104. Memorandum From William Wright and Sven Kraemer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)1
- Last Week in Geneva (22–26 April 1985)
Round I concluded this week and the three U.S. negotiators briefed the NAC before returning home on Thursday.2 Twenty plenary sessions were conducted; five full delegation and five each for the three negotiating fora. A summary of this week’s activities is at TAB A.
Ambassador Kampelman has provided his end of round assessment at TAB B in which he concludes that it was not a very productive round largely because the Soviets chose to infuse it with a large propaganda content. The clear Soviet target throughout was SDI, against which they employed the dual tactic of calling for a ban on research while tightly linking it with the prospects for radical reductions in offensive arms. The overlay of both public and negotiating proposals for moratoria in all three areas provided little indication of Soviet flexibility. Indeed, there seemed to be general Soviet frustration with our side’s ability to question inconsistencies with the details of the Soviet moratoria proposal without rejecting it outright.
For the next round Kampelman counsels consistency and patience if we are to be successful in convincing the Soviets that we will not abandon our SDI research and will accept no preconditions on achieving reductions in START and INF.[Page 374]
- Source: Reagan Library, Crisis Management Center, SDI (147–151). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Concurrence by Linhard. Copied to Matlock, Lehman, and McDaniel.↩
- April 25.↩
- Secret; Sensitive.↩
- Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Moscow. Sent Immediate for information to the Mission to NATO and USNMR SHAPE.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 100.↩
- Linhard drew a short vertical line and checkmark in the right-hand margin beside this sentence.↩
- Linhard underlined “the Soviets showed little or no flexibility” and drew a short vertical line and checkmark in the right-hand margin beside this sentence.↩
- Linhard underlined “went backwards by broadening their 1983 ban on cruise missiles to include ALCM’s.”↩
- Reference is to Gorbachev’s April 7 interview with Pravda on U.S.-Soviet relations. Excerpts are printed in the New York Times, April 8, 1985 p. A10.↩
- Linhard bracketed this section and wrote in the right-hand margin: “Key.”↩
- Linhard underlined “two qualities above all others—consistency and patience. The Soviets have shown us very little flexibility and have evinced very little interest in the flexibility and have evinced very little interest in the flexibility that we have told them we possess. They have no doubt been testing the adage that Soviet intransigence can provoke American concessions. This is a good period to prove them wrong.” He drew a short vertical line and checkmark in the right-hand margin beside the last sentence.↩