Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

107. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, June 10, 1985

SUBJECT

• NST Package Solution

The Soviet attitude during the initial sessions of Round II at Geneva appears as uncompromising as during the first round. The prospect of a deadlock in the negotiations, of an eventual Soviet walk-out, or of Soviet confrontational moves at various points along the Soviet perimeter significant enough to create a serious crisis should not be ignored. On the other hand, Gorbachev may be interested in an NST package solution if he can justify it to his military and his more aggressive Party associates.

It may, therefore, be timely to consider an NST package proposal that we could live with, if the Soviets were to prove interested, and that, in the event they turned it down, would persuasively demonstrate that it was the Soviets, not we, who had blocked agreement.

The key to such a package could be a trade of deep and meaningful reductions in offensive forces, both START and INF, on both sides, phased over a ten-year period, in return for reliable assurances by both sides that they would forego development, testing and deployment of ABM systems—particularly space-based systems—not otherwise permitted by the ABM Treaty. This would delay SDI actions that might contravene the ABM Treaty until 1995 (under the current program, such actions could take place at an indefinite point in the early 1990s).

The agreement would be self enforcing; either side could avail itself of its supreme interest right to withdraw from the treaty if it believed the other side had not lived up to its obligations. It is therefore important that there be an improvement in our security at each phase of implementation of the agreement.

A number of problems must be overcome in designing such a package.

The first is to assure that in each stage in the reductions US security is improved over what it is now and over what it could be expected to be in the absence of the agreement. Moreover, we would want to assure that at the end of the ten-year period the situation would continue to be stable for an indefinite period in the future. The prompt hard target kill capability of permitted Soviet forces in 1995 would continue to be somewhat greater than that of the US but MPS deployment of our ICBMs and the introduction of our Trident II missiles should leave them with no net advantage.

To make the offensive package plausibly attractive to the Soviets, it would be advisable to combine radical reductions of warheads, with comparable reductions in the various ceilings on SNDVs provided by SALT II and generally reflected in the Soviet START proposals of 1982–1983. To prevent instability rather than stability being induced by these concurrent reductions, one should add special provisions limiting the RV weight of new ICBM systems and allowing an increase in the number of permissible silos per missile. In order to improve the verifiability of limits on mobile ICBMs, it would be wise to limit their deployment to predesignated operational areas. I have also differentially increased the percentage reduction in heavy ICBMs (SS–18s). This may greatly decrease the negotiability of the package; it does not help us that much, however, and we could probably drop it.

The more difficult problem is to design provisions giving the sides adequate assurance against breakout in ABM systems, whether land-based or space-based. We would need to satisfy ourselves that we would know what they are doing beyond laboratory research and experiments. They would have a much easier time knowing what we are doing, but are not apt to agree to US programs to build and test major components or sub-components in laboratories or underground or in technology demonstrations carried out in space (such programs could be within—but would be seen as stretching—the bounds of the ABM Treaty). Negotiation of more precise demarcations between permitted and prohibited ABM activities would require extended discussions, but if the Soviets would wish to work it out, I believe it would not be an impossible task.

The attached paper entitled “NST Package Solution” deals with the above option.

There is also attached a second paper entitled “Joint Statement between the United States of America and the USSR on the Basic Principles of Limitation and Reduction of Nuclear and Space Arms.” It deals with a much more limited problem. It may be advisable some time during Round II or Round III to introduce a statement comprehensively setting forth a position consistent with the instructions to our Geneva negotiators. There is little prospect that it will advance our negotiations with the Soviets. It would, however, enable us to give a positive answer to questions as to whether we have put forward a concrete and comprehensive proposal at Geneva.

Paul H. Nitze²

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State³

Washington, June 10, 1985

NST PACKAGE SOLUTION

The following relates to a possible US package proposal covering all three areas of the nuclear and space arms talks. Its essence would be agreement on annual cuts in strategic nuclear and LRINF missile weapons by an aggregate of 50% by the end of 1995, contingent upon agreement by the sides not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components in contravention of the ABM Treaty as it currently stands. If at any time one of the sides were to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components in contravention of the ABM Treaty—or fail to make the reductions in offensive systems or otherwise violate the provisions of the agreement called for by the package proposal—the other side would be relieved of its obligations.

Defense and Space Arms

The sides would agree to resolve those compliance issues currently outstanding with regard to the ABM Treaty and do nothing further to erode confidence in that agreement. In this regard, the sides would reach an understanding on the demarcation between research which is permitted, and development and testing which is prohibited.

