Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

194. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia¹

252609.

Washington, September 22, 1981, 0104Z

SUBJECT

• Secretary Haig’s Bilateral With Vrhovec September 12.

1. (S—Entire text)

2. On September 12, the Secretary met for two hours with the Yugoslav FonMin Josip Vrhovec. Also attending, on the Yugoslav side, were Assistant Federal Secretary for West Europe and North American Affairs Milos Melovski, Assistant Federal Secretary for Multilateral Economic Affairs Kazimir Vidas; Yugoslav Ambassador to the U.S. Budimir Loncar; Foreign Office Director for North American Affairs Mirko Zaric; his deputy, Momcilo Koprivica (notetaker). On the U.S. side were Ambassador Anderson; Assistant Secretary Eagleburger, Director for Policy Planning Wolfowitz; Executive Assistant Goldberg, and Embassy Belgrade’s Political Counselor Harry Dunlop (notetaker).

3. Secretary Vrhovec said he was extremely pleased to welcome Secretary Haig and his associates, noting that “our good friend’’ Assistant Secretary Eagleburger had returned.² This meeting is particularly welcome, he said, both for his government and for him personally, for it demonstrates that “your government, your country is continuing the politically good, useful, and friendly relations between our two countries.” We wish to contribute our share to this important task, he continued.

4. Secretary Vrhovec then noted that not long before he and the Secretary had met at Cancun.³ Yugoslavia considered that meeting very successful. He had reported to his government afterwards on the good meeting they had there, and of their “frank and candid” discussion. During Secretary Haig’s visit to Belgrade there would be many problems to discuss, some “very dangerous;” “new avenues” must be sought on international relations, Vrhovec said. He then suggested that in the limited time available, they begin their discussions with a short exchange on bilateral matters and then return to the international scene.

5. Secretary Haig said he wished to reiterate President Reagan’s attitude: While we have had differences, and some will certainly surface today, our mutual objectives, which are the most important things, are shared. The concept of nonalignment, as represented by Yugoslavia, is something we value. It is a term that has been abused by some, but our relations are on a track that allows us to absorb differences. Secretary Haig then said that he would like to address three important bilateral subjects: terrorism, economic matters, and military cooperation. In our Western democracies, the Secretary continued, there seems to be an unfortunate license which permits occasional acts of terrorism. It is our intention, he stated, that terrorism be countered with swift and sharp justice. The Secretary said that Americans were appalled at the attack on the Yugoslav DCM’s residence in Washington, and he could assure his Yugoslav audience that for President Reagan, anti-terrorism is fundamental to policy. Secretary Haig recalled that the Ottawa statements on terrorism had been very strong⁴—surprisingly so, as some of our Western allies sometimes “take a bottom line approach” to this terrible problem. We in the U.S. do everything within our power to suppress terrorism.

6. Turning to the economy, Secretary Haig acknowledged that there is an international problem of great moment. The countries of the EC, for example, are suffering like all developed and underdeveloped countries. Only the ASEAN states seem to be doing well.

7. Secretary Haig said he knew that the Yugoslav balance of payments situation is not good. “We are attentive to that, and we will do what we can.” He said he had recently talked to Bill Brock, and would do so again next week on Tuesday or Wednesday.⁵ Secretary Haig also said he knew there were difficulties concerning Yugoslavia’s furniture exports to the U.S. He said we would do what we can. We will act, and act immediately, to help.

8. Secretary Haig then said he thought there was work to be done to improve the investment climate in Yugoslavia. Some U.S. corporations have complained, for example, about patent and copyright regulations in Yugoslavia being vague, or inadequate in the protection they afford foreign-produced products.

9. Secretary Haig then turned to the question of banking credits, which he termed one of the most difficult issues. Because of the interest rate problem and the unfortunate impact of the Polish situation, private lending institutions in the West have become somewhat nervous. This may be worse in Western Europe than in the U.S., but we are sensitive to this problem and to Yugoslav needs in the coming year. The U.S. cannot actively intervene in the decision-making process of our lending institutions; should we try, they would resist strongly. But we can describe the basis soundness of the situation in Yugoslavia accurately. In the final analysis, according to the Secretary, “You must work with the institutions themselves. We assure you that we are ready to help in the areas in which we can.”

