Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

410. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State¹

4562.

Prague, September 26, 1984, 1154Z

SUBJECT

• Strougal: Thoughts on His Agenda and Ours.

REF

• A. Prague 4528,²
• B. Prague 4529,³
• C. Prague 4530 (Nodis).⁴

1. S—Entire text.

2. Summary. Strougal’s comments to me on September 24 contained several interesting oddities: He was extremely negative on CEMA cooperation; defensive and confused about Kremlin politics, down on Gromyko, and very high on Gorbachev, whom he said “heads the CPSU Secretariat”. That he stayed away from our bilateral relations, declined to discuss the possibility of economic or other reforms here, and avoided inner-German relations, I also found interesting. He welcomed my activist approach, urged me to keep up my “protests” to his government when Czechoslovak leaders (Bilak and company) criticized President Reagan and he welcomed my article in Rude Pravo. He said I will continue to have access to him if we manage this discreetly. My conclusion is that Strougal is probably doing this on his own with the tacit approval of President Husak and that he does not want anything more from us now except for occasional briefings. I still want to press for the moderate increase in official dialogue with this government that I have recommended separately. See action requested at end of cable. End summary.

3. In the first three cables in this series (reftels), I tried to convey as accurately as possible Strougal’s remarks to me of September 24. In this cable I discuss some of the odd but important aspects of what he said, review what he stayed away from, report on his explanation of why he is seeing me and submit some analysis of this Strougal phenomenon. As in the case of the earlier cables, I request that distribution be limited. I suggest it be repeated to Moscow.

Some Odd But Important Aspects of Strougal’s Remarks

4. In reviewing my notes of the conversation there are a series of points which I find particularly noteworthy either for being unusual coming from a communist leader or odd coming from this particular country. Keep in mind that Strougal has been managing this government and economy for over 15 years during which time he has had a relatively close, if not intimate, relationship with the Soviet leadership. Here are some of the noteworthy oddities:

— Strougal’s extremely negative view of CEMA economic cooperation and the economic future of the region (Ref B) sounds more like an analyst from Wharton econometrics than the leader of an orthodox communist state. He seemed fed up and discouraged about the economic potential of this region.

— His remarkably candid comments about the Soviet leadership reveal defensiveness about his closest ally. Also he seemed to act like an outsider (like all the rest of us) rather than a trusted loyal confidante of the Kremlin rulers. He has had considerable access but the insights he reveals to us are only a little better than our own perspective. His perspective seems remarkably “Western”.

— Strougal was determined to give us guidance on handling Gromyko. Throughout the conversation he said that the “Soviet leaders” or “Soviet delegation” should leave the meeting with the President⁵ convinced that there was hope for negotiations. He avoided suggesting we had to convince Gromyko. His strong pleas for not revealing too much to the press after the meeting and his strange defense of Arbatov suggested ways to communicate with Moscow.

— His forceful defense of Gorbachev and particularly his repeated statement that Gorbachev “heads the Secretariat” of the CPSU is befuddling since Chernenko as General Secretary virtually by definition heads the Secretariat. Strougal is neither dumb nor uninformed on such issues. What does he mean by that? Moreover, Romanov, it is said here, has the watching briefing in the Kremlin over Czechoslovak-Soviet relations. It is interesting that Strougal is so high on Gorbachev.

What Strougal Did Not Say

5. The discussion went on for one hour and forty minutes and a great deal of ground was covered, but Strougal avoided a number of interesting topics.

— U.S./Czech relations. He was not prepared to discuss our bilateral relations nor did he have this on his agenda. I am particularly struck by his failure to respond to my candid explanation of our “differentiation policy”. He may have just been too much of a gentleman to discuss it, but I am inclined not to give him that credit.

— Despite his strong statements regarding the weakness of the CEMA economic system, he declined to give any hint of what might or might not be happening in reforms in this country suggesting, as usual, that nothing is happening.

— I gave him several openings but he refused to be drawn into a discussion of inner-German relations. I find that surprising given importance and sensitivity of that issue here and given his candor on other points.

Strougal On My Activities

6. Some of the more interesting information in the discussion related to his comments about my activities:

— His opening remarks of the conversation were “I read your letter⁶ to the Foreign Minister protesting criticism of President Reagan in Rude Pravo.⁷ That was awful.” I asked him, “What was awful? My letter?” He replied, “Oh, no, your letter was excellent. It was the criticism in Rude Pravo.” He said that type of thing should not happen and when it does happen “you should protest.” (He was referring to my protest letter to Chnoupek of July 6 regarding the published speech of Bilak—Prague 3104).⁸

— He congratulated me on the article in Rude Pavo and Pravda on the U.S. role in the Slovak national uprising.⁹ He said it was written with just the right tone to get it published and yet still carry the U.S. message in the papers with the largest distribution in the country.

