I believe those points constitute a good basis for your discussion with
Gromyko—taking him to
task for the lack of forthcomingness in the Soviet approach in Round I,
for Soviet backtracking from previous positions, and for their
distortion of the January 8 joint statement4
by making agreement to their “space-strike” arms ban a precondition for
movement on offensive arms reductions. The points also reiterate the
flexibility our negotiators have on START and INF.
However, I believe you should be authorized to make some stronger points
on defense and space, and that you should have contingency authority—if
the situation in Vienna warrants—to give Gromyko some elaborations on our
positions on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms reductions. I
understand that EUR takes a similar
view on these three areas.
Attachment
Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the
President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze)
to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(McFarlane)6
SUBJECT
- Views on Shultz-Gromyko Meeting and NST Round II
SACG principals were requested to
submit their views on the arms control talking points circulated by
General Chain for the
Shultz-Gromyko
meeting, and on new guidance for the delegation for the second
round. My views are presented below.
Shultz-Gromyko Meeting. The talking points
circulated by General Chain are a good basis for the Secretary’s
presentation to Gromyko. However, I believe he should be given authority
to make some additional points on defense and space, and should have
contingency authority—for use if the
situation in Vienna warrants—to flesh out the START and INF positions we introduced in Round I. This
contingency authority would take the form of elaborations of our
existing positions on offensive arms reductions.
With regard to the defense and space points
circulated by General Chain, the Secretary should also:
—Call for a commitment to comply fully with the ABM Treaty, in the context of
resolution of outstanding compliance issues.
—Propose to work out means to reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty, including ways to maintain
clear distinctions between ABM and
non-ABM systems.
—State our intention that, should new defensive technologies prove
feasible and desirable, we would negotiate as to how such systems
could be developed, tested and deployed in accordance with
procedures jointly agreed pursuant to the provisions of the ABM Treaty.
I recognize there is some unease over offering to “negotiate.”
However, we are committed by the ABM Treaty to negotiate any amendments. Moreover, one
of the four points agreed with Mrs. Thatcher at
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Camp David—and one of our strongest
public themes—is that deployment of new strategic defenses would be
a matter for negotiation.
On INF the
Secretary should have contingency authority to elaborate our current
position along the following lines:
—A global ceiling on deployed US and Soviet LRINF missile warheads at a level of
600.
—A limit on deployed US and Soviet LRINF missile warheads in Europe at a level of 300.
—US readiness to agree to a specific limit on the number of P–II
missiles deployed in Europe (though he would not offer a specific
level).
On START
the Secretary should have contingency authority to indicate that—in
the context of an equitable agreement entailing significant cuts in
ballistic missile warheads and meeting US concerns about the
destructive capacity and potential of ballistic missiles—the US
would consider:
—Associated limits on ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs at a level of about 8000 (8000
fully protects our planned ALCM
deployment of 2880).
—Associated limits on ballistic missiles and bombers.
The Secretary would determine whether to use these contingency points
depending on his reading of Gromyko. If Gromyko’s presentation merits their use, we could
derive several advantages. The elaborations on START and INF could:
—provide a concrete manifestation of the flexibility in our approach
and perhaps a stimulus for some real give-and-take when negotiations
resume in Geneva;
—serve the tactical objective of having fleshed-out US positions on
the table to counter the Soviet moratoria and “space-strike” arms
ban proposals and to shift the public away from SDI to our arms control agenda;
—better position ourselves for maintaining public, Allied and
Congressional support for our negotiating effort; and
—in the admittedly unlikely case the Soviets pick up on our ideas,
provide the basis for a joint declaration on negotiating guidelines
for a possible fall summit.
Moreover, it is unclear how US intentions and positions described in
Geneva were read in Moscow. Giving Gromyko a more specific presentation could ensure
the message gets through to the Politburo that we do indeed have
serious proposals that take account of Soviet interests. Finally,
there is a chance, albeit small, that Gromyko may come to Vienna
with a more reasonable position. At a minimum, the Secretary should
have some specifics to play in that event.
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I would not envisage a lengthy arms control exchange in Vienna, but
recommend the Secretary have authority, if the situation warrants,
to put these ideas to Gromyko and ask him to take them back to Moscow for
consideration in developing the Soviet delegation’s guidance for
Round II, making clear we continue to view Geneva as the main
channel for detailed negotiation.
Second Round Guidance. I recommend the
Delegation be given instructions along the above lines for the
second round.