10. Turning to military cooperation, the Secretary recalled that “When I was in Europe I kept closely in touch with the situation in Yugoslavia and had some influence with Cy Vance and Harold Brown.⁶ I always felt that it was important that Yugoslavia be able to provide for its own security.” The Secretary said he knew that when Larry Eagleburger had been Ambassador, he had worked on some problems in this area, many of which have now been worked out. But a basic problem remains: the high cost of high technology. He said he understood the Yugoslav problem, compounded by the international economic situation, where interest rates are such that purchases are almost unmanageable. He said, however, that Yugoslavia “can rely on our cooperation in providing, within the limits of our own restraint, all the cooperation we can.” He said he knew Yugoslav equipment is aging. Secretary Haig promised that in the future, when the U.S. economic situation is turned around, the U.S. will be in a position to improve its capabilities to assist. This we will do because it is in our interest and in the interest of international peace and stability to provide equipment to our friends at more reasonable rates. Secretary Haig recalled that one has to go back to the Eisenhower era to find as high a level of defense expenditures as today, about 5 percent of GNP. He said he wanted to share with Secretary Vrhovec some of the problems the U.S. faces in this area. Because the U.S. military industrial base has shrunk, we are finding it difficult to produce weapons at an adequate rate. For example, the lead time in providing Pakistan with F–16’s is about 3–4 years. We are working in two ways to improve the situation; we are seeking to improve our military industrial production base, and creating a pool of equipment for emergency requirements of nations in sudden need.

11. Secretary Haig then said that the reports of drastic reductions in the U.S. defense spending are not true. The President has already cut 30 billion dollars from the current budget. Inflation has dropped below 10 percent and looks as if it will stay there. Economic experts say that one reason short-term interest rates remain so high is that the financial market does not believe that President Reagan can keep the budget deficit down. Thus, we have heard there is another round of 20–30 billion dollars in budget reductions in prospect. Secretary Haig said there would not be any major cuts in defense spending. There will be some modest retrenchments in the military budget, but real spending on military items will increase at an annual rate of 7 percent over the next 5 years. One should not believe the ill-intentioned reporting of some press zealots. President Reagan will make a decision this week which will keep the defense spending levels up.

Military balance, commenting that the trend, while worrisome, is only serious if it continues. The U.S. is not in dire shape yet. But President Reagan is convinced that the only way to get the Soviets to deal realistically with us in the arms control area is to redress the military balance. Over the last 20 years, the Soviets have invested 4–5 percent in military spending annually.

13. With regard to military cooperation, Secretary Haig said he expects that in the next few years our policies will be able to be applied more flexibly than now. Our relations are on a very sound basis and despite differences they will continue to be so.

14. Secretary Vrhovec said he was pleased to hear very directly Secretary Haig’s impressions of the economic situation in the U.S. He said he would try to set forth the Yugoslav situation and then would deal with the other two subjects raised by Secretary Haig: terrorism and military cooperation.

15. As you are aware, Vrhovec began, Yugoslavia is implementing a very serious program of economic stabilization. Some results have been achieved, but they are far from enough to deal with all the problems confronting us. Yugoslavia has spent too much too quickly, the major problem is our international trade balance. Restrictions are still in effect in the West—as he told Secretary Haig in Cancun—which have two-fold negative consequences: the deficit in the balance with the Western countries increases, while Yugoslavia faces even less balanced economic relations with the rest of the world. Yugoslav industries, faced with obstacles in trade with the West go where they find it most easy, to the less-sophisticated markets of the East. Such enterprises are selling and making money, but are not acting in accord “with our global policies”.

