Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

224. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia¹

178031.

Washington, June 16, 1984, 1850Z

SUBJECT

• U.S.-Yugoslav Relations.

REF

• (A) Belgrade 4808;²
• (B) State 167843.³

1. S/NF—Entire text.

2. The Department shares the Embassy’s general assessment in Ref A that the GOY may have combined a series of recent coincidental events in the U.S.-Yugoslav bilateral relationship to reach the irrational and totally erroneous conclusion that our policy towards Yugoslavia is changing for the worse. What virtually all these events have in common is that they break no new ground in terms of the bilateral relationship as it has existed over the past twenty years. Such issues—for example, the content of VOA coverage of events relating to Yugoslavia. Proposals in Congress for a Mihailovich⁴ memorial on U.S. Federal property. [less than 2 lines not declassified] The protocol levels assigned to particular Yugoslav visitors—reflect both the problems and insecurities of the Yugoslav regime and the well-known differences in social/political systems and policies that exist between us. These factors clearly will not disappear any time soon despite the substantive gains and favorable publicity generated recently by our major efforts to coordinate Western financial assistance to Yugoslavia and by an extraordinary round of high-level visits.

3. We concur in the Ambassador’s assessment that what may be new in the present situation is that the new Federal Presidency, concerned about political stability and legitimacy in the face of continuing economic downturn, is giving new credence to hoary conspiratorial theories about alleged U.S. interest in and efforts to undermine the Yugoslav communist state. This mind-set probably derives almost exclusively from internal Yugoslav political dynamics, and there is relatively little we can do about it in the short term. We believe that our best course is to take a two-track approach. On the one hand, we should avail ourselves of every opportunity, both in Belgrade and in Washington, to stress to the Yugoslavs that our role in the financial negotiations (particularly during the last-minute fracas with the IMF over pricing policy) ought to demonstrate the depth and continuing commitment to support for Yugoslavia. In making this point, we should pull no punches regarding Yugoslav actions we find offensive, such as the “Nin” articles and Borba commentary. In short, the Yugoslavs should be told that U.S. support has been visible and concrete and will be continued, but that the relationship, as always, will be characterized by frank exchanges where we differ.

4. The second track. As suggested in Ref A, is to carry out business as usual and simultaneously explore means to improve the quality of relations. The following are the Department’s thoughts along these lines, keyed to the useful suggestions provided in para. 10 of Ref A.

— Messages to Yugoslav leaders. Messages have been sent recently to incoming President of the Presidency Djuranovic and Foreign Secretary Dizdarevic.⁵ These have been ceremonial in nature; for a subsequent message to contribute constructively to bilateral relations, it would need to be substantive, perhaps conveying a desire for consultations. No such meeting currently is planned, but the possibility should be kept in mind.

— Vlado Janzic visit. The Department will coordinate this visit with USIA and try to ensure a good reception for Janzic. We would appreciate clarification of his approximate rank and responsibilities; is he, for example, roughly equivalent to Ambassador Matlock?

— IMF. As stated above, we think that the Yugoslavs should be told in no uncertain terms, not only that the IMF’s interest is in strengthening Yugoslav independence, but also that our own role has been helpful throughout.

— Human rights. The Yugoslavs have no/no reason to be upset at the U.S. reaction to recent dissident events. There have been no press inquiries of the USG, and no public comments by us. Our statements to GOY officials have been low-key and directed more to providing information about possible U.S. reactions in certain contingencies. The reaction of U.S. human rights groups has been very cautious, and press reaction practically non-existent. In this situation, we agree that we need to continue to educate GOY officials about the potential problems their actions could cause. Of course, if the situation grows worse, we will need to consider a more active posture.

— Mihailovic memorial. The situation appears to be under control, and we and Hill committee staffs are monitoring it closely. There is nothing more to be done on this.

— Extradition cases. The Medenica⁶ case, as the Embassy knows, is extremely complex and difficult; for this reason, it inevitably will be slow-moving. The Department will move as expeditiously as possible on this case and advance the argument throughout that it should be decided by the courts on the merits. We will move forward on the Artukovic⁷ case as rapidly as possible.

— Re educating GOY officials about the U.S. political system, the Yugoslav Embassy has been quite active recently in expanding its contacts within the executive branch and on Capitol Hill (especially with regard to the Medenica case). We believe that the Embassy has conveyed sophisticated views to FSFA on a variety of troublesome issues (for example, Yugoslav EmbOffs have exhibited both knowledge and sophistication regarding the Mihailovic memorial, the Medenica case, and the VOA Albanian service); the problem may be more in winning acceptance for these views within the GOY.

— Moving ahead on exchanges. EUR/EEY has held informal discussions with Yugoslav Embassy officers about exchanges in the fall of 1984 and spring of 1985. Among the ideas discussed are: 1) a small (2–3 member) delegation from the Federal Assembly to be hosted by an equal number of members of Congress for one week, to be spent entirely observing the legislative process; 2) a similar exchange at the republic/state level; and 3) an intensive visit by a Yugoslav mayor to a comparably sized U.S. city. We would appreciate Embassy comments on these and other possibilities with a view to making a formal proposal soon.

— Consultations on international issues. EUR/EEY hopes to locate USG specialists on a variety of international issues who would be prepared to participate in an Ampart program in Yugoslavia. Request that Embassy provide suggestions along these lines in approximate priority order.

— VOA Albanian service. The Department will be in touch with other agencies on this question in an effort to improve coordination.

Shultz

1. Source: Reagan Library, Paula J. Dobriansky Files, Yugoslavia (7). Secret; Priority; Exdis; Noforn.
2. Telegram 4808 from Belgrade, June 14, provided the Embassy’s analysis that the Government of Yugoslavia was misreading U.S. policy and an immediate change was necessary to assure the Yugoslavs. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840384–0748)
3. Telegram 167843 to Belgrade, June 8, provided a summary of a recent INR intelligence report on the crackdown on dissidents. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840375–0479)
4. Reference is to Draza Mihailovic, a Yugoslav Serb general during World War II, who formed the Chetnik resistance movement.
5. Not found.
6. Reference is to Rajko Medenica, a medical doctor, whom the Yugoslavs requested be extradited in February 1984 to face charges of fraud. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D840107–0375)
7. Reference is to Andrija Artukovic, an alleged, World War II war criminal. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810391–0608)