Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

153. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State¹

4355.

Bucharest, June 2, 1987, 0635Z

SUBJECT

• Romanian Reactions to U.S. Policy on Hungarian Minority in Romania.

REF

• State 134330 (Notal).²

1. C—Entire text

2. Summary: A regular Romanian contact has given us views that clearly originated from official sources on U.S. policy toward the Hungarian minority, keyed to specific points in DAS Simons’ May 5 congressional testimony. His main points were that the issue is solely an internal one, and that U.S. linkage of the issue to MFN would be completely unacceptable. End summary.

3. Following a luncheon conversation on a variety of subjects May 18, Romania Libera writer Nicolae Lupu gave DCM a prepared commentary on DAS Thomas Simons’ statement to the CSCE Commission hearing on Hungarian minorities on May 5 (Ref). Lupu had brought along an annotated copy of the text, and although he cited no specific governmental or party authority, it was clear that he was conveying an authorized yet technically ‘‘unofficial” position. Lupu has retired from his editorial and managerial responsibilities at Romania Libera, but continues to contribute commentaries on foreign affairs to the newspaper.

4. Lupu began by saying that there were a number of points in the Simons testimony with which Romania had no quarrel. He said they appreciated U.S. Government statements that the Hungarian minority issue is not a territorial question. They appreciated that the USG did not wish to interfere, and saw no advantage in doing so. They fully agreed that the matter was a very sensitive one for those involved.

5. Romanians also appreciated the thought that questions of the history of Transylvania were also not questions for U.S. policy, Lupu said. But he saw numerous problems arising even in addressing historical questions. DCM interjected that he thought Romania should welcome Simons’ comments, brief as they were, on the errors in historical facts which were being bandied around Congress, some even reflected in draft resolutions. DCM said that the Foreign Ministry had often pressed the U.S. Government to make clear statements in response to factual errors about Romanian conditions and policies generally, and in this case the State Department was being helpful to the debate. Certainly there were pitfalls in addressing a historical subject, without making a policy issue of it, but in this case some members of Congress had already made the history of Transylvania a part of the issue. DCM said he was sure that the Department would not allow itself to be drawn into a running debate about history.

6. What Romania did not agree with, Lupu continued, was Simons’ statement that the minority question in Transylvania was a matter for the two governments (Hungary and Romania) to resolve between them. Romania felt strongly that it was alone responsible for dealing with the question.

7. Lupu emphasized that there was no way in which Romania would accept a linkage between the minority issue and MFN. He realized that U.S. policy included concern for human rights, but he saw a great danger to U.S.-Romanian relations in discussing the Hungarian question in Transylvania in conjunction with debates on MFN.

8. Romania disagreed that the Hungarian minority question was one of fundamental human rights, Lupu continued. Denying that any repression of Hungarians could be documented, he disagreed with the phrase in the testimony that minority groups had suffered disproportionately in Romania. Access to Hungarian language in schools was declining for natural and budgetary reasons, not discrimination, he said, disagreeing with DCM’s stated impression that reductions in Hungarian classes were disproportionate. Romania would never accept that there was a problem specific to the Hungarians in Romania, because the problems are the same for everybody. Lupu reminded DCM of an earlier conversation in which he had discussed the sacrifices being imposed throughout the country, insisting that the cultural costs to Hungarians were not disproportionate.

9. Lupu professed not to understand why the U.S. expected Romania to agree to joint Embassy Budapest/Bucharest trips in Transylvania. This could set a precedent for joint Soviet/Hungarian trips there, which Romania would never accept. When he asked rhetorically how the Soviets would react to joint travel in the USSR, DCM pointed out that Embassy Bucharest had sent a Romanian speaking officer with a Moscow EmbOff on a joint trip in Soviet Moldavia (December 1985). The trip had been very valuable for a balanced understanding of the situation of Romanian speakers there; one conclusion had been that religious life on the Romanian side of the border was healthier than in the USSR.

10. DCM recalled that Lupu had questioned an RFE report of Ambassador Palmer’s remarks to the World Jewish Congress in Budapest on the minority issue. DCM said he had checked with Embassy Budapest and was convinced that Ambassador Palmer’s comments, which also supported MFN for Romania, were completely consistent with other Department statements on the issue. Lupu back-pedalled quickly, saying he was sure Ambassador Palmer knew the situation well. Lupu then grumbled that RFE had reported comments from different sources on the subject at the same time and perhaps thus had given a more negative impression of USG views.

11. At the end of the meeting Lupu returned to the point he considered most important: U.S.-Romanian bilateral relations must remain separate from the Hungarian minority question. The U.S. should avoid encouraging tendencies which would undermine Romania’s independence and integrity. He urged that the U.S. Government be very careful not to slip into a damaging downward spiral in relations over this issue.

12. Comment. Apparently GOR preferred to pass on these specific reactions through an unofficial channel, thereby emphasizing their hope that the Hungarian minority issue not burden our bilateral relationship. The views are, of course, consistent with those of Foreign Ministry and other officials. The one seeming divergence—about the desirability of USG comments on the history of Transylvania—probably just reflects general GOR hypersensitivity on this issue in place of the more nuanced understanding of the U.S. political system we usually get from our MFA counterparts. Lupu has long had a special interest in U.S.-Romanian relations and we have found him to be very consistent in conveying GOR views, with little or no personal interpretation. This time he did not even pretend that the views were his own. End comment.

Clarke

1. Source: Department of State, Records from Ambassador Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Lot 03 D 256, Chron, May 1987. Confidential. Sent for information to Budapest, Prague, Vienna, Munich, and Moscow (by pouch).
2. See footnote 2, Document 151.