Historical Documents - Office of the Historian

1.

Summary. Deputy Secretary met with General Secretary/State Council Chairman Todor Zhivkov February 4 for two and a half hours of wide-ranging discussion. Issues included Zhivkov’s tenure, Soviet and Bulgarian restructuring programs, general international outlook, U.S.-Bulgarian relationship overall and with special stress on economic relations and human rights issues, especially Turkish minority. Zhivkov confirmed Foreign Minister Mladenov’s earlier hint that Bulgarians are willing to review and reduce zones closed to travel by resident diplomats, and was willing to entertain suggestion that Bulgaria invite [Page 1280] multinational investigating team to put false charges concerning Turkish minority to rest, if only they can get a sensible dialogue going with Turkey. Zhivkov was lively, vigorous and appeared fully in command and confident of tenure. End summary.

2.

Bulgarian President and General Secretary Todov Zhivkov received Deputy Secretary Whitehead at his Bojana residence between 11:30 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. February 4, and then hosted him at lunch between 1:15 and 2:15 p.m. Zhivkov was accompanied by Foreign Minister Petur Mladenov, Ambassador to Washington Stoian Zhulev and an interpreter. Whitehead was accompanied by Ambassador Polansky and EUR DAS Tom Simons.

3.

Whitehead commented that Zhivkov was still holding two jobs. Zhivkov said he would see what the future would bring. One of Bulgaria’s national liberators had said that we are in time and time is in us. If present prescriptions are followed he would be in his job until he was 95, so things were okay for him for the time being. Whitehead asked if he were the leader longest in office. Zhivkov replied jovially that he was the dean among general secretaries, and the vice dean among heads of state, after the Emperor of Japan.

4.

Zhivkov said he had sent the Politburo a short letter when he had proposed at the recent national party conference that the next party congress in 1991 decide in favor of fixed terms in office and no cumulation of high offices. He had the interpreter read it to Whitehead. Zhivkov told the Politburo he was guided by the interests of overall development, but also by personal interests. He asked what were his, and what were theirs. As for himself, he had drawn down his account well: he could remain General Secretary until the year 2006, when he would be 95, and that coincided with his interests. He believed his suggestion was also in the interest of the other Politburo members. That might not hold true for the younger ones, but for them social interests should be above personal interest. This would of course only be enforced at the fourteenth party congress, so they had nothing to worry about until then. He had signed Todor Zhivkov. He commented that there is a grain of truth in every joke.

5.

Whitehead recalled that when Gorbachev had first come into office he had said he would be replacing older leaders in Eastern Europe. He observed that this had not happened in Bulgaria. Zhivkov replied that Gorbachev had not told him that. Whitehead said it had been rumored. Zhivkov said he did not know if that were Gorbachev’s main problem; he thought perhaps Gorbachev had more serious problems. But there would of course be some changes. There was Husak, but he had been ill. Honecker was healthy. Kadar had some health problems, but he had not heard about any changes concerning Kadar. Still, [Page 1281] it would be natural for younger people to come on. Whitehead commented that he had met Honecker and Kadar the previous November, and they had seemed in excellent health. Zhivkov said Kadar was a year younger than he was; he was born in 1911, Kadar in 1912. But every party had its own concrete approach.

6.

Whitehead said he was pleased with the way relations between the two countries had developed over the year since his first visit. There was good dialogue in a number of areas. That morning he and the Foreign Minister had resolved to try to take the relationship another step forward over the next year.2 The two sides still had concerns and disagreements, but as they talked, they found, as always happens, that the differences were not so great as might have been perceived at the start. He had spoken to the Foreign Minister about bilateral relations, and he thought the main thing for this meeting was to hear Zhivkov’s views on world affairs, especially what was happening in the Soviet Union, and how he saw the Soviet-American relationship. Zhivkov’s wisdom and judgment made those views especially valuable for us.

7.

