Office of the Historian

177. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State1

1682.
Bucharest, March 7, 1988, 1237Z

SUBJECT

  • Popular Reaction to MFN Renunciation.
1.
Confidential—Entire text.
2.
Summary: One week after the MFN announcement,2 the Romanian public’s reaction is still somewhat mixed. There is still only an imperfect understanding of what actually has happened and of who did what to whom. However, almost all Romanians with whom we have spoken are glad that the U.S. no longer appears to be endorsing the unpopular leadership here. We have picked up considerable anger at Ceausescu, who in this view has once again shown his stupidity. The comment that “the man is crazy” is widespread. Only those who are looking to emigrate have evinced any concern over negative consequences of the MFN decision, and even some of them are philosophical about their situation. While one Chinese diplomat told us the Soviets are probably reacting with pleasure, the initial reaction we have gotten thus far would indicate that, to the contrary, Romanians are pleased that the U.S. has contributed to a further isolating of Ceausescu. End summary.
3.
The news of the MFN decision, now a week old, came out initially in imperfect fashion. The story of the U.S. announcement on February 26 first came via brief foreign radio broadcasts. The fact that it was the U.S. announcing a Romanian Government decision left some Romanians puzzled at first. The uncertainty was then compounded when the official GOR statement appeared on February 27 and, intentionally or otherwise, painted a slightly different picture of how events had unfolded. Even now, a week later, many Romanians still think it was the U.S. that has withdrawn MFN, rather than the Romanians who renounced it.
4.
Among those who do understand that it was a Romanian move, there has been some disappointment that we did not act first. One Romanian told us, “The match is one to nothing in their favor.” Most non-official Romanians with whom we have spoken, however, are less interested in who started the current process than in the fact of the apparent U.S.-Romanian tiff. The most immediate response we have gotten, from a number of Romanians, is that once more their leader has blundered. A few have shown genuine anger that Ceausescu would endanger what they view as valued relations with the United States. One Romanian, listening with PolOff to a West German Romanian-language broadcast describing the consequences on Romanian trade caused by MFN termination, expressed dismay when the possible effect on each trade figure was announced.
5.
More common, however, has been the comment that “the man is crazy.” One FSN, recalling the extraordinary efforts Ceausescu has always shown to increase Romanian exports and the importance of the U.S. market to those exports, said he appears to have forgotten his previous statements. Others have been more blunt, using terms such as “foolish” and “insane” to describe both their President and his action.
6.
Those who have shown more moderation in their reactions have understandably been the Romanians with emigration applications pending. Nelu Prodan, Baptist activist lawyer who had hoped to emigrate after his brief imprisonment last December, told us he now believes his chances were zero (Comment: We are not sure we share that view), but said he accepted the situation. Not all prospective emigrants have been as philosophical; only a few inquiries have come to the Consular Section so far, but most callers have shown considerable concern over their prospects.
7.
So far, speculation on the international implications of the MFN announcement has been confined to our colleagues in the diplomatic corps. A Chinese diplomat, analyzing the effects of Ceausescu’s decision, said, “The Soviets must be pleased,” and added he hoped the U.S. had considered this aspect before making its February 26 announcement.
8.
Comment: The reaction of non-official Romanians is still tentative, and could evolve over the coming weeks if they see a more direct impact on their own lives. So far, that impact has been minimal for most Romanians. Thus, they have had the luxury to use it as another excuse for their favorite sport: making fun of Ceausescu. In that sense, we would differ with our Chinese counterpart’s estimate. If anything, Romanians are glad that greater distance has opened up between the U.S. and Romania, and are pleased to have one more occasion to engage, albeit privately, in Ceausescu-bashing.
9.
Moscow minimize considered.
Kirk
  1. Source: Reagan Library, Rudolf Perina Files, Subject File, Romania—MFN (2). Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Eastern European posts, Moscow, Beijing, and Vienna for the delegation to the CSCE.↩
  2. For the text of the February 26 announcement, see Department of State Bulletin, May 1988, p. 43.↩