Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

53. Memorandum From Fritz Ermath of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)¹

Washington, January 28, 1988

SUBJECT

• Deputy Secretary Whitehead’s Trip to Eastern Europe

As you are aware, John Whitehead will be visiting Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia in the first week of February. (Rudy Perina is going with him.) Whitehead’s East European trips—of which this is the fourth—don’t capture much publicity in the U.S., but they represent our most deliberate effort to show the flag and exert influence in a region of growing instability and potential crisis. This memo is a brief synopsis of what Whitehead hopes to accomplish.

Poland:

This is one of the freest country’s of the region, but also a tinderbox. Poland remains paralyzed through stalemate between the government and the opposition, each waiting for the other to blink while the national debt reaches $38 billion. Failure of the government to win a referendum on reform policies has worsened the situation. Whitehead will continue our efforts to press Jaruzelski into dialogue with the opposition so that some measure of national reconciliation and effective reform can ensue. We will offer support of an IMF stand-by if IMF conditions are met, but no new credits. We may agree to a Washington visit by the Foreign Minister later this year. Terrorism will be high on our agenda because the Poles dallied too long in closing an Abu Nidal office in Warsaw.

Romania:

The objective in Romania is clear but very tough: to convince Ceausescu that he will probably lose MFN unless there is very visible human rights progress before June. The letter from the President should help,² but we are not optimistic. Ceausescu is losing touch with reality and may no longer care about MFN. In that case we will have to prepare for a sharp downturn in relations, while trying to preserve as much contact and influence as we can. The Whitehead visit should give indication if there is any hope of avoiding the worst.

Bulgaria:

Bulgaria surprised us over the past year with a sudden interest to improve relations, but thus far it has offered more talk than action. We have great human rights problems with Bulgaria because of its treatment of a Turkish minority, which infuriates our ally Turkey. Whitehead will pursue limited bilateral issues such as drug control and improved cooperation on counter-terrorism, but a breakthrough in relations is not likely until Bulgaria turns a corner on human rights.

Czechoslovakia:

What makes this country interesting is the recent change of the Party leader: Milos Jakes replaced Gustav Husak, who had been in office since the ouster of Dubcek. It could be the first step in reforming the repressive system put into place after the Prague Spring, but then again it might not be. All that we know about Jakes is that he has considerable blood on his own hands from the post-68 purges. Whitehead hopes to see Jakes and signal that we are willing to improve relations if the Czechoslovaks start long-overdue reforms and perform much better on human rights. Prague’s main objective—MFN—is not likely anytime soon, however.

Whitehead will cap the East European tour with a stop at NATO to brief the NAC. Our Allies are increasingly interested in Eastern Europe, in part because they also see a potential for crisis which could derail U.S.-Soviet and East-West relations. The Germans are the most concerned and try to preserve stability through considerable outlay of money. Whitehead will stress the importance of Allied consultation on Eastern Europe and seek to explain our efforts to push for reform and human rights improvements through a differentiated, step-by-step approach.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Rudolf Perina Files, Chronological Folder, Chron February 1988 (2). Secret. Sent for information. Prepared by Perina. Powell wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum: “FWE/Rudy, On balance this all seems like very useful & effective low key diplomacy. CP.” “Natl Sec Advisor has seen” is stamped at the top of the first page.
2. See Document 171.