Zhivkov said he would first like to say that he fully agreed that after Whitehead’s previous visit the Bulgarian side had observed a tangible improvement in our relationship. He would be very happy to see full normalization of relations during his term in office. He wished to reiterate that he saw no serious reason why we should not normalize relations fully. There were no contradictions between the two governments and the two peoples. There were no reasons to prevent normal bilateral relations. Problems had been discussed the previous time, but neither he nor Whitehead had created them. History had created them. They had looked at problems from the political aspect, but that did not mean they should be taken as contradictions between the two governments and peoples. Zhivkov continued that Whitehead had discussed bilateral problems, and things that could be obstacles to developing relations, such as drugs and terrorism. Whitehead’s previous visit had marked the beginning of resolution of such problems, and Zhivkov said he appreciated Whitehead’s contribution.

8.

What was needed was a balance of relations in the political sphere, Zhivkov went on. Bulgaria was here, on the Balkan Peninsula. It was ready to take account of U.S. interests in the Balkans, just as it takes account of Soviet interests in the area. It saw that the interests [Page 1282] of the Soviet Union and the U.S. were no obstacle to development of relations in the Balkans. Bulgaria had welcomed with full candor the meeting between Papandreou and Ozal. It had gotten things moving, in the direction of pacifying relations. The problems between Greece and Turkey were the fault of neither. They were there for historical reasons. Of course it would take time.

9.

Similarly, Zhivkov went on, Bulgaria had some problems with Turkey. Probably an overall reassessment of relations was necessary. Bulgaria was ready for it. It knew what the U.S. was, its role and responsibility in the world. It knew that the U.S. and the Soviet Union would decide on the future development of the world. Clearly overemphasis on some political problems would not lead to a settlement of the other problems in relations. So Bulgaria was ready for a balance of relations in politics, in the economic field, in agriculture, in culture and in international affairs, to the extent that they affected the Balkans, and also other parts of the world.

10.

Zhivkov said Bulgaria welcomed the new line in international relations initiated by the Soviet Union. This was new thinking. It was not a monopoly of the Soviet Union, or of the socialist countries. It should pervade everyone, since it concerns cardinal issues. It was revising all the key perceptions concerning international development. For instance, the concept of peaceful coexistence had been introduced by Lenin. But in his time the question of who would win was at stake. This was now cancelled. It was based on the class approach to interstate relations, and that was obsolete. Now all-human problems were the focus, the survival of humanity the question. Bulgaria still had respect for the international workers’ movement, but the survival of humanity came first. This was a 180 degree turn. The task was not to create obstacles to coexistence.

11.

Zhivkov said the second main issue was to rescue humanity from nuclear weapons. Bulgaria welcomed the INF agreement, and in general dialogue between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was of historic significance, the most important thing in the world, and should continue. But abolishing two classes of nuclear weapons did not solve the problem. It was not a turning point, not a breakthrough. Navies were being reequipped with cruise missiles, targeted against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The same was true of air forces. So we should not be misled. The dialogue should continue and expand to the full elimination of nuclear weapons, or at least to their reduction to levels where they constituted no threat. The Soviet Union was absolutely ready for this. What would a 50 percent cut mean? Bulgaria hoped a START agreement would be signed, but the 6000 warheads that would remain—or even 3000, if there were a further 50 percent [Page 1283] cut—would still be enough to destroy the world. So we can see how much work remains to be done, what a responsibility there is, Zhivkov said. That also held for the situation in Europe, Zhivkov went on. Think now many chemical weapons plants there are. Nuclear weapons were not needed to destroy Europe in view of such realities.

12.

The Soviet Union and the socialist countries were doing nothing in pursuit of their own advantage, Zhivkov continued, whether political, or military, or ideological. Their policies were based on humanitarian considerations, due to their concern to preserve all-human values. He had just come from a meeting of the Fatherland Front; there he had given a speech of one-and-a-half hours where he had mentioned these matters. He appreciated Soviet-American dialogue. He hoped it would advance step by step. Mankind had no other alternative. To believe that socialism could be destroyed with one stroke was absurd. It was equally absurd to believe that communism would be triumphant in the West in the next thirty to fifty years. Both sides needed to come down to earth and see the realities of the world.

13.

Zhivkov said Bulgaria welcomed Soviet perestroika. It supported it. Bulgaria was carrying out its own restructuring. There were no qualitative differences between them. He knew Whitehead read a lot, and knew about the differences. They were due to the concrete situation in Bulgaria. It had started in a different way.

14.