The sides would agree that neither would develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components in contravention of the ABM Treaty as long as both sides comply with the reduction schedules spelled out below for strategic and LRINF arms.

START

Yearly reductions in strategic arms would commence in 1987. In the interim, the sides would take any actions necessary to ensure that they would not exceed the following levels (i.e. these would be the starting points for yearly reductions to be taken through 1995):

—Ballistic missile RVs: 9000

—Ballistic missile RVs plus ALCMs: 12,000

—SNDVs: 2400

—MIRVed ballistic missiles plus ALCM-heavy bombers: 1320

—MIRVed ballistic missiles (SLBMs and ICBMs): 1200

—MIRVed ICBMs: 820

—Heavy ICBMs: 308

Initial SNDV levels are from SALT II; the limits on RVs and RVs+ALCMs were derived as follows: the current total of Soviet RVs is 8800, round to 9000 and add 3000 for the US ALCM program.

RV/ALCM Reductions. The limits on RVs and RVs+ALCMs would be reduced annually so that on 31 December 1995 they would be one-half of the initial levels, i.e. 4500 and 6000.

One way to achieve such RV and RV+ALCM reductions would be asymptotic reductions of 7.5% per year (with some rounding).

	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
RVs	9000	8325	7700	7120	6590	6100	5640	5210	4820	4500
RV+ALCMs	12000	11100	10270	9500	8780	8130	7520	6950	6430	6000

Alternatively, we could apply constant annual reductions (500 RVs and 650 RVs+ALCMs per year) to obtain the same end-1995 levels.

	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
RVs	9000	8500	8000	7500	7000	6500	6000	5500	5000	4500
RV+ALCMs	12000	11350	10700	10050	9400	8750	8100	7450	6800	6000

SNDV Reductions. We would also reduce the SNDV ceilings and subceilings each year. There are several possibilities for doing this, e.g. reductions at a constant or asymptotic rate.

An important question would be how low we would want to lower the SNDV limits by the end of 1995, e.g. to 75%, 60% or 50% of the end 1986 level. The lower the SNDV limits, the smaller the opportunity for de-MIRVing each side’s ballistic missile forces. However, given that each side in 1995 is projected to be dependent on highly-MIRVed systems for the bulk of its modern weapons (Trident in our case; the SS–18, SS–24 and MIRVed SLBMs in the Soviet case), unless the sides radically restructure their forces to less-MIRVed or single-RV systems, the 4500 RV-level may drive both to such low levels of launchers that either side’s force could fit within even the lowest SNDV limit.

One alternative for SNDV reductions would be straight-line cuts to end 1995 levels that are 75% of 1986 levels, except for a 50% reduction in heavy ICBMs, which would be justified on the basis of the particularly destabilizing nature of such systems.

	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
SNDVs	2400	2335	2270	2205	2140	2075	2010	1945	1880	1800
MIRVed BM+AHBs	1320	1285	1250	1215	1180	1145	1110	1075	1040	1000
MIRVed BMs	1200	1165	1130	1095	1060	1025	990	955	920	900
MIRVed ICBMs	820	795	770	745	720	695	670	645	620	600
Heavy ICBMs	308	290	275	255	240	220	205	185	170	150

This alternative would leave great room for de-MIRVing. (These 1995 outcomes could be reached by asymptotic reductions of approximately 3% per year.)

A second alternative would reduce SNDV ceilings at end 1995 to about 60% of their 1986 levels. This would result in greater reductions in SNDVs, but would allow less room for de-MIRVing than the first alternative. There would be asymptotic reductions of 5% per year for all SNDV ceilings and subceilings, with a 7.5% reduction for SS–18s (again based on that system being particularly de-stabilizing).

	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
SNDVs	2400	2280	2170	2060	1950	1860	1760	1680	1590	1500
MIRVed BM+AHBs	1320	1250	1190	1130	1080	1020	970	920	875	825
MIRVed BMs	1200	1140	1080	1030	980	930	880	840	800	750
MIRVed ICBMs	820	780	740	700	670	630	600	570	540	520
Heavy ICBMs	308	285	260	245	225	210	190	180	165	150

A third alternative would reduce the SNDV levels at end-1995 to about 50% of their 1986 levels, using asymptotic reductions of 7.5% per year for all SNDV ceilings and subceilings. This would result in greater reductions in SNDVs than either of the first two alternatives, but would allow little room for large-scale de-MIRVing. (Both the second and third alternative endpoints could, of course, also be reached by straight-line reductions.)

