Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

409. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State¹

4530.

Prague, September 24, 1984, 1621Z

SUBJECT

• US-Czechoslovakia Relations: Conversation With Strougal (Cable III).²

1. Summary: At the end of the September 24 talk, Prime Minister Strougal and I discussed US-Czechoslovak bilateral relations. I had nothing to say since the Department had provided me no guidance. But I spoke candidly about our “differentiation” policy and hinted at some small measures that I might propose later. I said that the Washington attitude was negative toward doing much with Czechoslovakia and that he knew why this was not likely to change in the near term. Strougal listened and said my analysis was probably realistic. He did talk about expanding contacts and said that my channel to him would remain open. He gave no hint of whether or when the GOC would respond to our offer to negotiate an exchanges agreement. This is the third of four cables reporting this discussion. End summary.

2. At the end of an hour and a half conversation on September 24 with Prime Minister Strougal, we turned briefly to the state of US-Czechoslovak relations. This followed a discussion on US-Soviet relations and CEMA developments which are being reported separately. This is the third cable in the series on this discussion.

3. Since Strougal did not seem intent on pursuing our bilateral relations, and, more to the point, since the Department had given me no instructions on what I could say, I spoke in general terms about U.S.-Czechoslovak relations. I outlined with some candor the shape of our differentiation policy which I said had become the subject of Soviet and Eastern European criticism over the past few months. I said we are pursuing a policy of self interest to improve bilateral relations with those countries in Eastern Europe that demonstrated they were prepared to pursue them with us. I said even though Czechoslovakia was now the country closest to the Soviet Union and furtherest for us, there was every reason to believe that it could conduct sensible relations with us as Hungary has been doing for some time and as East Germany has begun to. There are interesting developments in Central Europe that suggest it was possible for nations to pursue some independent self interests in this part of the world and still not leave the Warsaw Pact. I told Strougal that it is not U.S. policy to impose our form of democracy on Czechoslovakia (as Strougal had said in a recent speech), but it is in our interest to conduct mutually beneficial relations. I said quite frankly there was a good deal of reluctance in Washington to undertake even some minimal measures with Czechoslovakia until things change here for reasons which he knows well and which we have already discussed.

4. Nonetheless, I said that we were still seeking some very small steps to see what possibilities are open. I referred to our desire to see a response to our proposal to negotiate an exchanges agreement and spoke of the possibilities for a more open exchange of people. I said I hoped to be able to discuss within the next few weeks the possibilities of exchange of visits at the Deputy Foreign Minister/Assistant Secretary level and perhaps a discussion in depth of certain foreign policy issues on which the U.S. and Czechoslovakia differ. I said that there was considerable reluctance in Washington, however, to proceed with even this level of contacts with Prague. I concluded by saying that I thought, if in fact the Soviets were to respond to our initiatives and begin having the dialogue we sought following U.S. elections, there might be some improved opportunities to open up US-Czechoslovak relations ever so slightly. I said I was not the least bit optimistic over the short run, however.

5. Strougal listened carefully and said that he thought my analysis was a realistic one. He said he did not see much short-term reason for optimism in our bilateral relations but assured me that my dialogue with him and with ministers should continue. He discussed as well the need for more lower level exchanges of professors, political scientists, experts and “Americanologists” such as Arbatov from the Soviet USA Institute. (Comment: Here he entered a digression on Arbatov which I have reported separately³ and which took him away from US-Czechoslovak relations). He had to move on to another meeting so we left further discussion of the bilateral relationship until the next time.

6. Comment: As in so many areas, Strougal is simply marking time on this matter. He is probably hoping that some softening will be possible in their own policies if US-Soviet relations improve. He did not, however, suggest any movement toward negotiations on exchanges or indicate that he had any creative ideas of his own as he suggested he might last May. Creative ideas and the Czechoslovak Government are contradictions in terms.

Luers

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N840011–0087. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. Cable I, telegram 4528 from Prague, September 24, described the meeting between Strougal and Luers on September 24, focusing particularly on Strougal’s views on U.S.-Soviet relations. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N840011–0092) Cable II, telegram 4529 from Prague, September 24, described Strougal’s views on CEMA as presented at the September 24 meeting. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N840011–0089)
3. Not found.