That did not mean the Soviet Union would stop, Zhivkov went on. They would have their national party conference in June. He thought the conference would probably agree on a comprehensive program for the second stage of perestroika. He did not have precise information on the agenda for the conference, but he expected it to deepen and expand the process, both in the base and in the superstructure, as communists put it. The difficulties in the Soviet Union were bigger than in Bulgaria. The Soviets had to stir up more layers. They were a gigantic multinational state; Bulgaria was a small country. After the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU which had condemned the personality cult of Stalin and brought Khrushchev to the fore, there had been no deep-going changes at the succeeding congresses. Whereas in Bulgaria the April plenum of 1956 had introduced deep-going changes. Bulgaria had been one of the most backward countries, but in the past thirty years it had taken a historic leap in development. That was the reason for the processes underway in Bulgaria.

15.

Zhivkov said genially that he hoped the U.S. would help Bulgaria. History would really remember that the U.S. had helped a small Balkan state along the path of socialist construction. Bulgarians [Page 1284] were setting practical goals for themselves. It was not talking much about the democratic character of the changes. Whitehead would have noticed that it was not stressing democracy much. But in January they had started handing over socialist property to the commodity producers. Thirty percent of output only would be covered by state enterprises, and this would later be reduced to twenty percent. Work forces would be formed on a voluntary basis, and profits would be distributed on a voluntary basis. This was unprecedented in the history of mankind so far. But they were not making excessive noise about it. Their priority was explaining it to their own people.

16.

Millions of people were involved in the changes introduced on January 1, Zhivkov said, so they had called the national party conference. Of course there were difficulties, but he was surprised by the Bulgarian people, by the Bulgarian workers. They had started handing over socialist property January 1. But by the time the conference started only ten complaints had come in to the Ministry of the Economy. Of these two or three were justified, and the rest were merely consumerist in inspiration. The people were calm, quiet. Tension might grow as contracts had to be signed with the state. But in general, Zhivkov said with a laugh, the press was writing about difficulties so that people outside Bulgaria would not worry that things were going too smoothly. They did not want the outside world to worry about Bulgaria.

17.

There had been no surprises at the national party conference, Zhivkov went on. It had been televised, and heavily covered on radio and in the press. He had been surprised only at the high level of the speeches. They were not prepared in advance, or edited. There had been only one kind of interference, and that was his fault: he had assigned someone to look at all of them and make sure they did not contain excessive praise of him, Zhivkov. All this meant people had been thinking a lot in recent years.

18.

Now they would have to carry the restructuring process into the spiritual sphere, Zhivkov went on. They were not going to be too hasty about this. They were going to prepare carefully. There would be a Central Committee plenum, which would introduce radical changes into areas like the legal system, and public health. He had carefully examined the British experience with public health. Thatcher was very proud of it, although he now saw the nurses were on strike. But what he liked was that sixty percent of the services were delivered at the local level, where people lived. The community voted for the physicians, the highest-paid doctors. Only forty percent of health services were delivered in larger hospitals and clinics. It would be the same in Bulgaria. Services would be free, and patients could choose any doctor, but they would give the doctors coupons, which would determine their salaries.

19.

Zhivkov said the Bulgarians would also be borrowing from U.S. experience with trade, though not in every way. With regard to the deficit, it turns out that one can survive and do quite well with a trade deficit, that one can still give credits and aid.

20.

Returning to the Soviet Union, Zhivkov said there would be gigantic changes in the time ahead. If he were Gorbachev, he would be doing the same things. But it was an enormous country, and mistakes had enormous repercussions. Whereas Bulgaria was a small country: if it made mistakes, they could be rectified right away.

21.

That was the essence of Bulgarian restructuring, Zhivkov concluded. Organizations would choose their trading partners, at home and abroad. They had established eight commercial banks, which belonged to the producers. State capital was invested in these banks, for instance, the bank of the chemical producers. These banks were developing, but a banking system was new to them.

22.

