Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

397. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Bulgaria¹

366644.

Washington, November 24, 1987, 2233Z

SUBJECT

• DAS Simons and Bulgarian Ambassador Review Bilateral Relations.

REF

• (A) Sofia 5090;²
• (B) State 222792.³

1. C—Entire text

2. Summary: On November 20, DAS Simons met with Bulgarian Ambassador Zhulev to deliver the USG response to the non-paper on bilateral relations left by Deputy Foreign Minister Gotsev during his visit in July (Ref B). Simons reiterated important elements of the U.S. bilateral agenda, particularly human rights and reciprocity. To the Bulgarian agenda presented in the non-paper, Simons gave a positive response to some of the requests for increased high-level contacts. Simons and Zhulev concluded with a general discussion of the connection between U.S. relations with Eastern Europe and U.S. relations with the Soviet Union.

3. Simons drew from the following talking points, which were subsequently passed to Zhulev in written form.

I. General comments: We appreciated the non-paper Mr. Gotsev left us. I want to respond to the serious specific proposals it made. But first, it is important to note that we do not consider it to be an exhaustive account of the bilateral agenda. It ignores certain elements of prime importance to the U.S. First among these is the issue of human rights and humanitarian affairs. This is an important indicator of the degree to which Bulgaria and the U.S. are serious about fulfilling bilateral and multilateral commitments. There are still more than twenty divided family cases affecting U.S. residents and citizens. Although the MFA has promised resolution of a number of these cases, the rate of passport issuance has fallen behind the rate of promises. The forcible assimilation of the Turkish minority will certainly continue to affect bilateral relations. We will continue to speak out against it. The assimilation campaign will inevitably be an issue whenever Congress has to deal with Bulgarian issues.

II. Bulgarian Agenda

A. Meeting between Shultz and Mladenov: We are aware of your interest in a Foreign Ministers’ meeting, an interest we share in principle. In practical terms, I don’t think such a meeting is likely soon, given the Secretary’s heavy constraints.

B. Lukanov visit to the U.S.: We welcome a Lukanov visit to the U.S. in the first quarter of 1988, and would arrange top meetings at State, Commerce and other agencies.

C. Exchange of “official” parliamentary delegations: The Department has very little influence over the travel plans of individual Congressmen, or the invitations they extend to their foreign counterparts. The Department will continue to play a facilitative role in arranging appropriate programs for delegations in either direction. Certainly the degree to which the Congress has an interest in such exchanges is most directly tied to the openness, usefulness and substance of such visits.

D. Hold “regular political consultations” at the Deputy Ministers’ level: The visits by Mr. Whitehead and Mr. Gotsev this year were useful. Mr. Whitehead is considering another trip to Sofia in the spring. We don’t mind using the word “consultations”, but I think it means something different in Bulgarian practice than it does for us. Such meetings will probably never be “regular”. The timing, format, and participation from the U.S. side will inevitably vary from year to year. We should also be looking for areas in which it would be useful to expand dialogue at Assistant Secretary and DAS levels.

E. More USG involvement in Bulgarian-American Trade and Economic Council: Mr. Whitehead is personally involved in the search for a new U.S. Chairman for the BATEC. USG will seek other means to support BATEC, but it can’t oblige U.S. firms to be interested if there is no direct benefit to them. A lot will depend upon whether working conditions for businessmen, trade conditions, and joint venture requirements show improvement.

F. USG support for Bulgaria’s GATT application: We welcome the trends in Bulgarian economic reform. Continuing this course is important to Bulgaria’s application. As you know, we believe that the Bulgarian economy does not now meet the standards for GATT membership, and its membership would not be beneficial to existing members. We will continue to consider seriously any information you provide through seminars or other means. But the best way you can show the extent of economic change in Bulgaria is to allow our Embassy unimpeded access to actual economic decision makers and facilities in Bulgaria. (We recognize that there is progress in this regard in the last few months).

G. Cooperation in agriculture, trade, transport and tourism: We are willing to consider new programs of bilateral exchange, but would also like to see full utilization of existing programs, e.g. in the field of agriculture. We could also discuss cooperation in trade promotion, within the framework of our strategic trade controls. As we have noted before, continued Bulgarian involvement in illegal technology diversion will be an obstacle to such cooperation. Plans to exchange ministerial visits in these areas would depend upon the concrete agenda to be discussed. We are open to suggestions.

H. Support for scientific-technical exchanges: Recent workshops jointly staged by the NAS and Bulgarian Academy of Sciences were productive and could be expanded into other mutually beneficial and non-sensitive fields.

I. Bilateral diplomatic premises: There are a number of outstanding issues in this respect that can be handled by our two Embassies if there is a will to resolve the issues. We do not see a need to create a special working group. We have not yet been offered a satisfactory site for a new chancery in Sofia. It goes almost without saying that we cannot give permission for you to build a new chancery at the Van Ness International Center until we obtain an appropriate site.

