Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

225. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State¹

6384.

Belgrade, August 7, 1984, 1059Z

SUBJECT

• US-Yugoslav Military Cooperation: Need for a New Look?

REF

• State 228562.²

1. S—Entire text.

2. I arrived in Yugoslavia three years ago under the clear impression that I was to bolster the bilateral military relationship in accordance with the President’s June 1, 1981 memorandum to Secretary Weinburger. In my view, the rationale in that memorandum is as valid today as it was then, namely: “This administration views a militarily capable Yugoslavia as a key element in preventing Soviet expansionism and hegemony in southern Europe.” The memorandum cites as a central element of the administration’s policy one of arms transfer to Yugoslavia and “to be forthcoming in approving sales of arms and equipment required for Yugoslav defensive needs as circumstances warrant.”³

3. These words ring hollow in the light of recent experience. Despite promising statements of readiness for military cooperation from the President, Vice President and Secretary Weinburger in the past year or so, the USG has failed to provide one major system sought by the Yugoslav military in recent years.⁴ All of the earlier significant deliveries (Mavericks and Mark–44 Torpedoes date back to 1978 and 1981). The engine for the next Yugoslav-built fighter is an issue that has dragged on for almost two years with no positive result in sight. The Hughes and Johnson license requirements for ECM/EW and command and control systems are encountering further delays in Washington. The request for the Harpoon has been turned down flat. I am asked, in explaining the latter position, to inform the Yugoslavs that their primary threat comes from the land not the sea (see State 228562). That sort of condescension smacks of arrogance if not total incomprehension of just what sort of country we are dealing with. The Yugoslavs have a long and proud military tradition and hardly need us to tell them whence comes the threat.

4. I have no problem going to the Defense Secretary to explain the turndowns and delays. I am paid to do that in the best way I professionally can. But he will ask, with some justification, just why we so painfully negotiated the recently signed GSMIA if nothing the Yugoslavs ask for is forthcoming.⁵ He will also ask about the status of other requests for equipment. My present instincts tell me that none of these will be approved for release either.

5. I am not arguing here that we should try to meet every Yugoslav wish. On the contrary, there are bound to be items that we simply cannot release to them and we should tell them so frankly. But the stalling, foot-dragging approach we have adopted (viz. the aircraft engines and licenses for ECM/EW systems) are causing the Yugoslavs to question the value of the bilateral relationship in the military field. Secretary Mamula told me on his return from the U.S. in May that he was now waiting for concrete signs of cooperation from our side. The Yugoslav CNO (Admiral Vilovic) made the same point to me in Split two weeks ago. Both expressed disappointment that the military relationship seemed to be lagging and indeed deteriorating from earlier years. Judging by State 228562 and other signs of U.S. negativism in the military cooperation area, I conclude these Yugoslav military leaders are reading the tea leaves correctly.

6. This brings me to the final point. We have Yugoslavia’s excellent record of not/not transferring sensitive technology to the East; we have the GSOMIA; we have fairly regular high-level military exchanges; we have our Joint Military Committee—but what is all of this producing besides fine words and promises for the future? Is it not perhaps time to face the fact that words are fairly empty, the promises largely unfulfilled and the military relationship assuming an ever smaller place in the scheme of US-Yugoslav relations? I wonder whether we should not make this minimalist position clear at the next JMC meeting and save a lot of frustration and disappointment among our Yugoslav friends and allow them to go on about procuring their equipment from other more reliable sources, either the Soviets or from Western countries.

7. I am not at this time recommending this position for the next JMC meeting, for it seems to me to run directly counter to our geo-strategic interests in this part of the world. However, I do consider that it is high time for the USG to review its position on military cooperation with Yugoslavia and hopefully bring it into line with reality.⁶ Based on my experience here in recent years, I do not believe that the position adopted by those who are charged with implementing the President’s policy accurately represents that laid down in his 1981 memorandum.⁷

8. In the meantime, my staff will try to produce some ideas for a positive agenda for the JMC meeting. Hopefully, they will be able to come up with some alternative systems, equipment and material to those requested by the Yugoslavs. However, I repeat that we should also be considering how best to emerge from a JMC meeting with an acceptable military relationship that keeps our overall bilateral relations with the GOY from being seriously harmed. At this point, I confess to being stumped, given the recent indications from Washington that nothing of any sensitivity can be released to the Yugoslavs. I only ask myself, where will they be and what will they do if and when we count on them to defend their independence in an East-West crunch? They certainly will not be equipped with modern U.S. weaponry: of that I am sure.

9. Action requested. Washington agencies’ reactions to this message.

10. Please pass White House for Ambassador Matlock and Admiral Murphy.

Anderson

1. Source: Reagan Library, Donald Fortier Files, Steve Rosen File, Subject File, Technology Transfer—Yugoslavia. Secret; Priority; Nodis.
2. Telegram 228562 to Belgrade, August 3, dealt with Yugoslav concerns about license requirements and the sale of Harpoon missiles. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840494–0533)
3. An unknown hand drew a line in the left-hand margin adjacent to this sentence.
4. An unknown hand underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with the words “the USG has failed” to the end.
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6. An unknown hand underlined the portion of this sentence beginning with the word “for” to the end.
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