Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

299. Telegram From the Embassy in the German Democratic Republic to the Department of State¹

4760/Depto 6016.

East Berlin, November 11, 1987, 1630Z

SUBJECT

• Deputy Secretary’s Meeting With GDR Foreign Minister Fischer.

1. (Confidential—Entire text.)

2. Summary: Deputy Secretary Whitehead began his Berlin visit by meeting for two hours November 10 with GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer. They agreed that relations should be improved and identified an 11 point agenda that needed to be addressed, but Fischer showed little imagination or new flexibility on the main U.S. concerns including, claims and trade, family reunification, and the Wall and related human rights matters. He did provide an assurance that the Jessa case² has been resolved and said that he believed expert discussions on countering terrorism would be useful. He raised several points of his own, including a desire for a bilateral cultural agreement and concern about the fishing arrangement and the limitations imposed by the U.S. on the travel of GDR diplomats. End summary.

3. The Deputy Secretary and Foreign Minister agreed to concentrate on bilateral issues and address international questions at dinner. The Deputy Secretary addressed eight issues of concern to the U.S: claims; family reunification; international terrorism; GDR activities in the Third World; trade; the Wall; emigration; and USIA’s desire to hold an exhibition on filmmaking in Berlin in 1988. Foreign Minister Fischer added three points: cultural ties; treaty relations, especially fishing; and restrictions on the travel of GDR diplomats in the U.S. At the end of the two-hour session, they agreed that they had identified an agenda on which further work was required to give bilateral relations an important positive impetus. It would not be possible to agree on all items, they noted, but the goal should be for each side to become more predictable for the other, for relations to become more stable, and for progress to be made on a step by step basis.

4. Also participating were, on the U.S. side, the Ambassador, Deputy Assistant Secretary Bodde, the DCM, staff assistant Kelly, and the Political Counselor (notetaker); on the GDR side, Deputy Foreign Minister Nier, Ambassador Krabatsch, head of the Department for Basic Questions and Planning, Ambassador Birch, Deputy Director of the U.S.A., Canada, Japan Office, Dr. Reemer, U.S. Desk Officer, and Manfred Niklas, head of the Foreign Minister’s personal staff.

5. General Assessment—
Fischer said that Mr. Whitehead’s visit signified that the two sides had already achieved much in a relationship often characterized by ups and downs. He believed that the relationship would in future follow a road that, while not always smooth, would go forward. The Deputy Secretary said that he had come to say that the U.S. desired better relations and believed that there could be rapid improvement if the GDR was ready to respond to our concerns. He said that he would describe those concerns frankly, not in a critical spirit, but so that the GDR would understand our positions and what was required for the relationship to move ahead.

6. At the end of the discussion, the Deputy Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed that they had laid out a clear agenda, but that to resolve problems which had accumulated over years would require many follow-on sessions between embassies and ministries. Each side had acquired a better assessment of what the other side thought and required, however, and this boded well for a maturing relationship. The Deputy Secretary noted that some of the problems represented deep differences but others could be solved with mutual good will. Fischer characterized the session as frank and constructive and said the two sides should proceed realistically.

7. The eight items which the Deputy Secretary elaborated included:
Claims—
These, the Deputy Secretary noted, included both the Jewish claims Rabbi Miller was negotiating and official U.S. claims. He noted that a settlement was also connected with the question of expanded trade. Claims had been on the agenda a long time, and a quick settlement would be important.

8. Fischer explained that the GDR did not consider claims to include wartime reparations. The GDR’s reparations obligations, as laid down in the Potsdam Agreement, had been met by the payment of reparations to the Soviets. What was involved now, he said, were official U.S. claims and Jewish claims. With respect to the former, the GDR could—he emphasized “could”—produce its own claims against the U.S. Nevertheless, he said, the established negotiating channel should be actively pursued.

9. The GDR had taken the initiative on Jewish claims, the Minister said. Honecker initially made a symbolic offer, which the Conference on Jewish Material Claims rejected. Subsequently, the Minister took up contact with Rabbi Miller, whom he has met regularly for several years. The GDR was true to its anti-fascist legacy, he said, and was prepared to give help where it was needed. A point had been reached where it appeared that it would be possible to make available to the Conference on Jewish Material Claims a part of the funds that might become available if trade arrangements could be improved.

10. The Minister said that the GDR had looked carefully at what it wanted to export to the U.S. and had responded quickly to the U.S. request for a list of possible trade items. A long time elapsed before the U.S. was able to respond.

11. Now that the U.S. had answered, the Minister said, he looked at the overall trade/claims situation with confidence. He believed that the political problems had been resolved and that what remained were technical, commercial points that should be resolved by experts. He would continue to keep the matter under his control, however, because he wanted to be able to provide a political impetus as needed and because he did not want to put aside his relationship with Rabbi Miller, which had grown beyond the narrowly professional.

12. Family Reunification—
The Deputy Secretary expressed pleasure at progress achieved but said there were still important cases that had not been resolved, and he asked specifically about the Jessa family, whose situation had been raised by the Secretary in September.