Unlike some other countries, Zhivkov went on, the Bulgarian economy was tied mainly to the Soviet Union and other socialist states. There were historical reasons for that. The Soviet Union was a market for Bulgaria. The U.S. had restricted economic contacts, and there was no other way for Bulgaria but to go to the Soviet Union. The time would come when that U.S. line would be criticized. One or two billion dollars could do a lot, and large Bulgarian corporations were ready to invest in the U.S. But there are the U.S. limitations. It should be clear that no restrictions or embargo would stop the Bulgarian economy from going forward. Bulgaria was a small country, and the potential of the socialist community was sufficient for its normal development. This was also true of scientific development. Bulgarians had boasted that they had the largest fourth-generation computer in the world; IBM knew about it. It did one billion operations a second. When they showed it to the USSR Ministry of Planning, they had been shown one that did ten billion operations a second. That was what Gorbachev was planning. There was enormous potential in the opening up of the Soviet military industry. There is room under that roof for a cozy nook for sparrows like us, Zhivkov said.

23.

Nevertheless, Zhivkov went on, the U.S. is bigger, so there should be an even bigger nook under the U.S. roof for Bulgaria. Bulgaria was always accused of giving things it got from the West to the Soviet Union. The Soviets had no interest in these things. They had showed the Soviets something they got from the UK, and the Soviets had shown no interest, so the operation had been liquidated, forgotten. Bulgaria manufactured some light, conventional weapons, and these could not be altered in any respect. But Bulgaria had to take a firm stand. At present it had sixty percent of the trade in electronics among socialist countries. In ten years that would go down to forty percent. Bulgaria wanted [Page 1286] to keep competing, and the competition was growing. He himself was interested in what would happen in the next few years, and not in the further future; younger people could worry about that.

24.

The Deputy Secretary thanked Zhivkov for his views and ideas. He wished merely to pick up on two or three of the most interesting topics.

25.

Zhivkov had used the term “balanced relationship,” Whitehead noted. He thought that was an interesting and appropriate way to describe the U.S. interest in bilateral relations. Zhivkov interjected that he had spoken of a balance of economic, cultural, mass media and political relations, to be discussed as among human beings on the basis of each side’s interests. Whitehead said he would add world relationships as well. The U.S. side believed that if the U.S. developed closer relationships with East European countries, and the Soviet Union with West European countries, the world would be less dependent on a close relationship between the heads of the Soviet Union and the United States. There would be fewer chances of misunderstandings and disagreements, and the smaller countries would be more involved in the issues of the day. So we found the concept of a “balanced relationship” appropriate.

26.

Whitehead said he was also happy with Zhivkov’s comments on human values. He sometimes felt that the Soviet Union and East European countries did not understand the importance the U.S. places on human values. The previous year he and Zhivkov had exchanged some sharp comments on human rights. Zhivkov seemed to feel the U.S. was trying to impose its views on Bulgaria. He had explained that we had no right to interfere in the affairs of Bulgaria, a sovereign nation, but that if Bulgaria wished to improve relations with the U.S. it had to understand our system and the importance we attached to the way Bulgaria treated its own citizens. So he had been pleased that Zhivkov had placed human rights on his rpt his agenda, and had not required Whitehead to raise the subject.

27.

Zhivkov responded that this showed there was no single subject on which we need fail to reach agreement. If Whitehead would sign a piece of paper which said the U.S. would accept those alleged Turks who wished to settle in the U.S., if they agreed, he would advertise in the press—without mentioning the agreement—for applications for Turkey, for the U.S., for anywhere in the world. He had thought of a clause promising no restrictions on entry, but had been told that was not a human rights problem. There was no issue on which he could not reach agreement.

28.

The U.S. was also saying Bulgaria supported terrorists, or drug traffickers, Zhivkov complained. It was true that some items were sold, but that was by individuals, and just to earn dollars. That was foreign exchange; there was no support for terrorism.

29.

The Deputy Secretary then recalled Zhivkov’s comments on socialism and capitalism. He had made the point that it was not likely that the U.S. would be converted to socialism or the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to capitalism in our lifetimes. The point was to learn to live together although we had different systems. Zhivkov interjected “exactly.” Whitehead said he wished to point out that both systems were changing. Though the name was the same, our capitalism had adopted some features of Zhivkov’s socialism, and though the name was the same, he believed that Zhivkov’s socialism had adopted some features of our capitalism. So the two systems, which some years ago had been exact opposites, were now becoming much less different, and he found that encouraging.

30.

