Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

341. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State¹

10809/Depto 6031.

Budapest, November 14, 1987, 1925Z

SUBJECT

• Deputy Secretary’s Meeting With Hungarian Foreign Minister Varkonyi—November 13.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary:
Varkonyi stressed the steady improvement in U.S.-Hungarian relations since 1978 (date crown was returned) and the Deputy Secretary commended the improvement within the past year. Both agreed the process is not yet irreversible, and focussed on areas where they might decrease the potential for sudden destabilizing developments. The Deputy Secretary suggested there might be a role for Hungary in reducing the danger of misunderstanding between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, because Hungary, perhaps best of all the Bloc countries, understands the Soviet Union as well. Hungary could therefore help the Soviet Union better understand U.S. concerns. He mentioned that Kadar had agreed to give it a try.

3. Varkonyi suggested Hungary had already been active in this regard, and asserted the Soviet position on human rights now cannot be compared to a few years ago. He advised the Deputy Secretary that he would find Moscow “ready to accept almost anything” if he approached the problem during his upcoming visit² with understanding rather than with controversy, cautioning that the Soviets have their prestige to consider. Varkonyi said the Soviets are ready to compromise quickly on CSCE Basket III if the U.S. will move on Baskets I and II³ at the same time, and that the Soviets are willing to reduce arms beyond INF.

4. The Deputy Secretary suggested that another area of possible trouble in U.S.-Soviet relations where Hungary might help Moscow understand our views is the Iran-Iraq war. The Soviets have been unwilling to put teeth in UNSC Resolution 598⁴ and are delaying a second. Varkonyi appealed for the U.S. to reconsider the Soviet proposal for a U.N. peacekeeping fleet, but said he saw the point of Deputy Secretary’s argument that there is no role for a U.N. peacekeeping force until there is a peace. Varkonyi said to his knowledge Hungary does not sell arms to the belligerents as that is against GOH policy, but agreed to check on indications the Deputy Secretary raised that Hungary recently shipped military vehicles to Iran.

End summary.

5. State of Bilateral Relations:

Varkonyi opened by expressing appreciation for the frequent visits the Deputy Secretary is making to Hungary. He stressed that U.S.-Hungarian relations have definitely developed since 1978 and are now strongly progressing in all walks of life, highlighting the cultural agreement they were about to sign as an important aspect of this steady trend. He asked, however, that both sides consider whether the trend is irreversible or not, since he himself does not think that relations have yet reached a point where this is true. Varkonyi went on to say that sudden developments may still destabilize the relationship, and the MFA is doing everything it can to safeguard bilateral ties from such developments and to escape any destabilizing events.

The Deputy Secretary said we would do our best to perform that role also. He added that we are very pleased with the way the relationship has been developing, particularly in the past year. In earlier meetings he had reviewed the long list of concrete steps agreed a year ago and said that progress had been made. Varkonyi commented that we will have to keep up the impetus and indicated that there are many avenues we can explore in order to further develop bilateral relations.

6. Mediating Role for Hungary:

Deputy Secretary repeated a suggestion he had made in his meeting with General Secretary Kadar that there may be a special role for Hungary in the relationship between the U.S. and Soviet Union. He briefly reviewed the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations, mentioning the summit,⁵ INF, and our hopes for further constructive negotiations of START, chemical warfare, and nuclear testing. Mr Whitehead raised concerns that remain about the Soviet Union in two general areas: human rights and the Soviet Union’s conduct around the world, where it has invaded Afghanistan and meddled in Angola, Cambodia, Nicaragua and Ethiopia.

Because the Soviets do not seem to fully understand our concerns about their behavior, there is a possible special role for Hungary. The Deputy Secretary requested that Hungary help the Soviet Union understand the U.S. since it is Hungary that perhaps best of all the countries of Eastern Europe understand us. In this connection he suggested informally that we have a more active bilateral dialogue and discuss these regional affairs subjects frequently. The Deputy Secretary told Varkonyi that Kadar had agreed to give this a try.

7. The Foreign Minister mentioned steps Hungary has already taken in this direction. For the GOH, Hungarian-Soviet relations are a determining factor (but not the exclusive one) so his ministry does not just sit back and watch. Varkonyi said he had raised with several Western European colleagues, including Foreign Minister Genscher in New York, the need to look out for a destabilizing incident, to exercise patience, and to handle any incidents according to their merits and so reduce their importance. In this connection Hungary believes INF will be a breakthrough because it will confirm that both sides trust each other a bit more. This will be much more important than the actual reduction in stockpiles, which will only affect 3–4 percent of either side’s arsenal.

Varkonyi said that, of course, Hungary belongs to an alliance but that this does not mean that it cannot express opinions, although it does not always publicize it. As evidence, he cited that Hungary has been more lenient on human rights for 20 or 30 years. He implied that the Soviet Union was now more comparable to Hungary in this respect than it had been before Gorbachev, and urged the Deputy Secretary as he approached the problem of human rights with the Soviets in Moscow not to take a position of controversy but rather one of understanding, stressing that this would make possible enormous progress. He asserted that the Soviets are ready to accept almost everything.

CSCE.

8. In the context of the Vienna CSCE discussions, the human rights basket is important for Hungary, and there must be progress there, Varkonyi said. He urged the U.S. to agree to Basket One negotiations at 23 and stressed that all other baskets would then fall into line, because compromises are emerging in the other areas. The conference could then move quickly to a conclusion.

