Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

35. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Ridgway), the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Keyes), and the Director of the Office of Foreign Missions (Nolan) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Travel Restrictions on East European Officials

ISSUE FOR DECISION

How to implement the National Security Decision Directive concerning the possible imposition of OFM travel restrictions on East European officials.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

The Issue

On November 1 the President approved NSDD 196² which, inter alia, directs that we

“Require East European hostile country officials to use the OFM service bureau to book commercial transportation and public accommodations unless expressly waived in specific instances by the Secretary of State.”

The NSDD option represents a substantial modification of the SIG/I recommendation that was approved by the August 7 NSPG.³ It deletes a second sentence which has provided two criteria for the exercise of your waiver authority: reciprocity (the East Europeans do not require that we use a central bureau to book transportation etc.) and the President’s policy of differentiation. The previously unqualified waiver authority was further restricted to “specific instances”.

The NSDD nonetheless retains your waiver authority. We also understand that the NSC at a high level agrees that reciprocal treatment is a valid criterion to be considered in establishing waivers [1 line not declassified] Judge Sofaer (joined by OFM) finds that, as reformulated, the option establishes a presumption that travel requirements are to be applied across the board, except in regard to “specific instances” for which you find appropriate and sufficient reasons for a waiver. The expression, “in specific instances,” is ambiguous and is not defined or explained in the NSDD or elsewhere.

In L’s view, the expression could apply to particular trips or kinds of travel, or perhaps travel by particular kinds of officials. The expression may also have been intended to apply to particular countries. Under the latter construction you could determine whether to impose or waive the travel requirements on the basis of the lesser risks some countries present and in pursuance of the President’s policy of differentiation.

The restrictions contemplated would require the use of OFM travel services for the booking of commercial transportation and hotel accommodations for both official and unofficial travel. They do not involve the imposition of travel controls such as authorization to undertake travel or closing areas.

The question has now been publicly aired in open hearings on the Foreign Missions Act⁴ and espionage activities in the U.S. being conducted by the Roth Subcommittee on Investigations.⁵ On October 22, Senators Durenberger, Leahy, Cohen and Nunn, joined by DOD’s Perle and FBI’s Webster, vociferously criticized the Department’s performance in this area and, inter alia, called for imposition of travel controls on the EE’s. Roz Ridgway and Jim Nolan may be asked to testify in early December. OFM, L and H believe that unless the Department establishes meaningful controls on EE travel, restrictive legislation is likely to be enacted.

The East European Hostile Threat in the U.S.

The EE Warsaw Pact countries have [number not declassified] bilateral diplomatic and support staff personnel assigned to their missions here. In addition, there are [number not declassified] EE multilateral diplomatic and support staff personnel attached to EE UN missions. [number not declassified] more East Europeans are employed in the UN Secretariat. [less than 2 lines not declassified]

[1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]

Situation for U.S. in Eastern Europe

Unlike the Soviets, the East Europeans impose no discriminatory travel controls or restrictions against U.S. personnel. Our embassy staffs, military attaches [less than 1 line not declassified] can travel at will without advance authorization of closed area constraints. [1 line not declassified]

The East Europeans also do not impose travel service restrictions involving commercial transportation or hotel accommodations. While transportation and accommodations are government-owned, embassy officers may register at hotels without advance notification or bookings. They may also purchase air and train tickets at airports and train stations. Our ability to travel unimpeded by controls or restrictions is of significant operational value to us in these closed societies.

Options

1) Impose OFM travel restrictions on EE UN Mission and Secretariat employees. Put the EE’s on notice that any criminal act of espionage involving travel on the part of their bilateral official personnel will have severe consequences, including imposition of OFM travel restrictions. As provided in the NSDD, waive OFM restrictions on individual Warsaw Pact EE’s which do not impose such controls on us. (Favored by EUR, opposed by OFM, Ambassador Walters,⁶ IO and L as insufficient.)