With regard to disarmament, the Deputy Secretary recalled, Zhivkov had pointed out that the INF treaty was a relatively small thing, and that even a START agreement would have a lot of weapons with which to destroy each other. But this meant that while we had to pursue disarmament as aggressively as we could and make as much progress as we could, it was still not likely that complete disarmament would be achieved in our lifetime, if ever. So we had to find ways to live peacefully even without complete disarmament.

31.

U.S. disagreements with the Soviet Union were not so much about disarmament, Whitehead continued. There both sides were eager to achieve progress as soon as possible. The disagreements were more about regional problems, where we found that the historically aggressive actions of the Soviet Union were dangerous to the peace of the world. Hence we were now spending more and more effort with the Soviets on discussing these activities in places like Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and Nicaragua, which we see as hot and potentially dangerous spots.

32.

The Deputy Secretary recalled that Zhivkov had spoken of the importance of improving economic relations. The U.S. side agreed it was important to improve them. There were lots of aspects, and it was a complicated subject. But since the level of trade was now practically zero, it should be easy to make some progress fast. Two-way trade was only $150 million. Zhivkov said the level was “symbolic.” Whitehead agreed, and proposed that the two sides take as a target the doubling of the figure in two years.

33.

Whitehead continued that doubling the present figure should be easy, but it would take work on both sides. There would be a Trade and Economic Council meeting in April. This was an important organization, including both Bulgarians and Americans, and the meeting provided a chance to eliminate barriers that now exist.

34.

The Bulgarians would have to identify products they could sell successfully in the U.S., Whitehead went on. This might mean they also needed to redesign or repackage products to make them attractive to U.S. consumers. Bulgaria would also have to establish contacts with U.S. importers willing to accept and distribute Bulgarian products. He urged the Bulgarian side, with the help of their very fine Ambassador in Washington, to find ways to establish a better economic presence to help open up markets. We would be prepared to cooperate in such an effort.

35.

The Deputy Secretary then turned to U.S. investment in Bulgaria. We would like to encourage it, he said. But it was important for the Bulgarians to help us do that. It was important for Bulgaria to appoint someone who would deal with U.S. companies interested in investing here. Companies did not know whom to turn to; often there were a dozen organizations involved. It was important for them to talk to one person, who would then talk to all the rest. Doing those two things would help Bulgaria increase its trade with us and attract U.S. investment.

36.

Zhivkov said he would consider these suggestions to improve economic relations. He would name a person to be a contact point for potential investors. However, the banks would be the point of departure for such contacts. Linking investment with the banks would expand operations, since corporations stand behind the banks. He might assign Foreign Economic Relations Minister Lukanov, who had some confidence among American businessmen. He might assign someone else. He would consider it.

37.

Zhivkov said he was not one to give advice, but probably the U.S. had decided to revise its economic relations with socialist countries. The Deputy Secretary was on the political side, so he had to find issues on which to quarrel with Bulgaria; others got the cream. The Deputy Secretary said we would have to talk both about what we agree on and what we disagree on. Zhivkov said that of course this was true: dialogue was the way.

38.

The Deputy Secretary said he would like to spend a minute on U.S.-Soviet relations as we saw them. They had improved dramatically with the Gorbachev leadership in Moscow. We were cautiously optimistic that this could continue. We had a broad dialogue underway on [Page 1289] many subjects. Progress was being made across the board, not just on arms control, but also on other less publicized issues.

39.

At the same time, Whitehead went on, there was still widespread cautiousness in the U.S. and in our government about moving too fast in response to Gorbachev. Until we could see more tangible changes, for instance in the human rights area and on regional issues, especially Afghanistan, this would certainly persist. In spite of this cautiousness, however, we have negotiations underway across the board, both sides were pursuing their objectives, and they were reaching agreements.

40.

Zhivkov said not everything would be resolved either between the U.S. and the Soviet Union or between the U.S. and Bulgaria. What was important was not to create obstacles. He believed Whitehead’s visit would contribute to the two countries’ growing closer. He and Whitehead could enter the history books for their contribution to U.S.-Bulgarian relations. Whitehead said Zhivkov’s chances were better than his. Zhivkov said when his term was over, the history books would begin to criticize him; that was the dialectics of life. Whitehead said that was true in every society. The question was not whether to be in the history books, but what they would say. Zhivkov concluded that there was no better judge, and invited Whitehead to lunch.