	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
SNDVs	2400	2220	2050	1900	1760	1630	1500	1390	1290	1200
MIRVed BM+AHBs	1320	1220	1130	1040	970	890	830	760	710	650
MIRVed BMs	1200	1110	1030	950	880	820	750	700	640	600
MIRVed ICBMs	820	760	700	650	600	560	510	480	440	410
Heavy ICBMs	308	285	260	245	225	210	190	180	165	150

Illustrative 1995 US Force Structure. Assuming no radical reorientation of US strategic forces toward a less MIRVed force, US levels would be driven primarily by the 4500/6000 weapons ceilings. Resulting US launcher levels could be so low as to fit under all three sets of end-1995 SNDV levels outlined above. The following illustration shows US forces designed to meet the lowest alternative SNDV limits (i.e. 50% of the end-1986 levels).

System	SNDVs	RVs/ALCMs
MIRVed ICBMs:
MX	50	500
MM–III	50	150
	100	650
MIRVed SLBMs:
Ohio-class SSBNs4	384	3072
	484	3722
ALCM heavy bombers:
B–1/B–52H5	160	1920
	644
Other systems:
MM–II/Midgetman	350	350
Non-ALCM B–1/ATB	150
	1144
Subtotal missile RVs		4072
Total RVs+ALCMs		5992

Relaxing the SNDV ceilings would allow us to deploy a few more single RV systems, but unless we were prepared to deploy single-RV missiles in place of Trident, MX or ALCM heavy bombers, the RV and RV+ALCM ceilings would severely constrain our ability to take advantage of the higher SNDV levels.

Illustrative 1995 Soviet Force Structure. Assuming no radical reorientation of Soviet strategic forces toward a less MIRVed force, Soviet forces would likewise be driven primarily by the 4500/6000 weapons ceilings. Resulting Soviet launcher levels could fit under all three sets of end-1995 SNDV levels outlined above. The following shows Soviet forces under the lowest alternative SNDV limits.

System	SNDVs	RVs/ALCMs
MIRVed ICBMs6
SS–18	100	1000
SS–24	130	1300
	230	2300
MIRVed SLBMs:
SS–N–20/SS–N–23	192	1536
	422	3836
ALCM heavy bombers:7
Bear H/Blackjack	125	1500
	547
Other systems:
SS–25	400	400
SS–N–8	240	240
Non ALCM bombers	10
	1197
Subtotal missile RVs		4476
Total RVs+ALCMs		5976

As with the US, the RV and RV+ALCM ceilings are the primary factor driving down the Soviet SNDV levels. Relaxing the SNDV ceilings would allow them to deploy a few more single-RV systems, but unless they were prepared to deploy single-RV missiles in place of the SS–18, SS–24 or MIRVed SLBMs, the RV and RV+ALCM ceilings would severely constrain their ability to take advantage of the higher SNDV levels. On the other hand, as long as throwweight and RV weight limitations could be agreed upon, the higher SNDV levels would provide an incentive for de-MIRVing, both before and after 1995, at little cost in terms of breakout risk.

Post-1995 Reductions. After 31 December 1995 reductions could be scheduled to continue indefinitely (in this event it might be better to adopt a formula based on asymptotic reductions). An important question is: at what point would we invite the British, French and Chinese to “join” in the negotiations? It is highly unlikely that the Soviets would go beyond 1995 levels—even if they agreed to go that low—without inclusion of third-country nuclear forces. This is a sticky point; by 1995 when the US and USSR will be “low” on forces, the other nuclear states could be relatively “high,” particularly in view of British and French modernization programs. The end of 1995 might be an appropriate point for a “pause” in reductions while the third-country issue was tackled.

Other Provisions. Dismantling and destruction of excess systems would be in accord with procedures to be agreed in the SCC. Reports would be made of the status of dismantling, destruction and replacement of strategic offensive arms, by category, as of 31 December 1986; and numerical data reported to certify the number of such arms in each category to be identical to the agreed levels outlined above. Both such reports would be made to SCC Commissioners on 1 January 1987.

Subsequent reports would be made of the status of dismantling and destruction of strategic offensive arms, by category, as of 31 December of each year. Such reports would be made in the SCC at its first regular session after 31 December, beginning in 1987.

