86. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
403. For Secretary Shultz from Jack Matlock. Subject: Bessmertnykh on Secretary’s Meeting with Gorbachev.
1. (S—Entire text.)
2. On the margins of a lunch for Dick Solomon today, Bessmertnykh (strictly protect) made the following “purely private” observations about our Friday meeting with Gorbachev:2
—The meeting did not go “as planned”—with implication that Soviets had planned for a date to be set.
—He claimed that Gorbachev drew a hasty conclusion from the absence of an agreement on “key principles” in your list of summit agenda items as evidence that U.S. has rejected the idea of such an outcome. Gorbachev, he said, was not expecting absolute [garble] race, but only an indication that U.S. is committed to try to work out such an agreement.
—All options are genuinely open, with a summit this year a real possibility.
—Drafting of Gorbachev’s letter to the President “has started” and it should be delivered “in a few days”.3
—Soviets are “satisfied” with substantive results of the meeting.
[Page 487]—Aim of Soviet position is not to “kill” SDI, but to establish some predictability. Furthermore, current positions are still negotiable.
3. Bessmertnykh asked me, in light of the above, to “try to persuade Washington” not to make statements which would in effect, lock the Soviets into a given position. He said that they had been careful in their own statements not to burn any bridges. He also said what they were pleased with the way you handled the issues in your press conference here. His worry, he said, was that others in Washington might make statements which would make it more difficult for the Soviets to repair what he clearly understands is a major blunder on Gorbachev’s part.
4. I, of course, explained to Bessmertnykh the severe damage which on appearance of using the summit date to pressure the President could inflict on our relations.
4. Comment: Bessmertnykh, of course, has some axes to grind and I do not take his explanations as gospel. However, I am struck by Soviet efforts to put your meetings in a favorable light, and believe that there may in fact be efforts underway here to repair the damage. In particular, we probably should refrain at this time from characterizing Soviet policy as out to “kill SDI”. This may turn out to be the case. But to date the evidence is far from conclusive.
- Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, 1987 Oct. 26 Mtg w/the PRES. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Alpha.↩
- October 23; see Document 84.↩
- See Document 88.↩