54. Memorandum From Fritz Ermarth of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)1
SUBJECT
- Results of Deputy Secretary Whitehead’s trip to Eastern Europe
We sent you last month a memo on what John Whitehead hoped to accomplish in his visits to Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and Czechoslovakia (Tab A).2 Following is a report from Rudy Perina on the results of the trip.
[Omitted here is information on Poland.]
Bulgaria:
There is change underway in Bulgaria, though thus far limited to the economy. The Bulgarians have initiated an ambitious reform program which few would have anticipated a year ago. They are also desperate for Western credits and MFN. Their problem is a reluctance to move in the political sphere, though for the first time they seemed open to discussion of the Turkish minority issue which has cost them a lot of human rights points. Whitehead left the message that if they could improve their human rights performance, much could be improved in our bilateral relations.
Romania:
A lot is said about Romania and unfortunately most of it seems true: a grim, impoverished country teeming with police and a pervasive sense of fear—even among government officials who seemed very [Page 186] concerned about what we would tell Ceausescu. The Romanian leader reacted badly to the President’s letter3—denouncing it as interference and saying that Romania did not want MFN at that cost. He claimed that Romanians were never happier and their standard of living has been rising steadily. The Foreign Minister indicated that Ceausescu would answer the President’s letter and that Romania no longer wanted MFN unless it was indefinite and unconditional. The unproductive exchanges, together with harassment of unofficial Romanians invited to a reception, prompted Whitehead to issue a very tough press statement criticizing Ceausescu personally. Overall U.S.-Romanian relations deteriorated, but we have distanced ourselves from Ceausescu and may be somewhat off the hook on MFN renewal. We have to await Ceausescu’s letter and then study the legal implications of whether and how a country can renounce MFN. We are having a first meeting at State on this next week. The Romanian position on MFN is not yet public knowledge.
Czechoslovakia:
The legacy of 1968 still holds Czechoslovakia in paralysis. The Czechs want MFN, but have not made the political decision to begin either political or economic reform seriously, or meet us even halfway on human rights. Our relations remain on ice until Prague decides which way it wants to go. We made clear it was their choice.
Whitehead stopped off at NATO to encourage more Allied consultation on Eastern Europe. He stressed that this is a time of opportunity to press for East European reform and the Allies should work toward this in tandem. During a call on Belgian Foreign Minister Tindemans, CSCE was raised and Whitehead said that the West would be “foolish” to give the Soviets a Moscow human rights conference, particularly when they were backtracking on human rights.
In sum, the trip demonstrated that differentiation in our policy toward Eastern Europe does exist: we made progress with two countries, downgraded relations with one, and kept relations with another on hold. Whitehead was tough when called for, as in Romania, and overall did a good job in conveying the message that it is up to the individual countries to decide how they want our relations to develop.
- Source: Reagan Library, Rudolf Perina Files, Chronological Folder, Chron February 1988 (2). Secret. Sent for information. Drafted by Perina.↩
- See Document 53.↩
- See Document 171.↩