16. Secretary Vrhovec said Secretary Haig’s offer of support and assistance is most welcome. “We welcome U.S. readiness to do the things which you have just expressed so clearly.” According to Secretary Vrhovec, the immediate problem is inflation. The rate has dropped 7 percent from last year, but is still running at an annual rate of 30–35 percent. The Yugoslav balance of payments improved last year and this year, but to meet its goals Yugoslavia will need financial support from abroad.

17. According to Secretary Vrhovec, Yugoslavia plans to ask for the same amount of foreign support as last year. He said that “my expert (Secretary of Finance Kostic) has asked me to try to mobilize your attention to this problem. We hope to achieve the same level of assistance as last year, 400 million dollars, or perhaps more.” Loncar said last year’s objective of 400 million dollars was achieved, and Yugoslavia is looking for 450 million this year. Vrhovec added that Kostic and the Governor of the Yugoslav Bank soon will be traveling to the U.S. to discuss this matter.

18. Turning to terrorism, Secretary Vrhovec recalled that he had found the first paragraph of the Ottawa statement on terrorism an “excellent definition, and Yugoslavia is ready to endorse it.” Vrhovec added that Yugoslavia is satisfied that the U.S. has clearly demonstrated readiness to do everything possible to prevent terrorism. This not only broadens confidence between the bureaucracies of the two countries, but between their peoples as well. Regarding military economic relations, Vrhovec said that his military colleagues were “very satisfied” with the way relations had developed. He only hoped we would go further. There are obstacles, mainly high prices which seem to be going up at a greater rate than inflation in the U.S., and some procedures still go too slowly. He said his military colleagues had the impression there is some very sensitive technology which Yugoslavia still cannot acquire.

19. Vrhovec then noted the possibility of linking military purchases in the U.S. to the sale of Yugoslav goods. Yugoslav defense industries are under the same requirement as others to balance to the degree possible imports from hard currency areas with sales to same. Therefore, it was with great appreciation that Yugoslavia had recently concluded an agreement by which certain foodstuffs could be sold to the American military in Europe. Perhaps more could be done, such as providing vacation facilities for U.S. servicemen and their dependents. We know we must improve our own initiatives, Vrhovec said, and we will work on this.

20. Vrhovec said Yugoslavia is also pleased at the progress already achieved in providing training for Yugoslav officers in U.S. military schools. Secretary Haig said this is an item of good news for this year, and in the years ahead we hope there will be more funds for this military program.

21. Secretary Haig said that when economic difficulties are encountered we must not succumb to defeatist strategies. We are all interdependent; we need friends and have needed them since World War II. We need to keep trade lines open on an equal basis. Sometimes this requires self-sacrifice, but the alternatives are unacceptable.

22. The Secretary said he will see Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko this month for two full meetings.⁷ These will be extraordinary talks, but he did not wish to raise expectations; there would be no dramatic outcomes. He said that the Soviets had accused the U.S. repeatedly of not maintaining the dialogue, of slamming the door. This is simply not so. There had been talks in Washington with Dobrynin before he went home and in Moscow. It is not that there has been no dialogue, “the problem is that they don’t like what they are hearing.”

