “development” in the US position and help keep Allied and Congressional attention focused on offensive arms reductions, which are the primary near-term US arms control objective.

Other members believed that it would be unwise for the United States to appear to respond to Soviet intransigence in the talks or Soviet propaganda efforts in the public arena with US initiatives in the negotiations. Even a more detailed elaboration of illustrative outcomes in START or INF, for example, would require the United States to make difficult internal decisions on various negotiating options—decisions that so far have not been made because the Soviets have shown insufficient interest in US ideas. Once such decisions were made, even for “illustrative” purposes, they would only be the starting point for further negotiation and hence should not be undertaken merely for the sake of creating a favorable public impression.

Since current US negotiating instructions allow for substantial flexibility, including contingent authority for use in response to indications of Soviet interest in the US approach, the majority of team members foresaw no likely Soviet initiatives in Geneva during the period covered by this report that would require substantial change in current US negotiating strategy, style, or written guidance.

B. In The Public Arena

In the public arena, the United States should be prepared to counter the anticipated Soviet propaganda offensive by means of a coordinated and active public diplomacy campaign. To supplement existing public diplomacy efforts, we recommend that the NSC organize an ad hoc task force devoted exclusively to creating and implementing a US public diplomacy strategy through the fall period.

The US approach should emphasize the US negotiating agenda, exploit vulnerabilities in Soviet arguments and negotiating positions, highlight the bases for Western positions, and rely squarely on a presentation of the facts. For example, in START and INF, US proposals are aimed at reducing the number and destructive capacity of nuclear weapons; Soviet proposals are not. US negotiating positions remain flexible; Soviet positions have regressed from their December 1983 and January 1985 stance in some areas. The United States is strictly adhering to existing arms control agreements, including the ABM Treaty; the Soviet Union is not. US modernization programs now and in the past have consistently demonstrated restraint; Soviet military procurement and deployment has been excessive and well out of proportion to defensive requirements.

Without question the Soviets will seek to exploit all key political events through the Fall. The United States can and should expose the Soviet “peace offensive” not only for its lack of substance but also for its irrelevance to meaningful arms control negotiations.

• THE TIGER TEAM
• Michael H. Mobbs (OSD)
• Jack D. Crouch (ACDA)
• Col. Edward Hamilton (JCS)
• Capt. Edward Melanson (OSD)
• [name not declassified]
• LtCol. Van Perroy (OSD)
• William Spahr (CIA)
• Greg Suchan (State)
• Manfred Schweitzer (State)
• William Tobey (OSD)
• Verne V. Wattawa (ACDA)

1. Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 7, DOD. Secret; Noforn. Kampelman sent Nitze a copy of the memorandum and attached paper under cover of a May 30 memorandum, in which he wrote: “I thought you would want to see this.” (Ibid.)
2. Secret; Noforn.
3. Not found.
4. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 29.