EUR favors this approach for the following reasons:

It is a major step toward improving our ability to counter the hostile EE intelligence threat in the U.S. [less than 4 lines not declassified] By placing the other EE’s on notice that acts of espionage will have severe consequences for their presence here, we establish workable guidelines and deterrents to deal effectively with the problem. [less than 3 lines not declassified] It provides a response that is both effective and credible in meeting Congressional and public opinion concerns.

This approach preserves our ability to travel without prior notification throughout the region. Imposition of retaliatory travel restrictions by the EE’s, in our judgment, would impair our ability, inter alia, to:

• [less than 2 lines not declassified]

• [less than 2 lines not declassified]

• Investigate human rights abuses and attend trials of dissidents.

• Provide the range of services to American citizens in distress that the public and Congress have come to expect.

It would minimize the risk of East European retaliation, which would probably not be reciprocal. Were we unilaterally to impose travel restrictions on bilateral EE personnel, the EE’s would almost certainly retaliate. However, it is likely that the East Europeans would cite differences in size between the U.S. and their countries to justify an escalatory retaliation that would be difficult to control. Escalatory imposition of closed-area regimes could result. Since bilateral reciprocity considerations are less likely to apply in the case of EE UN missions and Secretariat staff, we believe that imposition of OFM travel service restrictions on these personnel carries lower, tolerable risks of harmful retaliation.

It implements the President’s policy of differentiation effectively by forcing the EE’s to take the threat of travel controls and more severe measures into account when asked to take on assignments for the Soviets. By placing them on notice that their participation in hostile intelligence activities will jeopardize their travel situation here, we signal punishment for those caught doing the Soviets’ bidding, and rewards (continued freedom to travel) for those who do not. We would therefore be encouraging useful Soviet-EE tensions in this regard.

This approach is also consistent with the SIG/I recommendation as initially written and subsequently approved by the President at the August 7 NSPG,⁷ and EUR believes, with White House understanding of the NSDD. We understand that Admiral Poindexter agrees that the absence of EE travel restrictions against US personnel and the need to preserve our collection ability in Eastern Europe provide adequate grounds to waive OFM travel service restrictions on EE bilateral personnel.

2) Require East German, Polish, Czech and Bulgarian officials assigned to bilateral and UN missions, the UN Secretariat, and other governmental offices to book commercial transportation and public accommodations through OFM. Waive OFM travel requirements on Romania and Hungary but warn them that similar requirements will be imposed on their officials if their personnel engage in espionage activities in the U.S. (favored by OFM, Ambassador Walters, IO, L, and H; opposed by EUR).⁸

Proponents of this option appreciate the value of travel without advance notice by U.S. personnel throughout EE, but believe effective steps need to be taken to address the significant support provided to Soviet intelligence collection efforts in the U.S. by EE intelligence personnel assigned to all their establishments in the U.S.

In OFM’s view, two recent EE (Polish) intelligence operations, those involving William Bell and James Harper,⁹ both convicted of espionage, demonstrate the threat posed by EE intelligence services. Bell, a radar specialist at Hughes Aircraft Company, saved the Soviets several tens of millions of rubles in research efforts, and advanced Soviet technology by about five years by permitting them to implement proven design concepts. OFM notes that this espionage was conducted by a U.S./Polish commercial enterprise, POLAMCO. Harper provided dozens of documents of potential U.S. ballistic missile defense programs, ICBM basing modes and related technology, affording the Soviets a unique look at potential U.S. future systems concepts. (EUR notes that in neither of these cases were the collectors from embassies or consulates that would be covered by the proposed OFM controls.)

It is OFM’s judgment that simply to warn the EE’s about possible travel controls is not an effective deterrent. [7 lines not declassified] OFM argues that the likelihood and degree of EE retaliation may be held to acceptable proportions. The OFM travel service restrictions would not impose a requirement for notice or permission for travel and would permit uncontrolled travel by automobile.