41.

Following a brief exchange recapitulating bilateral relations, Zhivkov said he had heard the President would visit Europe this year, and asked why should he not come to Bulgaria. This would be a great event. In fact, he laughed, it would be a greater event than a visit in the context of Soviet-American relations.

42.

The Deputy Secretary said it would be, and he wished it would happen, but Bulgaria’s neighbors would be too disappointed. The U.S. would make one friend, and five enemies. Zhivkov said he understood the President was a very nice man, who liked anecdotes. Whitehead said he was indeed charming and gracious.

43.

In a luncheon exchange, Zhivkov complained that Bulgarian per capita funding for scientific development was among the highest in the world, yet the role of science in Bulgarian society was minimal. Bulgarian students were among the best appreciated in the Soviet Union. Ambassador Zhulev commented that Bulgarian scientists were well received in the U.S. too. He had been with some studying brain functions at NIH; the trouble was their equipment was so complex and expensive that Bulgaria itself could not afford it.

44.

Ambassador Polansky recalled Zhivkov’s plenum remarks on the difficulty of moving science into production, and asked how it could be done better. Zhivkov said that in the economy Bulgaria was giving priority to the market as a criterion. There was nothing capitalist about a market; commodity exchanges were one of the oldest forms of human activity. Comparing this to Yugoslavia, he said he had no desire to criticize, but thought the Yugoslavs underrated strategic values. It was possible to overcentralize, but strategic needs had to be determined on a nationwide basis, and this included pushing resources into science and technology. The process, he thought, should be controlled by the banks, through their control of the national currency which should have a tight circulatory route. One trouble was they had no experience with banks in a socialist system.

45.

After the main course, the Deputy Secretary said he wished to introduce a delicate topic. Many Americans and other Westerners were wondering what was happening to the Muslim population in the eastern part of Bulgaria. There were reports—perhaps they were incorrect, but there were reports—that the government was seeking to eliminate the culture, history, religious practices and even the names of these people. The Western world considered this reprehensible, since it did not believe in establishing uniformity in speech, in religion, in schools. He asked Zhivkov to tell him what was actually going on.

46.

Zhivkov said the Muslims in Bulgaria lived very well. They had religious freedom. Their mosques were maintained by the state. Yet there was “speculation” concerning this population. He had had a report that they wished to build houses and were being refused permission; he had found there were delays because of urban development plans. They were an industrious people. There was no evidence of a problem here. It did not exist as an internal problem.

47.

Only Turkey and others outside were making it a problem, Zhivkov went on. The Bulgarians did not keep statistics on these things. The state financed the mosques; proportionately they got more than the Orthodox churches. He had told Whitehead the first time they met that it was up to the U.S. to advise the Turks. They had complied with the agreement they had reached with the Turks. They had offered to sit down and discuss resettlement. Then they had been told that only one hundred families wanted resettlement. Then when he had gone to Turkey this had grown to several thousand. Bulgaria was ready to settle this. More than a hundred thousand had left under the old agreement. All had been forced to change their names when they entered Turkey.

48.

Look at what Turkey is doing to the Kurds, Zhivkov went on. Bulgaria had never cited the Turkish internal situation, but it was the same with the Syrians and the Greeks in Turkey. Raising the issue was [Page 1291] not the Bulgarians’ idea. “Who needs it?” Zhivkov asked. It could be eliminated. What the Turks were doing was political hooliganism. He did not know of a state in the world that would permit such political hooliganism directed at the head of another state.

49.

The Deputy Secretary said that the U.S. did not raise this issue because Turkey was a NATO ally and Bulgaria a Warsaw Pact member, but because it was a human issue.

50.

Zhivkov continued that the Turks claimed there were one and a half million Muslims in the Bulgarian population. This was wrong: there were between 600,000 and 700,000. He agreed that the American Embassy staff should not have restrictions on travelling to those areas. This had been applied in the past, but it was not necessary to have it everywhere. It needed to be reviewed. But this was not a domestic problem for Bulgaria. It existed because it had been raised as an international problem. Bulgaria was ready to help the Turkish side overcome its infatuation with the issue. They were neighboring countries; they could not resort to such tactics.