9. The Deputy Secretary replied that we have seen no evidence of Soviet willingness to make any compromises in the CSCE meetings for months now. Varkonyi countered that in Prague recently the Soviet negotiators were in complete agreement about Hungary’s proposals for pushing forward. However, the U.S. position that if there is agreement on Basket Three, there will be movement on all others, is not acceptable for the Soviets. Varkonyi stressed that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union are waiting for the other, and that in his opinion they must step forward at the same time—although he appealed that this not be done by making any connection between the baskets. The Belgrade formula to agree that the nations did not agree is not acceptable to Hungary, and Varkonyi would consider this a severe setback in the European process. The conference must find a way to reach a substantial document acceptable to both parties, and he expressed the hope that the Deputy Secretary could settle this in Moscow where, he stressed, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze is open to any ideas on this.

10. Varkonyi brought up the subject of past INF arms negotiations and characterized this moment in history as a great one, the significance of which will only be realized 20 years afterwards. He admitted that there will be an asymmetry of armaments in Europe and suggested this might be remedied not by the West rearming in conventional forces and creating a new arms race, but by decreasing the level of arms. He said Hungary is ready to accept any discussion and asserted that the Soviet Union would like to reduce also.

11. Varkonyi reflected briefly on the human rights situation in Hungary, mentioning that he was the first to raise this issue with the Warsaw Pact and was the first Warsaw Pact state to raise it at the U.N. He asserted that the outcome of the current economic difficulties Hungary is facing will be greater democracy than Hungary has had before and not less, and that the government will not cope with this crisis by drawing back. Hungary practiced human rights precepts even before it spoke about them. The GOH now must simply accept and work with the fact that the international situation is wonderful for its foreign policy but deplorable for its economy. Deputy Secretary replied that we encourage the human rights trend as strongly as we can.

12. Iran-Iraq War:

The Deputy Secretary referred to another area of possible trouble in U.S.-Soviet relations, which is the Gulf and the Iran-Iraq War. He mentioned that in some ways the U.S. and the Soviet Union are on the same side there, which does not happen very often.

13. The U.S. now thinks that it is time for a second U.N. resolution, the Deputy Secretary said, adding that the Soviets have not been willing to put any teeth into Resolution 598. This is likely to become an important issue because there is serious risk every day of military incidents in the Gulf. He asked that Hungary keep this in mind in talks with the Soviets and stressed the importance of not finding ourselves on opposite sides on this question.

14. The Foreign Minister replied that Hungary welcomes the Security Council resolution but appealed for the U.S. to take into account the effect of the presence of its fleet in the Gulf. He asked whether the U.S. saw any merit in the Soviet proposal to establish a UN fleet, which would create a precedent for the future and would give teeth to the resolution, reviving the possibility of U.N. military involvement in certain regional conflicts and avoiding the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet conflict in the Gulf.

15. Varkonyi has spoken to both Iran and Iraq about the UNSC resolution, and indicated he saw the problem as one of the order of the resolution and the unwillingness of the two sides to agree on an order of implementation. Iraq is willing to first withdraw, then exchange prisoners, then form a committee to establish a culprit, whereas Iran insists that the committee be formed first. Varkonyi suggested that patience in this regard is advisable and that more time be given to working out a compromise.

16. From the U.S. perspective Iraq accepted the resolution and said so, the Deputy Secretary replied. Iran has not. The time has come to end the war. Iran should not be allowed to stall.

17. The U.S. is not in favor of a U.N. peacekeeping force. There is no peace and so can as yet be no peacekeeping force. To send a U.N. fleet in to be attacked by Iranian missiles is not a proper role for the U.N. The U.S. presence is proper because if we withdraw, Iran would threaten its neighbors and would close the Persian Gulf to shipping which would threaten the world.

18. Varkonyi said that he could see the point of the U.S. argument and that it has merit. From the center of Europe Hungary can press both sides to end the war and will do so, but he believes that to go further the U.S. must talk with Moscow. The Deputy Secretary affirmed that the Iran-Iraq war has now been added to the U.S.-Soviet bilateral agenda and will be discussed at the next quarterly review of regional issues to begin Monday.⁶

19. The Deputy Secretary raised the question of supplying arms to Iran and suggested that Varkonyi check Hungary’s policy in this regard since we have information that the GOH has recently sent military vehicles to Iran. Varkonyi responded that to his knowledge Hungary does not ship arms and that is its policy, but he said he would check to confirm this.

20. Participants were:

• U.S: Deputy Secretary Whitehead,
• S/CT Ambassador Adams,
• Ambassador Palmer,
• D Special Assistant Steve Kelly,
• PolOff Rebecca Joyce (notetaker);
• GOH: Foreign Minister Peter Varkonyi,
• Ambassador Ede Gazdik,
• Foreign Minister’s Private Secretary,
• MFA U.S. Desk Officer Tibor Kis.

21. Moscow minimize considered.

Palmer

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870939–0601. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Eastern European posts, Vienna, Moscow, and Bonn.
2. November 15–17.
3. See footnote 2, Document 64.
4. See UN Yearbook, 1987, pp. 217–237.
5. Reference to the Washington Summit.
6. November 16.