Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

154. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania¹

169512.

Washington, June 3, 1987, 1543Z

SUBJECT

• MFN Renewal: Simons/Gavrilescu Meeting.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. EUR DAS Thomas Simons called in Romanian Ambassador Nicolae Gavrilescu, June 2, to advise him that the President had decided to renew Romania’s MFN status for another year and had transmitted the MFN waiver determination to the Congress. Simons gave Gavrilescu the text of the White House announcement of the decision and a copy of the President’s report to the Congress, and urged that the Ambassador and the GOR study them carefully.²

3. Simons said the MFN decision had been very difficult for the administration. He said that we had just gone through what probably was the most intensive review of the issue since we began the MFN relationship with Romania over a decade ago. He pointed out that the White House announcement mentioned that all the options for dealing with the issue had been considered, and Simons stressed that this was accurate. He confirmed that the possibility of MFN suspension was looked at seriously, but that in the end, after a searching examination, we had opted for renewal as the most beneficial course for both countries. Now, he continued, we face a very tough job over the next three months defending the decision before the Congress.

4. Simons noted that for a long time we have been telling the Romanians that we needed to work together on problems on a year-round basis. Yet again this year, all was left for the last moments. The “goods” (marfa) were once again saved up and dumped on the American market late to push MFN over the barricade again. Only recently, he said, had there been enough Romanian movement to enable us to make a positive decision on renewal. Simons said GOR actions fed the perception in the U.S. that Romania cynically attempted to manipulate the MFN renewal process each year. This general impression of GOR cynicism quite aside from individual issues, is itself now part of the problem. What was needed, he said, was a steady pattern of GOR actions responsive to U.S. concerns throughout the year, rather than hoarding all actions until the MFN “season.”

5. Gavrilescu thanked Simons for the copies of the announcement and the report and said he would review them before commenting specifically. He said he appreciated the administration’s good judgment in going ahead with renewal which would be beneficial for bilateral relations. He said that it was not in either countries interest to “go through a divorce.” Gavrilescu acknowledged that the next few months might see a tough struggle in the Congress, but he said the outcome would depend “more on others than on us.” He said he believed that there were many strong elements in the U.S.-Romanian relationship which gave him hope for the future.

6. Simons responded that he also wanted to be optimistic about bilateral relations in the years ahead. He said that we believed good relations benefitted both countries. We recognized that trade was an important element of our overall relationship and that MFN was the key to trade development. Thus we worked hard to preserve MFN. However, he continued, the administration fully shared the concerns expressed in the Congress and the public over the human rights situation in Romania. He said it was a mistake for the GOR to think that concern over Romanian human rights policies and practices was limited to a few ill-intentioned individuals or groups. The concern was genuine and widespread, and evident even among those who worked to better bilateral relations.

7. Moreover, Simons said, there is a general difficulty caused by the overall state of the country as program to repay foreign debt continues. GOR itself recognizes difficulties—DepFonMin Solomonescu had referred to “crisis” in Ambassador Kirk’s initial call, and this is thus GOR rather than U.S. description—so it is not interference in Romania’s internal affairs to point to it and mention hardship it causes. He urged Gavrilescu to study Commerce DepSec Brown’s presentation at the April Joint Economic Commission meeting in Bucharest, which expressed USG view that debt repayment program has made so much progress that GOR can well afford to adopt a more growth-oriented economic strategy calling for imports as well as exports. Simons said his comments on these points were informal and not a demarche, but said his own impression was that many specific issues that arise in our relations are particular expressions of this general problem.

8. Finally, objecting to Gavrilescu’s comment, Simons stated that continuance of MFN did not/not depend primarily on “others.” He stressed that the GOR needs to take the kinds of actions on emigration and other human rights issues that would meet U.S. concerns. Gavrilescu said he understood action by both sides is required.

9. Comment: Gavrilescu and notetaker Dumitru seemed genuinely relieved by decision. Simons’ comments were intended to eliminate natural temptation to slip back after period of justified anxiety into nonchalance.

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Records from Ambassador Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Lot 03 D 256, Chron, May 1987. Confidential; Immediate. Sent Priority for information to the delegation to the CSCE; sent for information to Budapest. Drafted by Schlamm; cleared by Wenick and Lang; approved by Simons.
2. See Public Papers: Reagan, 1987, Book I, pp. 600–603.