23. Secretary Haig said he is convinced that the Soviets have one important concern: the U.S. awakening. At long last the American people are determined to correct their military deficiencies and the Soviet leaders have simply not yet grasped this. In the past, Moscow has been able to take advantage of the differences in our societies. For years, detente has been a one-way street. The West lost Ethiopia, South Yemen, Afghanistan; there is insurgency in Central America, stimulated by the Soviet Union, Kampuchea is in thrall to Vietnam, a Soviet-sponsored proxy. There are unprecedented encroachments of Soviet naval power in Southeast Asia, in the straits near Hawaii and along our coasts, in the Caribbean and in the Norwegian Sea. But America has finally awakened. Our people put President Reagan in office because they were disillusioned with the policies of the Carter administration, policies that had been the result of the lack of consensus which we have now turned around. In his opinion, the Secretary continued, Soviet leaders are now facing serious problems, especially in the economy. The Soviet economy has been pushed to its limits by the increased focus on defense spending. There is Poland, a situation that is worse today than before. Afghanistan is a bottomless pit for them, although it would be naive to believe that the USSR was going to collapse because of Afghanistan. One of the reasons why the Soviets are carrying such a serious burden in Afghanistan, according to Secretary Haig, is the refusal of the Nonaligned Movement to accept this unacceptable situation. Thus, our policies in seeking disarmament and arms control are based on ensuring that the Soviets realize they can no longer exploit detente to their advantage. They can no longer count on a policy designed to fracture the U.S. arms effort and to split the U.S. from Europe as they are now trying to do. “If I thought their policies were designed to achieve real disarmament, I would be genuinely pleased, but I see their thousands of Soviet missiles and their navies sailing seas never sailed by them before.”

24. Now, Secretary Haig continued, with Gromyko, I expect we will first deal with the TNF situation. We intend to make progress in TNF negotiations. But we will make clear as I will do in Berlin⁸ that there is no way that the Soviets are likely to respond if we do not take steps to redress the military balance in Europe.

25. We will also talk trade. We are not isolationists, and we are not slamming doors. We believe there should be an incentive for the Soviets to improve their behavior on the international stage, and we will provide it, but not blindly. We will relate our trade to Soviet international behavior.

26. We will also discuss South Africa. I do not expect Gromyko would be very responsive, but we believe it is in the Soviet interest to have a dialogue on such issues, and I think Gromyko would agree. Frankly, however, we are prepared, even if the Soviets are not, for such a constructive dialogue. I believe there are severe Soviet vulnerabilities in the economy and in command and control. “If they want a difficult world to live in, we are prepared to contribute to that. However, I am an optimist, not a pessimist. I believe the Soviets have too many problems to seek a policy of confrontation.”

27. Discussions with Gromyko will also include SALT. It is the U.S. determination to bring about reductions in strategic weapons, and we have worked hard to do so. In one to two weeks the President will make a decision about the U.S. strategic deterrence.⁹ There will be major increases in our spending in this area. Why? Because we are in the process of falling behind. We do not anticipate discussions on SALT before the first of the year; and those would depend on the international climate, how the TNF talks have gone,¹⁰ and on the international behavior of the USSR.

28. The Secretary said he would be glad to answer questions or hear Secretary Vrhovec’s views on these subjects. For example, in Ottawa, there had been talk about strengthening COCOM. It is in our interest to tighten restrictions on high technology to Russia where military applications are involved. But we would also like to loosen up on controls for items without serious military use. He said he knew Secretary Vrhovec would perhaps be concerned by what he had heard.

29. Vrhovec said he had a few short comments. Yugoslavia attaches great importance to relations between the great powers. As much as we would like to see a dialogue, he continued, we do not wish that dialogue if it would lead to the consequences we wish to avert, i.e. World War III. But we do consider a proper dialogue the only solution. This is not just theology, Vrhovec continued, it is a very deeply held conviction based on practical considerations. We know what you profess, and what the Soviets do as well, he continued. We are also aware that after Vietnam there were a number of international events which exposed the USSR as the power to interfere for selfish goals. He was sure the U.S. had noticed that the Non-Aligned Movement after Havana¹¹ and at New Delhi¹² for the first time had exposed Soviet actions. It was extremely important, Vrhovec continued, that the movement act with complete impartiality and criticize openly and frankly “no matter who”. This shocked the Soviet Union, Vrhovec said, and made them unhappy, but it reaffirmed the non-aligned nature of the Non-Aligned Movement. This is why we so strongly stated our views that in the movement’s agenda new crises must be added to old crises. We are for any solution which has as its result the affirmation of people’s right to self-determination. We are opposed to any actions contrary to that.