Modernization of strategic offensive arms would be permitted. However, any new-type ICBMs developed, tested or deployed after 31 December 1985 would be of a single-warhead type whose RV would weigh no more than 200 kg, whose throwweight would be no more than 400 kg, and whose launch weight would be no more than 15,000 kg.

Mobile or transportable ICBMs could be deployed, but only in agreed deployment areas under agreed procedures.

The SALT limitations banning new or additional silos would be relaxed, thus permitting an MPS deployment of ICBMs.

The primary means of verification would be by NTM. Additionally, the sides would agree on cooperative measures both to enhance and supplement verification by NTM.

The maximum number of warheads for each missile type would be as follows:

SS–11:	1	Minuteman II:	1
SS–13:	1	Minuteman III:	3
SS–17:	4	MX:	10
SS–18:	10	Midgetman:	1
SS–19:	6
SS–24:	10
SS–25:	1
SS–N–6:	1	Poseidon:	10
SS–N–8:	1	Trident I:	8
SS–N–18:	7	Trident II:	8
SS–N–20:	8
SS–N–23:	8

The maximum number of ALCMs for each type of heavy bomber equipped for ALCMs would be as follows:

Bear H:	12	B–52:	12
Blackjack:	12	B–1:	12

Missiles and bombers would not be tested or deployed with larger numbers of warheads or ALCMs, or tested in a manner which would demonstrate a capability for carrying more warheads or ALCMs.

INF

The sides would agree to an approximate 50% cut in their LRINF missile warheads from the current Soviet level and the planned US level by 31 December 1995. This would parallel the 50% reduction in strategic weapons by 1995.

These reductions would result in a global LRINF missile RV level of 600 for both sides (roughly one-half the current Soviet global total of slightly over 1200 RVs on 400+ SS–20 missiles). Further, each side would be limited to 300 LRINF missile RVs in Europe (roughly one-half the planned US deployment of 572 RVs in Europe).

In addition, while the US would retain the right to deploy outside of Europe up to the global total of 600 warheads, it would declare its current intention not to deploy LRINF missile systems in Asia.

The sides could work out a reduction schedule paralleling those suggested for START. Given the lower numbers involved, it might be feasible to set intermediate levels for end-1989 and 1992 as opposed to yearly. The US might further agree that it would not go above 300 RVs in Europe at any point (even though the end-1989 and 1992 limits for Europe could exceed 300).

Reporting and verification would be as with START.

Each side would be allowed 150 LRINF aircraft in Europe.

Further reductions after 1995 would be consistent with offense/defense criteria and eventual total elimination of nuclear arms.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁸

Washington, undated

Joint Statement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Basic Principles of Limitation and Reduction of Nuclear and Space Arms

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Reaffirming that the complex of questions concerning nuclear and space arms shall be considered and resolved in their interrelationship,

Reaffirming their objective of working out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability,

Reaffirming their ultimate objective of the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere,

Recalling the commitment to the non-use of aggressive force embodied in the Charter of the United Nations,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Reaffirming their obligations under the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972,

Recognizing that the numbers of nuclear arms have risen to unacceptable levels,

Proceeding from the premise that effective [non-nuclear] defenses could enhance deterrence and provide a more stable strategic situation,

Recognizing the contribution to stability that can be made by an evolutionary transition from an offense-dominant strategic posture to a defense-dominant strategic posture,

Recognizing that radical reductions in offensive nuclear weapons can reduce the numbers of defensive weapons needed in a defense-dominant environment,

Agree to the following guidelines for the negotiations on nuclear and space arms:

ARTICLE I

The two Parties will continue to negotiate reductions in, and limitations on, nuclear and space arms, with the objective of concluding a comprehensive agreement resolving the entire complex of questions concerning such arms by December 31, 1985.

ARTICLE II

With regard to strategic nuclear forces:

1. The Parties shall reduce the total number of warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles and deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles to a level not to exceed 5000.

2. The parties shall reduce the aggregate of air-launched cruise missiles on deployed heavy bombers, plus warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles and deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles to a level not to exceed 8000.

3. The Parties shall limit the number of deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers to a level not to exceed 1800.

4. The Parties shall agree, in the negotiations referred to in Article I, to constraints resulting in substantial reductions in the destructive capability of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs with an emphasis on the most destabilizing of such weapon systems, that is, silo-based ICBMs with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles.

