Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe

129. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 27, 1984, 11:35 a.m.–12:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Mr. McFarlane’s Meeting with the Foreign Minister of Romania, Stefan Andrei (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Paula Dobriansky, NSC
• Thomas A. Lynch, State/Romanian Desk Officer (Notetaker)
• Stefan Andrei, Foreign Minister of Romania
• Mircea Malitza, Romanian Ambassador, Washington
• Constantin Ghirla, Foreign Ministry, Romania

Mr. McFarlane opened by saying that he had spoken with the President before the meeting;² the President asked him to convey his personal welcome and to mention specifically his admiration for the courage and independence of Romanian foreign policy. Mr. McFarlane said that he wished Foreign Minister Andrei could have seen how moved the President was over the entry of the Romanian team in the Olympics stadium in Los Angeles. These feelings go beyond the Olympics to examples of Romanian ideas on East-West relations. The President believes we should encourage this kind of leadership. He has hopes and ideas for substantially expanding U.S.-Romanian political and economic relations over the next four years. The President wants to get Romanian ideas on how to foster better East-West and bilateral relations, and to give his thoughts on how to generate a serious dialogue with the Soviets. (S)

Foreign Minister Andrei said he had talked with President Ceausescu before leaving Bucharest. There are no serious problems to raise in light of the confident bilateral climate. There are problems with export licenses: Romania hopes the U.S. can do something to make its export licensing policy more harmonious with its policies toward Eastern Europe. The U.S. has good licensing relationships with China—dating from the Nixon years—and Yugoslavia. Romania believes this is as it should be. The Foreign Minister expressed appreciation that President Reagan received Vice President Manea Manescu during a very busy period.³ This is symbolic of good U.S.-Romanian relations. However, Romania wants to develop relations further as suggested by President Ceausescu’s June 25 letter⁴ which referred to technology and licenses. (S)

At this point, Foreign Minister Andrei said that the U.S.-Soviet relationship has special importance for determining the international climate. He saw Gromyko yesterday; Gromyko said he would work to assure detente, to further disarmament discussions, and to create an atmosphere for a Reagan-Chernenko meeting after the U.S. elections. That, Andrei said, was the message Gromyko give him. Andrei said Gromyko was reticent about the President’s UNGA speech⁵ and meeting with Secretary Shultz.⁶ Andrei observed that the Soviet system is cumbersome and suffers from inertia. Small boats, he said, can change direction more quickly than large ships. Changes in the U.S. course were evident at CDE in January 1984 and in statements by the President. The Soviets need encouragement in changing their course. (S)

It seemed to him that there were three elements in current U.S.-Soviet relations:

— The Soviets put considerable emphasis on non-militarization of outer space.

— There is the question of the manner in which the U.S. approaches the Soviets.

— There is the issue of strategic and INF forces, and countermeasures. Andrei gave a summary of the INF proposals contained in Ceausescu’s June 25 letter, noting that the objective was elimination of medium-range missiles from Europe. The Romanian view, he said, is that a U.S.-Soviet accord is necessary but must not come at the expense of other states: he summarized the basic principles of Romanian policy including the need for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the right to self-determination, regardless of social system. (S)

Andrei emphasized the importance of style in Romania’s relationships with Eastern countries: Romania started from the premise that it was normal to participate in the Olympics. Similarly, Bucharest did not react to cancellations of the Honecker and Zhivkov visits to Bonn as cause for reanalysis of Ceausescu’s visit to Bonn. Romania did not go back and wait for a green light. At this time, Andrei asked specifically what was discussed in the Shultz-Gromyko meeting. (S)

Mr. McFarlane said that the Secretary had reported the agenda was much the same as in previous meetings, with discussion of regional conflicts: Africa, Central America. There was no change on either side. A lot of time had been spent on arms control. Gromyko had taken the view that the U.S. was responsible for the current impasse. The Secretary had told him the President felt it was important to renew talks. The President would have more to say about this tomorrow.⁷ The U.S., Mr. McFarlane remarked, is ready to talk about space systems. The problem is priorities: there are thousands of land-based offensive systems already in existence, while space systems have not been deployed, yet. We want limits on space systems now. (S)

Mr. McFarlane then went on to say with regard to INF, we appreciate that Romania’s position is not the same as the Soviet position. We continued to talk while the Soviets deployed SS-20s in significant numbers. Then we deployed, and they stopped talks. As long as they insist on having long-term theater nuclear forces while we would have none, there would be no balance. We have reviewed our position and we have new ideas. But we cannot accept that a ten-to-one imbalance in INF is acceptable. (S)