13. The Minister said that the GDR had always acted on the principle that families should be reunited. It fulfilled its Helsinki Final Act commitments, but its policy predated that document. There was, of course, a need to ensure that all technical requirements for family reunification were met. Those technicalities were the responsibility of the Consular Department, and he would normally have to ask that department about specific cases. He was pleased, however, to be able to tell Secretary Shultz that the Jessa case has been settled.

14. The GDR tried to be responsive, Fischer said. He recalled that at an earlier meeting with the Secretary, he had been asked about a symphony orchestra conductor, whose case was resolved before the Minister left New York. The Jessa case was more complicated and had thus taken longer, but it was now resolved. Comment: The Deputy Secretary did not raise the Semler case because the Embassy had been informed authoritatively earlier in the week that the family withdrew its application in July (septel).³ End comment.

15. Terrorism—
The Deputy Secretary called this a world scourge. The U.S. wanted to have closer relations on how best to combat this scourge, including regular discussions among experts.

16. Fischer said that he agreed terrorism was a scourge for the entire world. He described at length how the GDR allegedly sought to assist the U.S. after the 1986 La Belle disco bombing in West Berlin. The GDR had sought to impose tighter controls over its state border to West Berlin, he said, by substituting passports for the identity cards issued by the Foreign Ministry. It wished to do this because it knew that the identity cards were more easily misused or counterfeited and thus were not a certain way to ensure that no unauthorized person misused the opportunity to cross between the GDR’s part of Berlin and West Berlin essentially free of controls. The new passport regime would not have applied to the Four Powers, he said, but nevertheless the U.S., UK, and France had objected that the GDR was trying to change Berlin status. This had not been the GDR’s intention, he said, so it went back to the identity card system, but this was a case where the U.S. had not wanted the GDR to take effective measures to guard against terrorism. A chance had been lost to set up reliable guards on both sides of the state border and to prevent the GDR’s part of Berlin from being a possible refuge for terrorists.

17. Comment: This description of the 1986 dispute over the use of identity cards or passports at Checkpoint Charlie was disingenuous. The original GDR effort, for example, was indeed to require also U.S., British and French diplomats to use passports. End comment.

18. Fischer said that he was favorable to the idea of expert discussions on counter-terrorism. The Interior Ministry, not the MFA, was the competent ministry, but he would undertake to speak quickly to his counterpart and believed he could get a positive answer as quickly as November 11.

19. GDR Third World Activities—
The Deputy Secretary expressed concern about GDR activities and association with undesirable actions of the Soviets in areas such as Angola and Nicaragua, which the U.S. believed were not in the interest either of peace or of the GDR’s reputation in the West.

20. The Minister said that he would repeat what he had told the Secretary in September.⁴ The GDR was active in the Third World, but primarily in the economic area, in providing vocational training and health care, and telephone communications. It was committed to such activity by its feeling of solidarity for the people. Several years ago, for example, it donated a hospital to Nicaragua, built by the contributions of citizens, which has by now treated 300,000 sick people. The Minister met yearly with members of youth brigades who went out into the Third World. In the West such work would be called developmental assistance. The FRG, quite correctly, he said, took pride in the similar work it did in the Third World, and so did the GDR.

21. Fischer said he could have told the Deputy Secretary not to interfere in the GDR’s business, but he had given an explanation instead because he considered it important for each side to say what was bothering it and to learn how the other views the matter. He would add one footnote, however: The U.S. should not concern itself with the GDR’s international reputation; the GDR would use its own judgment.

22. Trade—
Bilateral trade, the Deputy Secretary said, was so small it could hardly be seen. The U.S. wished to find ways to expand such trade so that both states would benefit.

23. Fischer agreed with the Deputy Secretary’s characterization and his wish. Sadly, he said, there were many obstacles, of which the COCOM list was one. Trade between the U.S. and the GDR simply was not yet the normal matter that it should become. There were many barriers to remove, including the absence of MFN. The GDR wanted no presents and knew that business only went well if there was mutual advantage. The two states should say to each other “Let’s trade.” The GDR was ready.

24. The Wall—
The Deputy Secretary said Americans found the Wall abhorrent, and he associated himself with what Codel Hoyer⁵ had said about it in Berlin a month earlier. The shoot-to-kill order (Schiessbefehl) was particularly reprehensible. The Deputy Secretary said he understood a change in that order might have been made. If so, it would be sincerely welcomed.

25. Fischer said that the Deputy Secretary should not think that he liked the Wall, but as he had told the Codel, it would be torn down when the conditions that had necessitated its construction were removed.

26. The Minister said that he would speak only of the economic background. Until the Wall was built, the GDR had lost, according to Western estimates, 160 billion marks. It tired of allowing foreign hands to reach into its wallet. Since the Wall was built, the GDR had become master of its own pockets. It should also be recalled, he said, that the decision to build the Wall was taken by the Warsaw Pact.