51.

The Deputy Secretary said he had a friendly suggestion. If the situation was misunderstood in the West, which believes it was not as Zhivkov had described it, it would be in Bulgaria’s interest to invite some international group to visit that part of the country, to talk with people and find out the truth for itself, to put the charges to rest. Now the area was closed and mysterious; outsiders were not let in. This built the notion in peoples’ minds that something bad was going on. His suggestion was that Bulgaria let such a group in to investigate.

52.

Zhivkov said there was no separate Muslim zone. They were all over the country. Whitehead said that meant the group should be free to go everywhere. Mladenov recalled that Congressman Steny Hoyer had been in an area of compact settlement. Ambassador Polansky said he especially appreciated the opportunity for candid talk on this important issue. The U.S. side appreciated well-organized visits, and Foreign Ministry help, especially with Hoyer. But Hoyer had also conveyed his desire to move around freely with a large group and it was not simply a question of visiting once: if people were consistently excluded from a single area, it raised questions. The Islamic Conference people had had the same experience as Hoyer.

53.

Zhulev said he had travelled with Hoyer. Hoyer had been honest with everyone. He had gone to any houses he chose, and he chose them. He had been accompanied only for considerations of security. Not all members of his group had been so honest. When he left he said he could neither confirm nor deny the charges. Others had issued a [Page 1292] report which was not based on what they had seen, but was pure slander. This referred to Congressman Richardson of New Mexico.3

54.

Whitehead said what was needed was not a group of predisposed people, but a respected group with open minds. Bulgaria should seek a way to convince such people that the things alleged were not happening.

55.

Zhivkov thanked the Deputy Secretary for his suggestion. He understood the problem. But when you are dealing with “speculation,” no country will accept pressure. When the situation returns to normal, Bulgaria will welcome as many visitors as possible. But until things calm down, this cannot be expected. There are slanders every day in Turkey, which are then publicized in the West. He was ready to open up the closed zones, but when things got back to normal. He was ready for new thinking on this. But when they had agreed to let children join their parents, the result had been a whole hostile campaign on TV. Bulgaria was not closed. It had no reason to keep closed. If Whitehead wanted to meet extremists, they could arrange meetings with some, so he could write a report. But there was no problem. What was important was dialogue. But it had to be on a new basis, not on the basis of lies.

56.

Zhivkov said he was ready for a commission. The U.S. could select the people. The Bulgarians would arrange meetings with extremists. In 600–700,000 people there were some, and the Bulgarians knew who they were. They were not creating difficulties. They had nothing to hide. They people were at work, they were honest. Poles, Vietnamese, Yugoslavs also worked in Bulgaria. The Muslim population was well-off. Some Muslims were returning from Turkey to Bulgaria. They were not publicizing this. They wanted things to be normal. The commission could hear from the extremists. The Bulgarians knew who they were, and who they worked for.

57.

Zhulev said there Muslim extremists in all countries. Zhivkov said Bulgaria knew who they represented. They had not made any announcement. The situation was calm. People who had formerly had Turkish names had had a bad attitude. Having the names had perpetuated them in backwardness. Bulgaria was developing electronics; it could not leave them in that backwardness. As he had said earlier, the question of who wins was now irrelevant. He was ready for a dignified, respectable outcome. He was ready to persuade several thousand people to resettle elsewhere, if that was what they wanted. There would be no revolt. These were Bulgarian people who had been violently converted to Islam; history had proved that. The Turks were creating their own problem. He invited Whitehead to take a week of his time and visit. They were a hospitable people.

58.

The Deputy Secretary said he found Zhivkov’s response very encouraging. If the charges were slander, the Bulgarian side ought to [Page 1293] expose them. A statement by Zhivkov that they were not true and that he invited an independent group to come in and prove this was so would be very welcome.

59.

Mladenov said he understood the motives behind Whitehead’s remarks. He believed Whitehead had the noble intention of helping Bulgaria resolve a problem. But there had been several visits. Hoyer’s was not the only group. There were also several Muslim groups. The programs arranged had been the ones they suggested; they had seen the people they wanted to see. They had been confident it would help. The Turks had raised the issue in the Human Rights Commission, and the Bulgarians had invited their Portuguese President, Ribeira. Zhivkov interjected that this was the first he had heard of that; they were keeping things from the President.