On strategic systems, Mr. McFarlane said we have some new ideas the Soviets don’t know about yet. We have tried to find a way to re-activate dialogue on space, INF, and strategic systems. (S)

Foreign Minister Andrei asked if these subjects could be linked. (S)

Mr. McFarlane replied that we would be prepared to consider addressing START and INF together. We have separate delegations now, but we would be prepared to consider it. (S)

Mr. McFarlane also commented that the President will state tomorrow that the Soviet Union is a superpower and we do not challenge that fact. He will refer to travel restrictions, trade, and other questions, and point out that if the superpowers understand their responsibilities, they should get back to the conference table. Some people have said we do not respect the Soviets or that we want superiority. That isn’t so. We hope that once the President has stated these realities the Soviets will be able to meet with us. (S)

On bilateral issues, Mr. McFarlane said the President believes there is a real opportunity for expanded U.S.-Romanian trade. Frankly, he said, there is one stumbling block which we need to overcome. As we move into higher technology areas, there are naturally concerns that the technology will benefit the Soviet Union. Regardless of the realities that we understand, this perception will create impediments in Congress and the Executive Branch. Mr. McFarlane said the President had asked him to underscore his admiration for Ceausescu’s visit to the FRG, and his appreciation of the leadership and courage involved. (S)

Foreign Minister Andrei indicated that with regard to licenses, Romania respects its commitments. Ambassador Malitza reported to Bucharest about the problem of developing reassurances that technology would not be diverted. Andrei said the Romanian side is ready to consider, through discussions with the Department of State, steps Romania could take to satisfy U.S. concerns about diversion. (S)

Asked about events in the Middle East, Mr. McFarlane asserted that the popular wisdom is that no more progress is possible, but the President intends to pursue his proposal of two years ago very forcefully. We have talked with the parties; they have many complaints, but it is in their self-interest to arrive at a compromise based on peace in exchange for territory. Mr. McFarlane said he was encouraged by the re-establishment of relations between Jordan and Egypt, and by our dialogue with Syria. He was more pessimistic about prospects for Lebanon’s finding a stable leadership. We feel progress can be made on the Syrian-Israeli side, and we will try. (S)

Foreign Minister Andrei pointed out that Romania has relations with all states in the area, and contacts with the PLO. Ceausescu talked with the many regional leaders who went to the August 23rd celebrations in Bucharest. Despite its previous support for the Camp David approach, Andrei said, Romania believes it is no longer practical to employ a step-by-step, country-by-country approach in trying to settle problems between Israel and its neighbors. Lebanon is a broader, regional problem. Romania favors an international conference on the Middle East: Ceausescu made this proposal three years before Brezhnev did. Romania believes a basic factor is that it is not possible to arrive at a Middle East accord without talks with the Soviets. As has been obvious over recent years, the USSR has an important role in Syria. Also, there is discontent—even among America’s friends in the region such as Jordan and Kuwait—that U.S. policies are too closely aligned with Israel. The new Israeli government might be more capable to progress on peace issues. Romania is working to encourage Egypt’s acceptance and role in the Arab world. A Palestinian solution is important: Romania has long believed there is a need for a single representative of the Palestinian people, and has dealt with the PLO. Unity of the PLO is important: terrorism, especially if reinforced by religious extremism, would result from divisions in the Palestinian movement. (S)

Mr. McFarlane said Foreign Minister Andrei’s perspective reflects a longstanding and active interest in the situation. Romania’s balance on Israeli emigration has given it credibility. He agreed that the new Israeli government might have more latitude if Likud and Labor could harmonize their views on West Bank issues. The Middle East is a tough problem: harder than arms control. Mr. McFarlane said he had a sense that the Saudis want an end to it. (S)

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, Romania (09/05/1984–09/28/1984). Secret. The meeting took place in the West Wing of the White House.
2. Minutes from this meeting were not found.
3. September 25, 9:40–9:51 a.m., in the Oval Office.
4. See Document 125.
5. Reagan addressed the UN General Assembly on September 24. See Public Papers: Reagan, 1984, Book II, pp. 1355–1361. See also Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 206.
6. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985. Documents 284 and 285.
7. Reagan’s radio address to the nation is printed in Public Papers: Reagan, 1984, Book II, pp. 1393–1394.