— Strougal asked again that the information he provides me not appear in the press. He said he was pleased there was no public feedback from our last meeting. I told him that my report of our meetings receives limited distribution and that I had not discussed our meeting with any of my colleagues in Prague or shared the information with other governments. He said the substance of my conversations he shared only with President Husak and only indirectly, without citing me, in his meetings with other ministers.

— He said that I would continue to have regular access to him keeping in mind that he had to be “careful” with his Foreign Minister and be discreet with other ambassadors. He said he and the President welcomed my activist approach which has been made even more difficult by the fact that this was one of the most troubled periods in U.S./Czech relations since he has been Prime Minister.

What Does Strougal Want?

7. This apparent open door to the head of a communist government is unusual and difficult to evaluate. The situation gives rise to several questions:

— Is Strougal acting on his own or under instructions? I suspect that he is acting more or less on his own trying to inform himself better and to pick up whatever scraps from us he can use to ingratiate himself to his President, the Soviets or someone else. He may also want to arm himself first-hand with facts and argumentation about our positions on central issues to use in his presumedly ongoing policy tussles with Vasil Bilak, party ideologue and Slovak rival. The way the meetings have come about and the personal style suggest that he is free-wheeling possibly with the tacit approval of the President.

— What is Strougal’s agenda? As a tired cynic who may be looking at the end of his career, he seems confused by Kremlin politics and deeply concerned about the future of the economy. To be charitable he may be reaching out tentatively to a part of the world with which he has had less contact than he, as a Czech, would like. To be unkind, he may simply be bored.

— Does Strougal want anything from us? Probably nothing except some information. Should U.S./Soviet relations perk up a bit he may ask for a slight upturn in our dealings with Czechoslovakia. Now he is simply keeping his ears and options open.

Strougal’s Health

8. He did not seem much different from his appearance in May. Although he seemed to bulge a bit more at the waist and was possibly a little more stooped, he looked reasonably fit. I had a report that he was worried about his health problems since his early July illness. The only hint of this was that he did make reference to his age several times. His close aide, in a conversation prior to the meeting, said in response to my question about the Prime Minister’s health that he was “getting old”.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

9. If access to Strougal can be maintained without cost we have nothing to lose and perhaps something to gain. This meeting was not publicized in Rude Pravo as the earlier one had been. So he is trying to keep our contacts discreet. His aide assured me the following day that the Prime Minister would help in getting us access to visiting officials, businessmen and even for a three-star general who will be visiting me here next month. We should, therefore, continue to try to provide Strougal interesing periodic briefings to sustain this access and get his rather candid views on events in Moscow and elsewhere. After all, we are primarily a “listening post” so we should take every opportunity to listen.

10. It is also in our interest to keep up an active effort to bring information on U.S. policies to this leadership more broadly than Strougal. Some slightly higher level contact such as an exchange of visits as proposed at the Assistant Secretary/Deputy Foreign Minister level hardly falls in the category of destroying our policy of differentiation. Clearly, my talk with Strougal about how troubled the Soviet leadership is and how desperate CEMA cooperation has become cannot be considered bestowing prestige on the Czechoslovak Government. In fact, such information, if it proves accurate, should enable us to formulate better tactical approaches to the Soviets and to the region. Therefore, I reiterate my interest in pursuing my earlier recommendations to open slightly a dialogue with this wretched—but well connected—government.

11. Action requested:

— EUR, INR and Embassy Moscow provide feedback on Strougal’s remarks and my analysis of them. Do they track with other information?

— Provide me authority soon to approach Strougal or Chnoupek on an invitation to a Deputy Foreign Minister to visit Washington and on a visit of Assistant Secretary Burt.

Luers

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N840011–0150. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. See footnote 2, Document 409.
3. See footnote 2, Document 409.
4. See Document 409.
5. Reagan met with Gromyko in Washington on September 28. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Documents 286 and 287.
6. Not found.
7. Rude Pravo’s criticism of Reagan’s “inadvertent voice test remarks” before his August 11 weekly radio address, in which he suggested that the United States was about to bomb the Soviet Union, was reported in telegram 3770 from Prague, August 15. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840520–0940)
8. Telegram 3104 from Prague, July 6, conveyed the text of Luers’s letter. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840434–0112)
9. Not found.