You probably know that we are on the verge of implementing a closed zone regime for Bulgarian diplomats in the U.S. on the basis of reciprocity for the permanently restricted area in place in Bulgaria. We are very familiar with your arguments: that Bulgaria is different, that it has hostile neighbors, that it is smaller. I can only say that the U.S. has legitimate security concerns as well. When weighing those concerns against our desire to maintain an open society, we have always come down on the side of openness. Your policy, and the reciprocity factor, have now obliged us to adopt the same sensitivity to security concerns that you have. The U.S. will always be open to reduce or eliminate such restrictions on a reciprocal basis. Conversely, if your government increases restrictions, and once again creates an asymmetrical situation, we will be obliged to respond.

J. Involvement of U.S. Customs Bureau in narcotics cooperation: The situation is unchanged for reasons of which you are probably aware. The U.S. Customs Bureau has no interest at this time in a cooperation program with Bulgaria. The State Department is exploring other means to provide the form of training most useful to your interdiction capabilities. Until we find a way to offer that training, I urge you to take full advantage of the full array of DEA training and cooperation programs available.

K. Anti-terrorism cooperation: We appreciate the serious and forthcoming response you gave in our discussions on terrorism. We intend to continue the dialogue, and will continue to ask for cooperation in specific cases. We cannot agree that the information we have provided to your government is “conjecture or unsubstantiated”. In fact, concrete information we provided about the presence of a known terrorist in Bulgaria was acknowledged by your government to be accurate.

In making the above points on the Turkish minority and on congressional exchanges, Simons made reference to the “extremely organized” visit by Codel Hoyer⁴ to Bulgaria. Simons concluded that the GOB non-paper, and this response, constitute a starting point for a practical, concrete approach. The USG would continue to seek ways to build on the progress made in relations.

4. Zhulev’s response: Zhulev noted that the GOB took this approach of presenting a concrete agenda very seriously and appreciated receiving the USG response. While he was encouraged that the USG also took this seriously, he characterized Simons’ discourse as “not exactly glowing with enthusiasm”. He promised a more formal comment after consultations with Sofia. In response to Zhulev’s question, Simons noted that the Deputy Secretary is actively thinking about a trip to Eastern Europe in the spring, to include Sofia, but no plans have yet been made.

5. U.S.-Eastern Europe relationship: Zhulev asked about development of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, particularly with reference to U.S. relations with Eastern Europe. Simons responded that the USG deals with Bulgaria independently of the USSR, but that the current preoccupation with the Soviet Union precludes giving Eastern Europe the attention we would like. Progress in U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations, on the eve of the summit,⁵ is substantial, particularly in human rights, regional issues and bilateral issues, which have been overshadowed by arms control. But it is clear that we are not entering a new age of overly optimistic detente, as evidenced by the Congress’ reaction to the idea of listening to an address from Gorbachev. Parallelism with U.S.-Soviet relations may help rpt help to set a framework for dealing with Eastern Europe, but the U.S. will deal with each country individually. Each bilateral relationship will continue to have both positive and negative elements, and we will continue to identify specific practical opportunities for improvement.

6. Zhulev noted that some commentators have raised the possibility that the U.S.-Soviet relationship will surpass the relationship with Eastern Europe. Simons answered that the degree of Eastern European closeness to the USSR would certainly affect certain bilateral elements, such as technology transfer. But the basic assumption of differentiation—that any Eastern European variance from the USSR is good for the U.S.—may be called into question in the Gorbachev era. It might be healthy to question the automaticity of our policy assumptions. To Zhulev’s comment that we must work out new assumptions for our relationship, Simons answered that this would have to move slowly. There is a great value to continuity, particularly for a policy that enjoys such wide popular support as differentiation. As an example, Simons noted that some Eastern Europeans advise him to “abandon the cold war mentality”. But, Simons asked rhetorically, if the cold war is over, why should the U.S. worry about a little country like Bulgaria? He explained that the ideological competition with the USSR is one thing that helps to sustain USG interest in Eastern Europe. Without it, Bulgaria would have to compete for USG attention, probably less successfully, with other small countries around the world. Simons said he hoped to see U.S.-Soviet relations progress to the point where this kind of discussion could become less theoretical and more actual. Zhulev concluded that Bulgaria is not seeking more attention from the U.S., but only the application of non-discriminatory principles.

Whitehead

1. Source: Department of State, Records from Ambassador Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Lot 03 D 256, Chron November 1987. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Budapest, Prague, Warsaw, Bucharest, Belgrade, and Moscow. Drafted by Thomas Countryman (EUR/EEY); cleared by Seymour (EUR/EEY); approved by Perito.
2. Telegram 5090 from Sofia, November 17, reported the Embassy’s assessment of the non-paper on bilateral relations that Gotsev presented during his visit to Washington. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870947–0922)
3. Telegram 222792 to Sofia, July 20, transmitted the text of the Bulgarian non-paper (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870573–0072)
4. Representative Steny Hoyer (D–Maryland) lead a congressional delegation to Bulgaria September 1-4.
5. Reference is to the Washington Summit. See footnote 5, Document 52.