Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

170. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State¹

88.

Bucharest, January 7, 1988, 0925Z

SUBJECT

• Ethnic Hungarian Views on Current Situation in Romania.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary: Geza Domokos (please protect, strictly—hereafter referred to as “source”), a leading ethnic Hungarian intellectual and former Central Committee member, offered views on the internal situation in Romania in a January 3 conversation with PolChief. Source noted that although Brasov² had been a shock to party members generally, there was no wavering in the small circle around Ceausescu. Ceausescu himself is oblivious to how low the country’s reputation has sunk, and still thinks himself clever—and impressing the West—when he shows a little independence from Moscow. The general population is pleased with Brasov, and there have been isolated incidents of protest since then, but source said that until Romanians developed some more established means of communicating among themselves, e.g. through samizdat, there is little chance of more organized protest against the regime. Source said he anticipated a tough crackdown on any sign of protest in the months to come, and said the regime may be cranking up the anti-Hungarian propaganda machine to distract the public’s attention. He noted that although Romanian intellectuals see through the regime’s diversionary tactics, anti-Hungarian propaganda still influences most Romanians. He strongly urged the U.S. to withdraw MFN from Romania, which he said would be an important political blow to the regime. Pol Chief countered—and we continue to believe—that MFN gives us greater access both to the GOR, inter alia to argue many of the human rights positions that source supports, and to elements disaffected from the regime. End summary.

3. The party post-Brasov. Source said there continued to be disarray among the Communist Party rank-and-file in the wake of Brasov, but not among the elements that count. The small circle of advisers around Ceausescu—his wife Elena, Emil Bobu, and a handful of others—are as unwavering as ever in their support of the current policy line. As far as he knows, source said, there is nobody speaking out in favor of different policies. In addition, new Interior Minister Postelnicu is too close to the Ceausescus to offer anything but blind loyalty. He said there are some signs that Securitate troops have begun to feel the impact of the poor economic situation, but not so much that they would present any danger to the regime.

4. Still living in a dream world. Source said Ceausescu has no idea of how low the country’s reputation has sunk. One indicator is the cavalier manner in which he rejected West German offers of humanitarian aid in December. Nor does he know how bad off the population is: source said Ceausescu in recent days had offered food and medicine to help the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip, thereby acting as if Romania had the supplies to spare. Source said Ceausescu still believes that he impresses the West when he makes little gestures of independence from Moscow. He doesn’t realize the Soviet Union now has a more positive image in the West, and that his small gestures of independence on issues on which the West is more in agreement with Gorbachev than with him cause him to lose points.

5. Increased popular pride, but no coordination. Source said the population is proud of the Brasov disturbances, and added he expected more protests, if on a smaller scale, through the winter. He confirmed a rumor Embassy had picked up earlier of a fire in the Scinteia publishing house on 12/15. Source said he had seen the fire burning, and said some disgruntled employees had set fire to a pile of newspapers presumably because they contained Ceausescu’s speech of the previous day to the opening of the Communist Party Conference.

6. However, source continued, incidents of protest would only seriously threaten the regime if there were widespread coordination among them. Securitate does a very good job making sure that potentially troublesome elements do not talk to each other. Source lamented the absence of any kind of “samizdat” in Romania, adding that until such a system developed, he saw little prospect for any kind of broad protest.

7. Source said he expected authorities to be much tougher with any dissidence for a while now. He noted that police were being especially efficient at present, and had called him in for questioning when he attended a holiday diplomatic function at the Hungarian Embassy. He said the regime appeared to be warming up another anti-Hungarian campaign, and noted a recent article by military historian (and Presidential brother) Ilie Ceausescu whitch was particularly vitriolic against Hungary.³ (Comment: He may have been referring to an October, 1987 article in a historical review which does go on at length about the “crimes” of the Horthyist elements against Romanians.) Source said the anti-Hungarian line could have been predicted, since organizing diversionary tactics is the standard reaction of the regime when it has internal worries. He noted that most Romanian intellectuals see such diversions for what they are, and pay no attention. However, the average Romanian, i.e. the majority of the population, still reacts positively to such “rally round the flag” appeals. One consequence would be a further slippage in the status and rights of the Hungarian minority, source noted resignedly.

8. Asked what the U.S. reaction to the current Romanian situation should be, Geza responded immediately, “You must withdraw MFN.” He said the economic impact of such a move would probably be small, but argued the political effect on the regime would be powerful. He said “any Romanian you talk to” will say the U.S. should withdraw MFN. PolChief argued that MFN allowed the U.S. to help individuals in Romania, but source dismissed such reasoning. (Comment: We continue to feel that the presence of MFN allows us greater access both to dissident elements and to the GOR itself, giving us opportunities to make many of the same points—for example on the status of minorities—that source wants to see defended. Moreover, source may have been speaking for many Romanians in insisting that he wants to see MFN withdrawn, but opinion is far from unanimous on the subject.)

9. Comment: Source’s comments on conditions in Romania strike us as generally on the mark, in particular in his cautionary notes regarding the impact of Brasov on either the circle around Ceausescu or the prospects of wider protest. We too would expect some increase in anti-Hungarian propaganda as a diversionary tactic, but would have expected to see more of it by now than just one article in October, 1987 by Ceausescu’s brother.⁴ On the other hand, Romanian observers have noted to us what they saw as a harsher tone on minorities in Ceausescu’s speech to the Communist Party Conference on December 14 of last year (see 87 Bucharest 10241).⁵

Clarke

1. Source: Reagan Library, Rudolf Perina Files, Subject File, Romania—Substance 1987 (4). Confidential; Priority. Sent Priority for information to Budapest.
2. Reference is to the demonstrations in Brasov in November 1987. See footnote 2, Document 167.
3. An unknown hand underlined this sentence.
4. An unknown hand underlined this sentence.
5. Telegram 10241 from Bucharest, December 15, 1987, summarized Ceausescu’s report to the Communist Party Conference. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, D871026–0234)