Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

178. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State¹

2606.

Bucharest, April 7, 1988, 1501Z

SUBJECT

• Eastern Europe; Perspective from Bucharest.

REF

• A) State 52978,²
• B) 87 State 398186.³

1. (C—Entire text)

2. Summary: We have been reluctant to join the discussion, as Romania is dancing to a very different tune from the rest of Eastern Europe, and we agree with much of what has been said. Now that some differences of view have cropped up, however, we want to add a comment from our rather special vantage point. In sum, we feel the U.S. should have an activist policy in Eastern Europe—within the limits of our possibilities and priorities. We should identify ourselves with and encourage the strong forces for change already at work, while continuing to deal with existing governments to the extent necessary to get the things we need from them. End summary.

3. We start from the conviction that the reduction and eventual elimination of Soviet control over Eastern Europe is in the U.S. interest. It would reduce Soviet military power to move Soviet military forces back within Soviet borders and to decrease the Eastern European countries’ military cooperation with the USSR. It would help open the way for closer economic and diplomatic ties with the West. It would correspond to the wishes of the people of the area. Some argue that reduced Soviet control would heighten instability. It is true that it would permit more open intra-East European rivalries. But the present situation—Soviet hegemony imposed on hostile peoples—contains greater potential for world crisis.

4. We also start from the conviction that long-term historical trends are working against Soviet control over Eastern Europe—the day of multinational empires is past. Contemporary developments—economic, social, informational and technological—are reinforcing the long-term historical trends. Gorbachev’s new approach recognizes and reinforces these developments. It is likely that there will be retrogressions as the process unfolds—and we must be prepared for them. But the long-term trend is clear, and the present environment is particularly promising.

5. We therefore feel that the U.S. should take a basically activist approach. We foresee, as does London,⁴ that the amount of resources we devote to the task will be quite limited and that our approach and the priority we give it will vary from one administration—or even year—to the next. The basic impetus for reform and independence will come from the objective forces at work and from within the societies involved. Our actions will be only a supplement, and should be planned as such. But that does not mean they are worthless.

6. Budapest has outlined a number of areas where we can act and a catalogue of measures we can take.⁵ Budapest quite rightly puts the emphasis on measures to associate the U.S. with the “peoples” of the area, with the “new forces” in society. The U.S. has an extraordinarily positive image in Eastern Europe among reformers and the population as a whole. The impact of our radio broadcasts and contacts is especially great among information-hungry peoples. We believe Budapest’s thoughtful compilation provides a good take-off point for developing a program for each country, attuned to local problems and opportunities and to changing U.S. political and budgetary realities.

7. A more controversial aspect, underscored by London, is our relationship to the present governments. One is tempted—especially in Bucharest—to have little or nothing to do with them as a demonstration to their peoples, and ourselves, of what we think of them, and to confine our contacts to stern demarches.

8. We pay a price when we distance ourselves, however. These governments are the current decision-makers. If we want anything, we have to get it from them, be it cooperation on narcotics or terrorism, access to officials or non-officials, space for an exhibit, or progress on human rights. We feel this particularly keenly right now in Bucharest, for the GOR has been tightening up in recent weeks following their denunciation of MFN. We are losing our access to persons and institutions; warning signals are up on our sizeable cultural program; and we expect a decline in emigration to the U.S. (we have a backlog of over 2,700 qualified persons wishing to enter the U.S.). Our experience underscores the fact that local government cooperation, or at least acquiescence, is essential to any program, and certainly to the measures outlined by Budapest. We see no way to get such acquiescence through pressure alone, or ostracism.

9. There is another aspect. Governments in Eastern Europe—even traditional ones—have the power to change their policies. It is important to avoid the impression that any of these regimes is considered “hopeless” and to keep some channels of communication open in case they want to use them. Having channels and programs in place is important also to our ability to expand our activities under successor regimes. Furthermore, even if the governments as a whole are not reform-minded, individuals within them may turn out to be. We should focus our dialogue on such individuals, to the extent we can do so without harming them. But we probably will not know who many of these individuals are. The broader our contacts with the government are, the greater the chances of including the “sleepers” will be.

10. Our conclusion is that we should deal with all the East European governments; consult with them on matters where they are important to us; use these channels to express our point of view on internal reform and human rights; and be sure we get something in return for any favors we do.

Kirk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880297–0595. Confidential. Sent for information to CSCE Collective.
2. Telegram 52978 from the Department of State, February 20, was a follow-up to Telegram 398186 From the Department of State, December 24, 1987, and requested that countries which had not yet responded do so. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880663–0213)
3. See Document 52.
4. Telegram 6227 from London, March 18, conveyed the Embassy’s response to Telegram 398186. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880236–0326)
5. See Document 343.