30. Vrhovec continued that Yugoslavia has never criticized the presence of Cuban troops in Angola or Ethiopia, because such presence is “logical” as these countries consider themselves endangered by outside aggression. This does not mean we are happy with it. We wish to create the conditions in which Cuban troops are no longer needed in Angola. We believe real prospects lay before us. This is not only “psychology”, but is based on reality, for we know that Angola would like to be free of Cuban troops. In fact, we propose some concrete steps, such as considering the introduction of Nigerian troops which may signal the beginning of freeing Angola of Cuban presence. The main obstacle to this, of course, is South Africa’s aggressive policies and actions. But now we are hearing even from the Front-Line States that neither Cuba nor the USSR is eager to enlarge their role in Angola. Recently SWAPO head Sam Nujomo was in Belgrade and I told him very frankly our views. He told me and asked me to convey to you that he sees the future of Namibia as an independent and non-aligned country. I can tell you in confidence that I arranged a dinner for him with the Foreign Ministers of Tanzania and Zimbabwe. During that dinner they joined me in urging him to play a truly non-aligned role. He told us he is opposed to any preconditions for a settlement, but said he is prepared to give assurances that the minorities in Namibia will live in peace. We told Nujomo he should also be prepared to accept the presence of foreign capital from both South Africa and Britain. We tried to explain to him why such foreign capital is necessary.

Vrhovec said he would welcome U.S. readiness to promote real independence in Namibia and elsewhere throughout Africa. This is the only way to promote the departure of Cuban troops.

31. Vrhovec also recalled that at Cancun Secretary Haig had said that the USSR would like to find a way out of the Afghanistan impasse. Yugoslavia believes the Soviets want to appear more flexible by sending Firyubin to many countries. “They will not say, they will not think, of troop withdrawal yet”, Vrhovec said, but he thought they might have started to “make some move”.

32. Secretary Haig said he was grateful for Vrhovec’s observations. He would like now to speak very frankly about South Africa. He knows Yugoslavia’s very special interest and influence there. He said, “I would like to repeat what I told representatives of the OAU two weeks ago before the UNGA. It is simply not true that the U.S. has aligned itself with the RSA, but it is true that after three years of rhetoric which isolated the RSA and drove it into paranoia, we had the RSA performance in Geneva when it repudited UN Resolution 435.¹³ I can assure you that the RSA is powerful enough that it can just sit in splendid isolation for ten years. My Assistant Secretary and my Deputy, Judge Clark, are both engaged in extensive discussions with RSA leaders. When Judge Clark was there, he packed his bags and headed for the airport three times before he was called back to continue discussions. We may not be aligning ourselves with the Front Line States, but we are not aligning ourselves with the RSA either. The South African leaders tell us that they completely reject 435; they want no UN presence at all, no “blue helmets”, which they term agents of SWAPO. There are five non-aligned independent states intimately involved with the South African economy, which could be stifled and smothered. Our policy is not to isolate the RSA. In our discussions they have begun to reveal their real concern—Angola and the Cuban-Soviet buildup there. Regrettably, they found all too convincing evidence of this recently—massive stocks of Soviet arms, tanks, rockets, artillery. They found foreign advisors, 29 in one village alone. They had been there for two years. This Soviet warrant officer they captured—he is singing like a canary, and the RSA has all its fears reinforced and regenerated. They are telling us, “We told you so.”

33. The Secretary continued, “I assure you if we had a commitment, a credible commitment, that Cuba would be out of Angola tomorrow. We could deliver an independent Namibia tomorrow! I am absolutely certain of that, and it would be on the basis of 435.”

We realize Angola is not really a free agent. Everyone has got to make a contribution to restoring Angola to true independence. The Angolans, the Soviets, and the Cubans have to help in their way, too.