5. The Parties shall implement the above reductions at a rate of _______ percent per year commencing on ______.

ARTICLE III

With regard to intermediate-range nuclear forces:

1. The Parties agree to the goal of eliminating the entire class of intermediate-range nuclear weapons. In the interim, the Parties agree to the limits set forth below.

2. The Parties shall limit the total number of warheads on deployed intermediate-range nuclear missiles of longer-range to a level not to exceed 600.

3. The Parties shall limit the number of warheads on deployed intermediate-range nuclear missiles of longer-range in Europe to a level not to exceed 300.

4. The United States of America shall limit its deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe to the level currently deployed.

5. To the extent that reductions in weapon systems currently deployed are necessary to conform to the above limits, the Parties shall implement such reductions at a rate of ______ percent per year commencing on ______, and reductions of such weapons in Europe and on a global basis shall be made in proportion to the levels currently deployed in Europe and on a global basis.

ARTICLE IV

With regard to defense and space arms:

1. The Parties are conducting research on effective defenses against various delivery systems for nuclear weapons consistent with existing agreements. The Parties shall cooperate with each other in examining the feasibility of a possible future defense-oriented strategic posture and in managing any transition from an offensive-dominant to a defense-dominant strategic posture.

2. Each Party shall inform the other fully of its plans, programs and activities in the fields of nuclear offensive and strategic defensive arms.

3. The Parties agree that deployment of defensive systems must contribute to stability. To that end, the Parties agree that any such deployments must be phased with reductions in offensive nuclear weapons to insure that one Party does not obtain a unilateral advantage over the other Party. The Parties agree to refrain from activities which would lead to the attainment of strategic superiority involving either offensive or defensive systems.

4. Should either Party’s research lead to a conclusion that new defensive systems (including systems based on “other physical principles” referred to in Agreed Statement (D) of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty) could enhance security and stability, the Parties agree to discuss how such systems could be developed, tested and deployed in order to enhance the security of both sides and strengthen the stability of the strategic relationship. Such development, testing and deployment would be carried out in accordance with procedures jointly agreed and authorized pursuant to Articles XIII and XIV of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

ARTICLE V

With regard to anti-satellite weapons:

1. Neither Party shall test an anti-satellite interceptor weapon against a space object any part of whose orbit is located at an altitude greater than ______ kilometers above the earth’s surface.

2. Each Party shall be limited to one operational anti-satellite weapon system. For the United States this shall be ______ and for the Soviet Union this shall be ______.

ARTICLE VI

With regard to verification:

1. The Parties in the course of the negotiations referred to in Article I shall establish measures which, in conjunction with national technical means, permit effective verification of compliance with the provisions of such an agreement.

2. The Parties shall refrain from activity impeding or interfering with verification of compliance with the terms of this Statement.

ARTICLE VII

With regard to existing treaties:

1. The Parties shall comply fully with all provisions of existing treaties limiting arms in outer space, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. In particular, the Parties shall not place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, station such weapons in outer space in any other manner, carry out any nuclear explosion in outer space or develop, test or deploy space-based anti-ballistic missile systems or components.

2. The Parties shall make new efforts to resolve all outstanding issues of compliance relating to past agreements. In particular, the Parties shall take such steps as are necessary to prevent the further erosion of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The Parties shall agree to means to assure the strict implementation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, including provisions to maintain clear and unambiguous distinctions between non-anti-ballistic missile and anti-ballistic missile radars, interceptor missiles and launchers.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Within the context of the reductions and limitations above, the Parties shall negotiate other appropriate constraints.

2. The Parties agree to continue further negotiations after the completion of the negotiations referred to in Article I, with the ultimate objective of the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

3. The Parties shall not take any actions contrary to the objectives and provisions of this statement.

4. This Statement shall remain in effect until the entire complex of questions concerning nuclear and space arms is resolved in the negotiations referred to in Article I.

1. Source: Department of State, Lot 16D0355, James Timbie Files, Box 1, NST 1985–1992. Secret; Sensitive.
2. Nitze signed the memorandum “Paul” above his typed signature.
3. Secret; Sensitive.
4. [1 line not declassified]
5. [1 line not declassified]
6. Soviets might choose to alter their mix of SS–18s and SS–24s within an aggregate of 230, without exceeding the limit of 150 for SS–18s. [Footnote is in the original.]
7. Assumes a counting rule ascribing 12 ALCMs per bomber. [Footnote is in the original.]
8. Secret. All blank underscores are in the original text.