27. Turning to the shooting order, the Minister said that the GDR’s borders were not the only ones along which there was shooting. He had recently seen a film which showed a similar problem on the U.S.-Mexican border. The Deputy Secretary interjected that the problem on the U.S.-Mexican border involved people who wanted to cross into the country, not leave it. Fischer said that he agreed there were different causes; he had wanted only to note that border shooting did not occur exclusively in the GDR.

28. Fischer said when he discussed the shooting order with GDR Minister Wilms during Honecker’s visit to West Germany, he had said that shooting could be expected when persons tried to avoid the required examination of documents in what was, after all, a military area. He also said that the GDR order to border guards was no different than the one the FRG issued March 2, 1974. Fischer said that the GDR wanted no deaths on the border. Still, he added, state borders had to be respected.

29. Emigration—
The Deputy Secretary said that it was hard to understand why GDR citizens were not free to move about and to leave their country if they wished. The U.S., as a land of immigrants and refugees, felt strongly about this issue. Our relations with another country tended to a large extent to depend on whether that country treated its citizens as the U.S. did its citizens.

30. Fischer said that the GDR followed a policy of permitting emigration in principle, though in individual cases it always had to consider an applicant’s level of education. The GDR spent enormous sums of money to provide free education. The Minister knew no businessmen who would throw money out the window. Likewise, a state had to look after its resources. Nevertheless, the GDR adhered to a policy of permitting family reunification. It did not violate the Helsinki Final Act. He recalled that during Honecker’s visit, West German political leaders, including Kohl and Genscher, had noted approvingly how much GDR citizens were travelling. Out of a population of 17 million, practically every second citizen was travelling—if one excepted children and the infirm, this was practically everyone who was mobile. The only limitation, he said, was that the GDR had to be sure it had adequate financial resources.

31. USIA Film Making Exhibit—
This was a small point that should be easy to resolve, the Deputy Secretary said. Nevertheless, USIA was having great difficulty in putting on the exhibition. It was not political or controversial, and he would appreciate the Minister’s assistance.

32. Fischer promised that he would instruct his Ministry to inform him of any special problems. He said he had talked previously to the responsible culture official who had said that “You can do what you want with me, Oskar,” but there was no place for the exhibit in Berlin in 1987 because of Berlin’s celebration of its 750th anniversary.

33. The Minister added three points to the agenda, including:
Cultural Relations—
Fischer said that there was not adequate movement in this field. A few things had been done such as the “Splendor of Dresden” exhibit that had come to the U.S some years ago⁶ with David Rockefeller’s assistance, and some orchestra visits. But there was no mechanism to provide regular stimulus to cultural relations. There should be, he said, mutual interest in developing this stimulation. The GDR was interested in negotiating an agreement that could help. It did not exclude doing more on both a cultural and a commercial basis.

34. Treaty Relations (Fishing)—
Fischer said that treaties should help both to expand and stabilize relations, but this could only happen if each side knew how the other would behave. The bilateral fishing agreement, he said, was operating unfairly because of restrictions imposed by the U.S. To continue fishing despite the changes introduced by the U.S. would not be interesting for the GDR. No one would put money into a business where it was clear that it would be lost.
Comment: Later the MFA’s U.S. Desk Officer said the reference was to a recent seventy percent rise in U.S. boundage fees for Atlantic mackerel (which had been $59/ton). End comment.

35. Restrictions on GDR Diplomats—
Fischer said, without elaboration, that he found the restrictions imposed by the U.S. on GDR diplomats “disturbing.”

36. The Deputy Secretary did not respond substantively to Fischer’s three additional points except to say that he agreed they belonged on the agenda of issues to be addressed.

37. International Relations—
While Fischer generally respected the Deputy Secretary’s suggestion that the conversation focus on bilateral matters, he made several points about the international situation. Acknowledging that the GDR was a small land, geographically far from the U.S., he said that it should nevertheless be important for the U.S. because of its geopolitical position, above all its location at the point of division between the two military alliances.

38. Because the GDR was so located, Fischer said, it was especially sensitive to the East-West political situation and did all that it could to assist in making that situation less tense, more calculable. Thus, it made its own proposals, such as for a chemical weapons free zone and a nuclear weapons free zone in Central Europe, and it fully supported all Warsaw Pact proposals for disarmament and detente. It welcomed the U.S.-Soviet INF agreement and expected it to be signed in December and quickly ratified and implemented.

39. Comment: Fischer, who does not make major foreign policy decisions here, broke no new ground and was his usual cautious self. He stressed that the GDR wants a better bilateral relationship, but he gave few indications of what more it might be prepared to do to move forward.

40. Moscow minimize considered.

Meehan

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870930–0393. Confidential. Sent for information to Eastern European posts collective, Bonn, Moscow, Vienna, USAFSB Berlin, and USDel NST Geneva.
2. See Document 297.
3. Not found.
4. See Document 297.
5. Telegram 4418 from East Berlin, October 19, reported that Congressman Steny Hoyer’s delegation met with East German Foreign Minister Fischer on October 12, during which time they discussed the Berlin Wall and the shoot-to-kill order. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870858–0392)
6. The exhibit was displayed at the National Gallery of Art in 1978 before going to New York and San Francisco in late 1978 and early 1979.