We suggest there could be a simultaneous withdrawal, the RSA out of Namibia, and Cuba out of Angola. I don’t wish to be tied up in catechisms, but it is clear to us that the Cubans are in Angola because they like to be there. They live better there than they do in Cuba. Even Portugal has told us if the RSA withdrew from Namibia first, there is no reason to believe the Cubans would then withdraw from Angola. The Secretary continued that we welcome Yugoslavia’s contact with Angola. We see no reason that a formal link should be made between Cuban and RSA withdrawal, but we believe there is a recognizable relationship between the two. If Angola were truly independent, our friends in Western Europe tell us the doors will be open for assistance. It is a rich country. We want to see it like Zimbabwe, truly non-aligned. If it were so, even the RSA, I believe, would help.

We do not, of course, believe that in Angola the Soviets are behind everything that has happened, but it is true that they have a heavy hnd in what has gone on there and in Central America as well.

The Secretary said that what he had just heard about Nujomo’s intentions is very important. It made his entire trip worthwhile, and he would welcome further ideas from the Yugoslavs about what could be done.

34. Turning to the Middle East, the Secretary noted that he had recent talks with Sadat and Begin, as well as three hours Saturday morning with Crown Prince Fahd.¹⁴ He regards the situation in the Middle East as very dangerous, more so than in a long time. That is because the situation is in flux. Arab moderates are worried about the USSR, but frustrated by Israeli intransigence. Lebanon is a tinderbox.
The Secretary said that the Camp David peace process is nearing a crucial point; Sadat wants autonomy talks completed by April next year. Israel, for different reasons, wants the same. Otherwise, Sadat will have gotten what he wants in the Sinai and given nothing. Thus, the talks will begin this month.¹⁵ Egypt has sought a high-level U.S. presence at these talks. Secretary Haig said he did not think that would be wise. Both sides should together get down to it, but if the U.S. was there in a high profile, expectations would be unrealistically raised and neither side would make concessions. He told both sides, “You sit down, you get an agenda, you get a deadline—three months or so—and if you convince me you have done this, then we will join.”

— The Secretary said Crown Prince Fahd told him, “You were right.”

— The Crown Prince also had a positive attitude toward the Camp David process. Saudi Arabia has also been extremely helpful in Lebanon. We were within hours of a major conflict there. Why? Israel wants to clean up southern Lebanon, to push the PLO north and create a barrier. Israel would do this today, and it would be catastrophic.

— Arafat too is in a squeeze. He has an antagonistic Syria to his north, and the Israelis to his south. His own movement is fragmented, as evidenced by the attack on the synagogue in Vienna by a splinter group with some Soviet influence, triggered to create an incident. The Israelis are looking for an excuse.

— Prince Fahd will work on the PLO, and we will work on Israel, to try to keep weapons out of Lebanon. Secretary Haig said it would be a catastrophe if we did not.

— If Lebanon quiets down, a more stable framework for negotiations could emerge. We want to solve the Palestinian problem in a constructive way, both the West Bank and the Gaza. This is not mere rhetoric. For example, Egypt and Israel are talking about cooperation in areas heretofore inconceivable.

35. Vrhovec said it was curious that the eight-point proposal which Crown Prince Fahd had been presenting was received in Cairo, Damascus, and the PLO. He asked if there was some kind of consent by the U.S. to it?

— Secretary Haig said the Fahd proposal was unacceptable in several respects. One, territory—on which 242¹⁶ had included some deliberate ambiguity. Resolution of the territorial disputes is an area for negotiation between the parties concerned. It calls for the withdrawal of all post-1967 settlements. If people are to live in peace, why is this necessary? This, too, should be negotiated. I also think Israel will not accept it. What is good is the implicit recognition of Israel’s right to exist. Secretary Haig had talked to Fahd about his proposal. Fahd accepts that the Camp David process must he pressed ahead, but it is essential that the process move now. Discussions with Fahd were not tense. He has been very helpful. We agreed that if Sadat abandons Camp David he is in jeopardy. But if it fails of itself, he may turn elsewhere.

— Vrhovec mentioned some speculation that Sadat’s position is not too good internally. Haig said Crown Prince Fahd and Israel are both aware of the possible ramifications.

