Office of the Historian

36. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost) to Secretary of State Shultz1

Washington, November 22, 1985

SUBJECT

  • Travel Restrictions on East Europeans

Travel restrictions on East Europeans can no longer be avoided. At present EE officials can travel without warning in the U.S. The FBI cannot always provide coverage. [less than 3 lines not declassified]

[Page 126]

We have travel controls on the Soviets, but not on EEs—because our diplomats are not restricted in their countries. This freedom makes it easier for us to watch military activities in EE [1 line not declassified] and to learn about such events as Bulgaria’s brutal campaign against ethnic Turks.

Everyone agrees, however, that we must run the risk of retaliation against our personnel in EE, if that is the price for better controlling EE espionage here. EUR wants to thread this needle by putting travel restrictions on EEs at the UN in New York, while only warning EEs in Washington (Option 1). This might minimize the retaliation risk.

Ron,2 Dick Walters, OFM, IO, and L think tougher action is needed. They want travel restrictions on the worst offenders—the East Germans, Bulgarians, Czechs, and Poles—and would draw no line between the UN folk and those in Washington (Option 2). All pose a serious espionage threat.

At issue are not the tough controls binding the Soviets—no travel beyond 25 miles without U.S. approval, and closed areas throughout the U.S. Rather, the CI community will be satisfied if EE officials have to give advance notice of travel, and use OFM to book travel and accommodation. This will give the FBI time to organize coverage.

The second option makes the most sense to me. The CI concerns are valid, and the remedy reasonable. We fought the SIG/I measures for too long. The President now wants firm action. If we seek to waive restrictions on all EEs in Washington, we’ll take heat, interagency and from the Hill. A tougher approach will better protect our CI interests. It risks retaliation, but even the EUR option may not prevent it.

Michael H. Armacost3
  1. Source: Reagan Library, Secretary George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (11/21/1985–11/29/1985). Secret; Sensitive. McKinley initialed and dated the top of the memorandum on November 22.↩
  2. Ron Spiers, Under Secretary of State for Management.↩
  3. Armacost initialed above his typed signature.↩