342. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Staff (Solomon) to Secretary of State Shultz1
SUBJECT
- Planning Talks in Hungary
Summary. Members of my planning staff held the first ever policy planning talks with Hungarian officials in mid-December. While generally defending Soviet positions in their formal presentations, the Hungarians were eager to talk with us frankly “away from the table” on a whole host of issues. In these side talks, as well as in conversations with Party officials, the Hungarians were open and often self-critical of their economic and political difficulties. What emerged from our visit was a picture of Hungary that is anxious about internal developments, skeptical about Gorbachev’s chances for succeeding with Perestroika, and upbeat on the future of East-West relations. I see real value for us in holding similar planning talks with the other East European countries, and plan to do so later this year, as the basis for a fresh look at our policy toward the region as an element in the East-West relationship. End Summary.
Hungarian Internal Developments
1988 and the prospect of unrest was on everyone’s minds. Almost to a man, our interlocuters let it be known that Kadar is hanging on too long. State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Gulya Horn stated flatly the paradox confronting Hungary: economic reform without political reform will not succeed. Yet, political reform cannot come at the expense of one-party rule. The Hungarians will hold a party conference next year (as will the Soviets) to delineate further the roles of the party and the government, another indication of tinkering with the system in hopes of stimulating economic reform.
The Central Committee members we met, while aware of the economic problems facing the country, were dismissive of the notion of a blow-up in the near term. They gave every indication they would do [Page 1079] whatever it would take (including further mortgaging of Hungary’s economic future) to keep the discontent from turning into an assault on Party rule.
Developments Within the Soviet Union
The Hungarians were frank in their assessments of Gorbachev’s reform efforts within the Soviet Union. They stressed continually the difficulties he faces, pointing out that Perestroika will not provide positive pay-offs until 1991 at the earliest—plenty of time for Gorbachev’s opponents to derail the process. Asked about the Yeltsin affair, it appeared that the Hungarians were bothered as much by the way Yeltsin was sacked (especially his need to “recant” in true Stalinist fashion), as by the fact that it had occurred. Underlying these comments was a profound sense of skepticism that Gorbachev would succeed. The demand for reform could not be imposed from above, they asserted; it has to come from below. As the Hungarians saw it, this demand was absent among the Soviet population. Paradoxically, the pessimistic Hungarian analysis was coupled with the conviction that Gorbachev has no other option lest the Soviets fall further behind in world influence.
East-West Relations
Predictably, the Hungarians were upbeat on the Summit results and prospects for future arms control agreements. The Hungarians were quick, however, to contrast the current state of East-West relations with the “exaggerated” and, therefore, flawed period of detente of the early 1970s.
On most specific issues, Hungarians deviated only imperceptibly from Soviet positions: the need to recharge CSCE (including scheduling a human rights conference in Moscow); the desire for more progress in bringing about a nuclear-free Europe; and the necessity of meeting Soviet concerns on SDI. The Hungarians voiced concern about the sustainability of the US arms control agenda, in particular INF ratification prospects, and our willingness to cut strategic forces by 50 percent. They attached high priority to conventional reductions (vice stability). In fact, prospects for conventional arms control (including the withdrawal of “foreign”—read Soviet—forces from host countries) dominated a good deal of the discussion. Interestingly, the Hungarians pointed to France as the “factor of uncertainty” in this thaw in relations. The desire in Paris to put the brakes on Europe’s “detente fever” is registering within both alliances.
Hungarian-Romanian Tensions
The tensions between Hungary and Romania were yet another example of the nationality conflicts that are beginning to resurface [Page 1080] within the Warsaw Pact as well as non-Pact Communist countries: the Albanians in Yugoslavia; Turks in Bulgaria; Tibetans in China; and in Hungary’s case, the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. Indeed, the reduction in East-West tensions may lead to an even greater resurgence of these long-suppressed conflicts.
In our exchanges on CSCE, the Hungarians spent as much time criticizing Romanian obstruction at the conference, and their appalling human rights performance, as they did discussing CSCE’s three baskets. Interestingly, one victim of these tensions might well be the tacit Hungarian-Romanian Alliance within the Warsaw Pact Consultative bodies, with the former having quietly supported the latter’s opposition to Soviet demands—earlier of greater military expenditures, or of economic specialization within CEMA.
Future Steps
Our Hungarian hosts were pleased to learn that Hungary was the first Warsaw Pact country with whom we have had such talks. They were delighted at the prospect of a return visit to the US next year to continue our discussions. For our part, the discussions confirmed our view of Hungary as uniquely situated to provide insight into trends both within the Soviet Union, as well as throughout the region. Deputy Secretary Whitehead’s visits, and more frequent and varied consultations by Department officials strike us as the best approach to building valuable links in the area. To that end, we would recommend reviewing the issue of extending an official invitation for Prime Minister Grosz to visit Washington later this year.
- Source: Department of State, Policy Planning Director’s Correspondence Files, 1981–1988, Lot 89 D 149, S/P Chron—January 1988. Confidential. Sent through Whitehead, who did not initial the memorandum. Drafted by Lowenkron; cleared by Sherrod McCall (S/P), Wenick, and Nadia Tangour (EUR). “Expedite” was stamped at the top of the memorandum. Solomon wrote “Dick” next to his name in the “From” line.↩