[1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]

Views of Ambassador Walters and IO

Ambassador Walters and IO support the proposal to impose OFM travel restrictions on EE bilateral UN mission and on Secretariat personnel provided that similar restrictions are placed on all EE bilateral personnel or, at least on those bilateral EE’s which the intelligence community finds to pose the greatest domestic security threat. They also recommend that the USG not impose such steps until Ambassador Walters reports that the UN Secretariat has agreed to measures which effectively implement our travel restrictions on the six groups of “hostile country” (USSR, Afghanistan, Cuba, Iran, Libya, and Vietnam) personnel on the Secretariat.

L Views

Strong reasons exist immediately to impose the proposed travel requirements on the three or four EE countries considered by the relevant agencies to be the most actively engaged in espionage, leaving open the possibility of narrower waivers at a later time, if you deem that desirable:

— The original SIG/I proposal adopted by the President apparently contemplated broad application of the requirements to EE countries.

— If we fail to apply requirements broadly, Congress is likely to mandate controls that are more comprehensive and severe than may be warranted by the actual threat, and which almost certainly would prompt retaliation against our personnel (H concurs strongly with this view.)

— We should not apply travel requirements only to EE UN missions and Secretariat personnel. We could not justify such measures to the UN on security grounds in the absence of similar requirements on the far larger bilateral missions of those countries. Moreover, Congress would likely view the imposition of such half measures as an admission of the problem but a refusal or inability to take effective measures. (IO concurs, noting also that option 1, it adopted, would destroy the rationale we have used with the Secretary General and the Congress in determining which “hostile country” Secretariat employees come under our September 15 program of travel regulations.

Recommendations

1) Impose OFM travel restrictions on EE UN Mission and Secretariat employees. Put the EE’s on notice that any criminal act of espionage involving travel by their bilateral personnel will have severe consequences, including OFM travel restrictions. Waive OFM travel restrictions on Warsaw Pact EE’s which do not impose such controls on us. (EUR favors, OFM, Ambassador Walters, IO and L oppose.)¹⁰

2) Require East German, Polish, Czech and Bulgarian officials assigned to bilateral and UN missions, the UN Secretariat, and other governmental offices to use OFM to book commercial transportation and public accommodations. Warn the Romanian and Hungarian governments that similar requirements will be imposed on their officials if their personnel engage in espionage activities in the U.S. (OFM, Ambassador Walters, IO and L favor, EUR opposes).¹¹

1. Source: Reagan Library, Secretary George Shultz Papers, Official Memoranda (11/14/1986). Secret. Sent through Armacost and Spiers. Drafted by Kuchel on November 11; cleared by Gilmore, Palmer, West, Courtney, Heichler, Murray, Williams, Hulings, Rashkow, and Kovner. Initialed and dated November 14 by an unknown hand at the top of the memorandum.
2. Counterintelligence/Countermeasure Implementation Task Force. The text of the NSDD is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. II, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy.
3. Minutes were not found for this meeting.
4. 22 U.S.C. 4301–4316.
5. The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee was chaired by Senator William V. Roth (R–Delaware) through 1986.
6. Vernon “Dick” Walters was the U.S. Representative to the United Nations from May 1985.
7. Not found.
8. A November 15 note from Spiers to Shultz stated, “I believe EUR has the better substantive case on this, but the political pressures and perceptions are such that I reluctantly conclude that I must join in the recommendation for Option 2.” (Reagan Library, Secretary George Shultz Files, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (11/21/1985–11/29/1985)).
9. See Howard Kurtz, “Soviet Network Intensifies Hunt for U.S. Secrets,” The Washington Post, October 23, 1983, p. A11.
10. Shultz checked the “Disapprove” option, and the date, December 9, 1985, was stamped next to the check mark.
11. Shultz initialed the “Approve” option, and the date, December 9, 1985, was stamped beneath his initials.M