60.

Mladenov continued that other groups had been here. But Bulgaria was a state, and it could follow up on what happened afterward. Brutal pressure was exerted on these people to speak out against Bulgaria afterward. Ribeira had written a report which did not support the Turkish thesis. But pressure on the Islamic Conference had been enormous. What guarantees did Bulgaria have that this would not happen with a new group, Mladenov asked. Hoyer had not been sympathetic, and had neither confirmed nor denied the charges, but Richardson, in the same group, had evidently seen different things. Whitehead should go to Turkey, Mladenov said; people were being killed there every day. He did not reject Whitehead’s suggestion, but there were no guarantees for the Bulgarians. Whitehead was an honest man. Let him select the commission. But the head of the delegation should be a responsible man.

61.

The Deputy Secretary said he appreciated the change of atmosphere in our discussions. It was not a question of accusing Bulgaria. But there was a problem of perception, and there should be a way to deal with it. There should be a multinational inspection group not composed of predisposed people.

62.

Zhulev said that the Deputy Secretary’s remarks were making them cautious. As Ambassador to the U.S., he had visited Assistant Secretary Schifter. The Turkish press had cited his name and had him saying things Zhulev could not believe he had said. When Zhulev visited him, he denied having said them, but asked what could be done about the Turkish press. Zhulev had asked him to publish a denial, but none had appeared. He felt he had failed in his work as Ambassador. The Deputy Secretary said he would look into the matter; we did not wish to leave false statements about senior officials unanswered; there might be some unfinished business on that topic.

63.

Zhulev said he wished to express before the President his opinion that the State Department in the person of Mr. Whitehead was eager to resolve the problem.

64.

The Deputy Secretary said there might be scope for some effort on the Turkish side as well. Zhivkov said that would be the only way to stop the Turkish slander campaign. There were not one and a half million Muslims in Bulgaria; the Turks knew that, but said it anyway. Bulgaria occasionally responded, when there was no other way. But it did not want to fall prey to escalation. It wanted to restore a reasonable dialogue with Turkey. Then there could be talk of an international commission. They had held a press conference in Bulgaria, at which people the Turks claimed were dead had been resurrected. But the conditions for dialogue did not now exist. How could these things be discussed when one could not know what new lie would appear in the evening, Zhivkov asked. No state in the world could allow itself to be so abused and keep silent.

65.

And, Zhulev added, this was being done by a state that is destroying a population of fifteen million, the Kurds. Zhulev said that was the historical paradox. Everyone who goes to Turkey becomes a Turk. Such medieval terror exists nowhere else, not even in South Africa. Turkey had the biggest prison population in the world. There had been many Bulgarians there; now there was not a single one. The same was true of the Syrians. Probably there were some Jews left. But this was genocide.

66.

The Deputy Secretary recalled that Zhivkov had spoken of peaceful coexistence. This had been used many times in diplomacy. Brezhnev had used it. So had we. Sometimes it referred just to relations between countries with different social systems. He asked Zhivkov if it also referred to relations among socialist countries.

67.

Zhivkov said theory is one thing, content another. The priority now must be on all-human problems. This was what applied in interstate relations. One could start with relations with Sweden, or Switzerland. They had some very interesting ideas, for instance about organizational changes, in the direction of corporate organization. A rural proverb said that if things are going bad for my neighbor, I’m alright. That is on its way out. The time will come when we realize that our problems are all-human. If we do not come closer together, there will be a catastrophe. We had to see interdependence, and the real prospects. A catastrophe for the United States would also be a catastrophe for Bulgaria. He asked Whitehead not to quote him; he could be expelled from the party.

68.

In conclusion, Zhivkov thanked Whitehead for coming, and urged that Bulgaria was a small country that had suffered a lot, and deserved respect. Once it had reached the Carpathians. All that had been taken away. Bulgaria had no territorial claims against any neighboring [Page 1295] state. But it had lost and suffered, and that deserved respect. That was one reason why he so appreciated President Reagan’s message of greeting to the Bulgarian children’s choir.4

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

398. Telegram From the Embassy in Bulgaria to the Department of State1

SUBJECT