36. According to Vrhovec, the outlook in the Middle East is “very gloomy because no one believes Begin is ready to go ahead.” There are those who even believe he will not give up the Sinai. Haig said we must create conditions which would make that impossible for Begin.

— Vrhovec said that if there were no PLO participation or negotiations, no progress is possible. Arafat is the most moderate in the Palentinian camp. Secretary Haig agreed but said that if the Lebanon situation improves as a stronger central government emerges, if we can reconcile the Christians and Moslems, and if the Palestinians and PLO contribute to this, it would greatly increase their stature. Unfortunately, the PLO is splintered. A way must be sought to stop the movement of heavy weapons into south Lebanon. This is coming from Syria and the USSR, and Israel will simply not accept it.

— Vrhovec said that until recently one of the major obstacles to accepting the PLO has been its failure to recognize the right of Israel to exist. As long as Israel operates openly against south Lebanon the PLO cannot openly recognize Israel. This is not just a matter of principle, but of practical politics. Acceptance of the Fahd proposal could signal the end of a negative process. We believe that Arafat understands that the end of the negotiations must have the complete recognition of Israel, of its right to exist.

37. Secretary Haig said that just as the RSA, Israel is very powerful. Israel can defeat any combination of the Arab states against it even without U.S. support. Maybe this is our mistake, having made them so powerful. One strike by Begin could provide ten years of security for Israel. The Camp David process has solved some problems, true. We do not intend to drive Israel into self-defeating military action. Fahd understands this but also knows the consequences if we fail.

38. Vrhovec then said there had very clearly been a useful exchange. We have addressed very important questions. We all must try to contribute to solving these complex and dangerous problems, seizing every opportunity. Haig said his Berlin speech would set a tone intended to recognize the unity and direction in Western Europe, and address some of the confusions that seem to be present there. He also said he wanted Vrhovec to know that the U.S. is aware and has proof of use of toxic weapons in Afghanistan. Vrhovec asked if documents would be published on this. Haig said they would be on Monday¹⁷ and there would be more than documents. Our evidence that thousands may well have been murdered in Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Laos would be provided to the U.N.

Stoessel

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary Haig and Shultz Memcons, 1981–1986, Lot 87 D 327, SEC/Memcons—September 1981. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Harry Dunlop; cleared by Alvin Adams (S/S), Nancy DeGumbia (S/S-O), Anthony Wayne (S), and Richard Erdman (S/S–O); approved by Eagleburger. Haig was in Yugoslavia for an official visit on September 12 and 13. According to an attached Executive Secretariat cover sheet, Haig’s meeting took place on September 12 from 5:30 to 7:20 p.m. at the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs. The cover sheet listed the participants, the subjects discussed, the action commitments, and the follow-up needed. (Ibid.)
2. Eagleburger was Ambassador to Yugoslavia from June 21, 1977, to January 24, 1981.
3. Haig was in Cancun from July 31 to August 2 to attend the Foreign Ministers preliminary meeting for the International Meeting on Cooperation and Development.
4. See the text of the statement on terrorism, July 20, in Public Papers: Reagan, 1981, p. 637.
5. September 15 or 16.
6. Haig was Supreme Allied Commander Europe from December 1974 to July 1979.
7. Haig and Gromyko met during the UN General Assembly. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Documents 88–91.
8. Haig traveled to West Berlin on September 13 to address the Berlin Press Association. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Documents 60 and 61.
9. See the President’s remarks on October 2, which are printed in Public Papers: Reagan, 1981, pp. 878–880.
10. U.S.-Soviet negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces began on November 30 in Geneva.
11. September 3–9, 1979.
12. February 9–13, 1981.
13. The text of the resolution is printed in the UN Yearbook, 1978, pp. 915–916.
14. Haig and Fahd met in Marbella, Spain, on September 12.
15. For additional information on the Camp David Peace Process, see Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.
16. Additional information on UN Security Council Resolution 242 is in the UN Yearbook, 1967, pp. 225–258.
17. September 14.